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a convenient analogy but represents the convergence of 
two phenomena as profound and consequential as each 
other, where the online world now provides a home for the 
migrant workers who feel otherwise ‘homeless’.
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vIntroduction to the series Why We Post
This book is one of a series of 11 titles. Nine are monographs devoted to 
specific field sites (including this one) in Brazil, Chile, China, England, 
India, Italy, Trinidad and Turkey  – they will be published in 2016– 17. 
The series also includes a comparative book about all our findings, pub-
lished to accompany this title, and a book which contrasts the visuals 
that people post on Facebook in the English field site with those on our 
Trinidadian field site.
When we tell people that we have written nine monographs about 
social media around the world, all using the same chapter headings 
(apart from Chapter 5), they are concerned about potential repetition. 
However, if you decide to read several of these books (and we very much 
hope you do), you will see that this device has been helpful in showing 
the precise opposite. Each book is as individual and distinct as if it were 
on an entirely different topic.
This is perhaps our single most important finding. Most studies 
of the internet and social media are based on research methods that 
assume we can generalise across different groups. We look at tweets in 
one place and write about ‘Twitter’. We conduct tests about social media 
and friendship in one population, and then write on this topic as if 
friendship means the same thing for all populations. By presenting nine 
books with the same chapter headings, you can judge for yourselves 
what kinds of generalisations are, or are not, possible.
Our intention is not to evaluate social media, either positively or 
negatively. Instead the purpose is educational, providing detailed evi-
dence of what social media has become in each place and the local con-
sequences, including local evaluations.
Each book is based on 15 months of research during which time 
the anthropologists lived, worked and interacted with people in the 
local language. Yet they differ from the dominant tradition of writing 
social science books. Firstly they do not engage with the academic lit-
eratures on social media. It would be highly repetitive to have the same 
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discussions in all nine books. Instead discussions of these literatures 
are to be found in our comparative book, How the World Changed Social 
Media. Secondly these monographs are not comparative, which again is 
the primary function of this other volume. Thirdly, given the immense 
interest in social media from the general public, we have tried to write in 
an accessible and open style. This means we have adopted a mode more 
common in historical writing of keeping all citations and the discussion 
of all wider academic issues to endnotes.
We hope you enjoy the results and that you will also read our com-
parative book – and perhaps some of the other monographs – in addition 
to this one.
INTRODUC T ION TO THE SER I E S WHY WE POST
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Introduction
In the decades since the de facto Chinese leader Deng Xiao Ping ended the 
cultural revolution and opened up the economy towards more capitalist 
forces, China has witnessed the largest ever human migration.1 Such an 
unprecedented flow of labour from China’s rural interior to more coastal 
factories and cities has resulted in vast economic growth, urbanisation 
and the proliferation of labour- intensive industries. In 2015 the number 
of Chinese peasants who had left their hometowns to work in these fac-
tories had risen to 277.47 million.2 If Chinese rural migrants were the 
population of a country, it would be the fourth largest in the world.
In 2013, following an assumption that those Chinese migrant 
workers would be highly dependent on the boom in Chinese social 
media to remain in contact with the families they had left behind, I went 
to study social media usage in a small factory town in southeast China, a 
site for tens of thousands of migrant workers. However, during the sub-
sequent 15 months of field work, mostly spent living inside one of these 
factories, I began to understand that the reality is very different from 
anything I had imagined.
First, I was surprised about the motivations for migration among 
the new generations, which I  had assumed would be essentially eco-
nomic. Second, I was largely wrong about what kind of social media use 
I would find among what is known in China as a ‘floating population’: it 
was not mainly about retaining links to users’ places of origin. Most of 
all I had not anticipated my primary finding, which was that this would 
be a study of two migrations conducted in parallel: one from rural to 
urban, and another, undertaken simultaneously, from offline to online. 
We can call these parallel because both, in their own ways, were jour-
neys to the same destination of an imagined modern China. Finally this 
book will make a surprising claim as to which of these migrations seems 
to have been more successful in reaching this goal.
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Chinese migrant workers are evidently Chinese. However, many 
key stereotypes of Chinese people do not apply to this particular pop-
ulation. For example, many migrant families have managed to dodge 
China’s one- child policy3 and usually have at least two children. 
Education, generally believed to be highly valued in Chinese society,4 
is actually valued in a far more utilitarian way. Many, if not most, rural 
migrant parents as well as rural migrant youth in my field site did not see 
success in school as a priority. In such a situation, as Chapter 3 argues, 
social media plays a key role in filling gaps left by lack of education. For 
young migrant workers who dropped out of school early and became 
factory workers before adulthood, social media is a form of ‘post- school’ 
education and schooling that implies their ‘coming of age’.
It is also necessary to update the most widely held perception, in 
and out of China, of these Chinese migrant workers in terms of their 
social development. Recent migrants are very different from the initial 
wave upon which most academic accounts are still based, and which 
tend to focus on economic concerns.5 For example, poverty is no longer 
the only reason behind migration. The initial motivation of the rural- to- 
urban migration was economic necessity.6 Low productivity in the coun-
tryside could not support the livelihoods of the Chinese peasants who 
constituted the majority of the country’s population; working in factories 
and cities seemed to be the only viable solution. Nowadays, however, the 
economic advantages of migration have become less clear. The combina-
tion of higher living expenses and increased consumption (influenced 
by the general lifestyle of urban areas)7 means that marginal improve-
ments in migrants’ incomes hardly warrant the costs of, for example, 
no longer being able to care for their parents. For the new generation 
of rural migrants, the whole trajectory of rural- to- urban migration has 
shifted from the ‘push’ factor of economic necessity towards the ‘pull’ 
factor of aspirations towards modernity. For young migrant workers, 
migration means ‘to see the outside world’8 and to gain autonomy from 
one’s family.9 In such a context, social media is less of a bridge that con-
nects individuals with what they have left behind in villages and more of 
a projector illuminating an ideal modern life to which they aspire.
Tens of thousands of migrant workers live in the small town where 
I conducted my field work, but almost none of them see the place where 
they live as ‘home’. The living quarters in this factory town, as we will 
see later in this chapter, mainly serve to provide ‘infrastructure for 
labourers rather than offering places in which human beings can main-
tain social relationships and feel security and emotional belonging’.10 
So where do people actually live? What does it mean when a young 
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factory girl says ‘life outside the mobile phone is unbearable’? By mobile 
phone she meant her social media profile, to which she keeps constantly 
logged in and in which she portrays herself as a modern lady.11 What her 
statement suggests is precisely that social media has become an alter-
native, and indeed a better, home to those migrant workers: given the 
offline conditions of their floating lives, many find social media to be the 
place where a new personal identity, with a ‘higher human quality’ (you 
suzhi),12 can be created. This point is central to the ethnography that 
informs this volume. True, I spent most of this period of field work living 
in a factory, whereas most people just work there. In some ways I  too 
lived with these factory workers, in as much as I shared the active social 
and imaginative lives they led online, rather than merely spent time in 
the same physical space.
In previous studies of Chinese rural migrants the issue of gender 
is one of the core topics. Almost all the studies focus on female Chinese 
rural migrants, suggesting that women workers are the most subor-
dinated group within Chinese migrant populations.13 Some of these 
claims and findings are still relevant today, but other things have 
changed. For this particular migrant group gender inequality may in 
some respects have reversed, leading to male rural migrants becoming 
the relatively disadvantaged group. This does not apply only to the job 
market or marriage market, but also to the social pressure and discrim-
ination they suffer, compared to that of female migrants. Through male 
migrants’ social media usage such gender anxiety comes to be repre-
sented and experienced.14 It is worth noting, however, that this gender 
imbalance often reverts after marriage.
During the time of writing this book, the Economist published an 
article15 about the children of Chinese migrant families left behind by 
their parents. This article rightly pointed out that such children were a 
damaged generation, suffering significantly higher states of anxiety and 
depression than their peers – a situation that may be connected to a lack 
of support following early separation from their parents. It is said that 
in 2010 there were 61 million children below the age of 17 left behind 
in rural areas; in several provinces more than half of all rural children 
had been left behind.16 Such children have truly become a severe social 
problem in modern China. However, even this latest article still fails 
to cover some of the most recent developments and consequences of 
such problems. In the town where I conducted my research most young 
migrant workers had once been ‘left- behind’ children; they had dropped 
out of school at ages ranging from 14 to 17,17 and then joined their par-
ents to work in factories. Even as academics and journalists continue 
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to discuss the population of ‘left- behind’ children, many of their sub-
jects have already made themselves part of a new generation of migrant 
workers.
Most research and reports about Chinese rural migrants focuses 
on the ‘first tier’ cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.18 
However, the 2013 national survey on ‘floating populations’19 shows 
that 47 per cent of Chinese rural migrants work and live in small and 
medium- sized towns. Here migrant parents are significantly more likely 
to live with their children (more than 60 per cent of the new genera-
tion of rural migrants live with core family members in migration des-
tinations). In the factory town where I worked more than 80 per cent 
of newborn babies came from migrant families, while migrant children 
also represent the majority at the local primary school.20 This new gen-
eration faces difficulties, however, as it is not yet integrated into the local 
society.21 Today’s young migrants confront the same problem as their 
parents did, of not being able to access urban social welfare. They may 
feel even more frustrated by social discrimination,22 as they are usu-
ally keener to integrate into modern city life.23 This new generation of 
migrant workers has been experiencing insecurity and impermanence 
since childhood. As a result them seem to have learned to present them-
selves as unflappable or even unconcerned about their own lives. Such 
a highly performative attitude almost detaches them from either their 
own or other people’s judgements. Once again it turned out that a study 
of social media was also a really effective strategy for understanding 
these young people; only through this inner but online world24 did it 
seem possible to find out who they really are and what they really want 
from life.
Social media use among Chinese migrant workers also challenges 
some basic ideas that have formed the premise of several heated debates 
about social media worldwide. For instance, there is a constant worry 
that the mediation of social media has rendered our social relationships 
in some way less authentic. Here, however, people find social media is 
the only place to establish a ‘purer’ (geng chun) relationship, free from 
all the practical concerns of offline life.25 Furthermore, when we are 
questioning the impact of social media on friendship we may not be 
aware that merely using the concept of ‘friendship’26 is problematic. This 
is particularly so when applied to people from traditional communities 
in which kinship and regional relationships (such as fellow villagers) are 
dominant; the Western notion of a separate sphere of friendship may 
simply not exist.
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As Chapter 4 illustrates, it is on social media that Chinese migrant 
workers have created and experienced a real sense of ‘friendship’ for the 
first time. A similar situation occurs when we look into the issue of pri-
vacy. In the West, it has become commonplace to accuse social media of 
being a threat to privacy,27 but what if the very idea and practice of pri-
vacy has hardly existed in a society? Migrant workers have their origins 
in village families with no provision for individualised space, a situation 
compounded in adulthood by current conditions of shared dormitories. 
Many are also linked to a traditional idea that ‘anything that is hidden 
from others must be something shameful or bad’ – in effect saying that a 
mere preference for privacy is a bad thing. Given such factors, one has to 
consider the use of social media from a totally different perspective. In 
the real life of migrant workers, social media has remarkably increased 
the experience of privacy and legitimised the right to it.
When it comes to the impact of social media on politics, the 
ideals of the ‘cyber- utopian’,28 which regards the internet as a politically 
progressive force and has become a very popular argument worldwide, 
may also be problematic. In the specific case of China and the Chinese 
internet, it is also widely believed that the development of the inter-
net and social media might actively empower a future civil society. 
However, the ethnography suggests an entirely different picture, based 
on the evidence for the daily use of social media and its political content 
at a grass  roots level. As will be shown in Chapter 5, the evidence here 
is that social media has far less impact on political participation than 
expected and rather than empowering or encouraging political partici-
pation, its use tends to diminish any motivation for turning discontented 
thoughts into active political action. Rather, in many ways social media 
helps to monitor and channel public opinion (yulun daoxiang)29 and fur-
ther legitimise the Chinese party- state.
Here, then, is a litany of ways in which the results of this research 
differ from the expectations of both myself and others. Given the degree 
of these discrepancies, and the many quite surprising claims that follow, 
much of this book focuses on the evidence that arose from the ethnog-
raphy and provides the foundation for these claims. It is also hoped that 
the detailed ethnographic descriptions will also provide a sense of empa-
thy and immersion in the lives of these people. We perceive them in the 
irresistible tides of these social transformations, and can see what this 
‘floating population’ felt, believed or mistrusted; what their fantasies, 
hopes and fears might be; how they understood situations and reacted 
offline and online. This book is composed from hundreds of voices and 
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images and fragments of individuals’ daily lives, but not one of them 
is trivial. In addition a bigger, but also very different and distinct pic-
ture of modern China appears in view when we bring these individuals 
together analytically.
A brief review of the book
This book is about a new population and a new media. It depicts a situa-
tion in which a very particular group of people has emerged as an adult 
working population alongside the rise of social media in China. The 
Chinese rural migrant population that did not exist three decades ago 
is taking on its new form, very much facilitated by the capability they 
find in social media. At the same time social media, a new media that 
did not exist two decades ago, has rapidly come into daily use for a large 
proportion of the population. We can only make sense of both modern 
China and social media if we appreciate the dynamic, dialectical context 
within which both are being formed.
In Chapter 1, besides an introduction to the context of this study, 
we take a tour around the factory town and meet the people who inhabit 
it. Chapter 2 gives a detailed description of the Chinese social media 
landscape and budget smartphone market, while Chapter 3 focuses on 
what people post on their personal social media profiles – thus opening 
a window on to individuals’ aspirations and anxieties, expectations and 
social lives. Drawing on Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 maps out social 
life on social media, exploring in detail the ways in which people nav-
igate various relationships. Why, for example, are classmates, neigh-
bours and colleagues valued less than strangers online? Why and how 
does the mediation of social media constitute a ‘purer’ interpersonal 
relationship? Answers to those questions can be found in Chapter  4. 
Meanwhile Chapter 5 focuses upon the specific impact of social media 
on politics and gender, both closely examined through the online and 
offline behaviour of different groups of local people.
Finally Chapter 6 further explores how we can make sense of the 
dialectical relationship between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ – from postings of 
deity images to bring good fortune to the QQ homeland albums which 
in a way ‘transport’ people’s home villages to online; from ‘recording 
the youth’ in salon photography to practising a modern life online. An 
understanding of people’s struggles and their negotiation between 
online and offline leads to one of the main arguments of this book: that 
dual migrations are taking place simultaneously in the daily lives of 
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Chinese rural migrants – one from rural to urban, the other from offline 
to online. Could it be the latter which in practice proves more efficient 
and effective than physical migration, and which empowers people to 
achieve their aspiration of modernity?
Chinese family and hukou
Before presenting the evidence and arguments, there are two key histor-
ical questions that provide the foundations for the situation encountered 
here. Where do these migrant workers come from? And why have they 
had to take up a ‘floating’ life?
The first question is an inquiry into a traditional agricultural 
society in which not only these migrants but also the vast majority of 
Chinese people used to live – merely half a century ago. Here we can 
find answers in the anthropology of a more traditional China. The schol-
arship is simply too rich to review here, but a few key concepts will be 
briefly mentioned as a starting point. In Chinese the word ‘family’ ( jia) 
actually refers not only to kinship, but also to a group of people, an estate 
of property or an economy (a set of economic activities).30 The Chinese 
institution of family31 is regarded as the nucleus of society. No one who 
has delved into the intricacies of Chinese social relations would deny the 
leading role kinship plays in Chinese political32 and economic33 affairs; 
this further sets the foundation for Chinese cosmology, where ances-
tors were worshipped as deities by descendants.34 Patrilineal descent, 
or agnate kinship,35 in which only men can inherit family property and 
a child’s lineage is only calculated from the father’s side, constitutes the 
social order of both the domestic and public domains.36
Age, generation and gender served as the three hierarchical prin-
ciples within a Chinese family: that is the old are superior to the young, 
the male is superior to the female, the older generation is superior to 
the younger.37 The senior male members usually control family affairs, 
and were regarded as the maintainers, providers and protectors of the 
family. Parent– son relationships are the most important in a traditional 
family. In an extended family a married son is supposed to stand firmly 
by his parents’ side, regardless of what he thinks is right. Filial piety 
requires children to ‘show respect and obedience to their parents under 
all circumstances and a daughter- in- law is always in the wrong if she 
dares to talk back to her mother- in- law’.38
In traditional Chinese society, human relationships start with 
the immediate family as an in- group and then radiate to encompass 
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the extended family, village and wider social connections.39 With 
Confucianism providing the philosophical basis of Chinese family and 
society,40 the country has long been seen as a typical collective or ‘low- 
individualism’ society – placing the needs, interests and objectives of in- 
groups at a higher priority than those of individuals.41 Other traditional 
Chinese ethical concepts, such as the importance of interpersonal rela-
tions (guanxi)42 and face (mianzi), which refers to one’s own sense of 
dignity and reputation in a community,43 are all closely related to these 
collective features of Chinese society. These emphasise the distinction 
between in- groups and out- groups, the importance of engaging in co- 
operative tasks, and a focus on avoiding conflict in the ultimate pursuit 
of communal harmony.
In regard to the second question, the reason why Chinese peasants 
had to take up a migrant life, rather than settling down in cities, lies in 
a policy called hukou. Established in the 1950s, the Chinese household 
registration system (hukou) plays an important role in migrant workers’ 
lives. One’s hukou status determines one’s rights to welfare, employ-
ment and land, with people formerly only being permitted to work and 
reside at their place of hukou registration.44 Because of hukou, mainland 
Chinese were divided into rural residents and urban residents. Urban 
residents enjoyed a range of social, economic and cultural benefits that 
rural residents did not receive.45 With its strict rules against migration 
between rural and urban areas, hukou tried to limit mass migration 
from the land to the cities to ensure social stability.
This situation started to change in the 1980s, when industriali-
sation of China needed more and more cheap labour. The control over 
rural- to- urban migration has been gradually relaxed, enabling a vast 
number of rural labourers to work in cities while remaining registered 
as rural residents.46 ‘Floating population’ (liudong renkou), a term in 
Chinese official discourse,47 describes the migration pattern48 of those 
rural migrants. Peasant workers (nongmin gong), a combination of 
‘peasant’ and ‘worker’, is another word used in colloquial discourse to 
refer to the same group. As this term suggested, migrant workers are 
still peasants; they do not have access to the same welfare benefits as 
urban workers do under the allocation system of hukou. In such a rural– 
urban divide migrant workers usually find it difficult to establish roots 
in their temporary residential places  – despite being the backbone of 
China’s economic miracle based on labour- intensive industries.
Three decades ago, when the first wave of Chinese migrant work-
ers left their villages,49 they were leaving behind dreadfully poor agri-
cultural communities and entire families that were desperate to be 
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supported. Three decades later, the second or even the third generation 
has now become the main force of migrant labour,50 and it is important 
not to extrapolate our understanding of the first generation and assume 
that it applies equally to these later generations. At this point, however, 
having considered these issues in the abstract, the actual ethnogra-
phy encountered them through the lives of individuals such as Dong, a 
21- year- old migrant worker and part of this new generation.
The story of Dong
The bad news finally arrived. At the other end of the phone call Dong’s 
niece told him that his old grandfather (lao ye zi) had died.
Three days later, with his parents and two other relatives who 
work in the same factory, Dong was on his way back to his village in 
a mountain area of YunNan province to join the funeral. It was a long 
trip: 2 hours on a mini bus, followed by 48 hours on the train, then 3.5 
hours by bus, and finally an hour on foot. Before the smartphone battery 
ran out, Dong had a last check of his QQ (a Chinese social media plat-
form). When the train left Zhejiang province, he deleted the GuanYin 
(the mother Buddha) deity image that he had posted on his QQ a week 
ago in the hope that his grandfather would recover from his stroke. 
‘GuanYin didn’t do me the favour,’ he told me later on QQ.
Dong had mixed feelings about this old man. Left behind by his 
parents who had worked outside of the mountain village more than 
20 years ago, Dong was raised by his grandparents. Ten years ago his 
grandfather suffered an attack by a snake in the field, which left him 
unable to do any more heavy farm work. The only job he was offered 
was that of a public toilet attendant in a nearby town centre. Dong thus 
accompanied his grandparents to the single room attached to the public 
toilet, and there he lived. ‘My classmates called me shiwa [shit boy] from 
then on, and I hated my childhood and my schooling time . . . my grand-
parents really couldn’t help me . . . I mean for them to make sure I was 
not ill or hungry or lost was the best thing they could do.’ Both Dong’s 
grandparents were illiterate and could hardly give him any advice on 
school problems. The experience of being left behind as a child and the 
bullying in school partially pushed Dong to drop out of education at the 
age of 16. He left his home village and became a migrant factory worker. 
Since then he had only visited his grandparents twice in four years.
‘Everybody was coming back and saying the outside world was full 
of beautiful things, and I was so looking forward to a new life outside 
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at that time . . . couldn’t wait to escape the desperate village life and my 
grandparents,’ Dong once recalled. After four years of hard work in 
various factories, he would not necessarily agree with his initial dream 
about working as a migrant worker (da gong) any more. Nonetheless, 
as he said, ‘Even though life outside was truly not as easy as I thought, 
struggling outside is always better than waiting for death in the village’. 
Dong believes in the saying ‘the real man travels the world’ (hao nan 
er zou si fang). At least that is something he can boast about one day in 
front of his children:  that their father once visited many places. Dong 
planned one day, when he had finally saved up enough money, to start 
his own business in the town centre – no longer just labouring work, but 
a real business. Much of what he shared on his QQ profile were stories 
of successful entrepreneurs who had started from scratch, some of them 
from an even worse situation than his own. After all, most of the fac-
tory owners for whom he worked were once peasants like him. If they 
could succeed, why not him? ‘I just need a bit of luck and maybe some 
patience,’ he observed.
Two days after his return to his home village, Dong updated his QQ 
status: ‘Farewell grandfather, sorry for being so buxiao [unfilial].’ Two 
weeks later Dong had still not returned to the factory. One day I got a 
message from him on QQ: ‘I am not coming back; I am going to marry a 
girl in our village soon.’ The marriage was arranged by fellow villagers, 
and after the wedding the young couple are going to work together in 
another factory town in southeast China. As for Dong’s current job, a rel-
ative working at the same factory would help him to sort everything out. 
Hopefully Dong would still get a proportion of his final month’s wage, 
but to be honest he did not expect to receive it.
I realised that the moment when I  saw him off to the local bus 
station would be the last time I ever saw Dong. ‘Oh, my poor nv boshi 
[female PhD], I  think that is something you can never learn,’ Feige, a 
forklift truck driver, remarked. ‘Things happen like this all the time: 
there’s nothing unusual in saying goodbyes. You know, I have seen so 
many new faces appear and disappear in factories and nobody really 
cares . . . except for you.’
The GoodPath: A transitional town
Feige is probably right. In GoodPath, a small factory town, people do 
come and leave, day in day out. GoodPath town for them is indeed a 
‘path’ rather than a destination. Although others have talked of the town 
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as a destination point, it is more accurately a transitional place connect-
ing village and city.51 The town itself is not an enclave in a city, but a 
rural place in the process of ‘becoming’ urban.
GoodPath has a long history as an agricultural village that dates 
back to the Tang Dynasty (610– 907 BC). However, as a factory town it 
is very young. It was only in 2004 that the local government decided 
to develop industry. A  decade of industrialisation has turned 76 per 
cent of the farm land in the centre area of GoodPath into 61 massive 
factories and 224 related companies. In 2004 agriculture contributed 
89.2 per cent of GoodPath’s GDP; in 2013 this figure has shrunk to 
12.7 per cent.52 Rural migrants who work in factories account for two- 
thirds of the resident population (totalling around 62,000). The popu-
lation density of GoodPath has also jumped to 1,341 persons per km2, 
compared to 142 per km2 for China as a whole and 255 per km2 for the UK.
Many rural migrants chose to come to GoodPath because of the 
job opportunities that are gained through the personal network of 
fellow villagers or relatives. Here 79 per cent of local rural migrants 
live with at least one family member, with only around five per cent 
living alone.53 On the one hand these figures are consistent with the 
2013 Chinese national census of domestic migration,54 which shows 
that across China 70 per cent of rural migrants live with at least one 
family member. On the other hand, these numbers reject the cliché 
of Chinese rural migrants being totally isolated in their new loca-
tions. As a ‘transitional town’ GoodPath provides everything for rural 
migrants – except the sense of belonging. ‘It (GoodPath) is just where 
I work . . . of course it’s not a home. Home is where you go back once a 
year to celebrate Chinese New Year.’ Guo Biao, 49, lived with his whole 
family in GoodPath; his three adult children work in two different fac-
tories. GoodPath for him is still by no means ‘home’, even though he 
has spent a good deal of time here.
Like many other Chinese ‘urban villages’, newly developed in the 
process of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation,55 the economic and 
social development in GoodPath is unbalanced. The co- existing urban 
and rural elements manifest themselves in complicated, often conflicting 
ways. The changes served to disrupt the existing social order; crime rates 
shot up and living conditions deteriorated, with local people blaming 
rural migrant workers for all the troubles.56 In GoodPath there is a very 
limited social bonding between local people and rural migrants. Seventy- 
two per cent of rural migrants reported57 that they had no communication 
with local people apart from functional relationships such as ‘shop owner/ 
customer’, ‘landlord/ tenant’ and ‘factory manager/ factory worker’.
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Such separation begins at primary school. In GoodPath’s only 
primary school most of the students (around 85 per cent) come from 
migrant families. There were five classes at each grade, divided 
in turn into four ‘outsider classes’ (waidi ban) and one ‘local class’ 
(bendi ban). Better teachers were allocated to the ‘local class’, which 
only enrolled local students. A  local teacher explained the reason 
behind the structure: 
 . . . (Local) parents were so worried that their children will pick 
up bad habits from those ‘wild kids’ from rural migrant fami-
lies . . . which in many cases was true. You cannot expect children 
to be well- behaved if their parents do not care about their school 
performance and they have no discipline at home . . . 
The social and economic transformation of GoodPath described above 
has been taking place gradually. However, the change in this small fac-
tory town’s appearance seems to have happened overnight. During my 
stay in GoodPath, an advanced cinema, which can show 3D movies, 
popped up in the first six months. On the one side of a busy national 
motorway there is a freight parking area. On the other side a large shop-
ping mall with an advertising pillar like London’s Big Ben rose from 
the ground (Fig. 1.1). On the front facade of the mall a huge advertis-
ing hoarding depicts a foreign woman holding a box of Häagen-Dazs 
ice cream. A slogan beside the billboard recommends ‘keeping up with 
the world’ (yu shijie tongbu). Together with the heavy trucks and the 
long- distance minibus, the massive industrial area seems to give con-
crete form to the numerous abstract forces driving China’s ‘reform and 
opening- up policy’ over the last three decades – especially globalisation, 
migration, industrialisation and commercialisation.
The following section seeks to capture a greater awareness of 
GoodPath, a place within which all these transitions and transformations 
Fig. 1.1 The varied scenes of a freight parking area, farmland and a 
modern shopping mall in GoodPath
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occur. ‘Walking’ around in the town and ‘talking’ with people as a 
researcher usually does may help you to become more familiar with the 
town and its people, and so understand better all the stories in this book. 
A map of the town centre is given (Fig 1.2) to help anchor the discussion 
in this particular place.
A tour of GoodPath
The first stop: The high street
A mere country road a decade ago, the high street today has more than 
100 shops lining both sides. Along with the development of the facto-
ries, the local government repaved the road and sold the land on both 
sides to property developers to build residential buildings, four or five 
storeys in height, with shop fronts. Most shops deal with useful house-
hold items and men’s and women’s clothes and shoes, as well as hair-
dressers and digital devices. As you walk along the street, all of one’s 
senses are overwhelmed: loud music, bright colours, strong scents, fla-
vours of food, and people everywhere.
Fig. 1.2 A map of GoodPath town
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Even at first glance something is striking about the people 
here: young people and children are in the majority, and people seem to 
like being in groups. Around 22 per cent58 of the pedestrians are babies 
and children under the age of 15; only three per cent of them are elderly; 
79 per cent are walking in groups, and 38 per cent of the adults are 
accompanied by children. One thing that distinguishes rural migrants 
from local residents is that many of them are young parents with more 
than one child, in apparent contradiction to the Chinese one- child fam-
ily plan policy.59 This in turn explains the ‘graffiti’ on the whitewashed 
mortar walls of lanes off the main street. This graffiti is actually mobile 
phone numbers offering to provide all kinds of fake authorisations. One 
of them is ‘birth permission’ (zhun sheng zheng). Under Chinese family 
planning regulations, a pregnant woman will be turned down by a hos-
pital unless she can show a birth permission document. Nor can a baby 
born without ‘birth permission’ be given a hukou (household registra-
tion), creating all kinds of problems in future life. For people employed 
in the public sector (government administration, education, hospitals, 
etc.), having more than one child will result in the loss of one’s job and 
income, a penalty imposed on unplanned birth (chao sheng). People who 
work in the private sector may not lose their jobs, but they still need to 
pay a huge fine60 to obtain a ‘birth permission’. In rural areas, however, 
people are allowed to have a second child if the first one is a girl. A decade 
ago, when ‘one- child’ policy was carried out strictly, rural mothers had 
to give birth in secret (tou sheng) to avoid the penalties imposed on 
unplanned births. ‘Years ago they [local officials] would chase you to 
the end of the Earth if they knew you had a baby hidden elsewhere, but 
now they can’t be bothered’, explained Ma, a factory worker aged 29. His 
three young children were born in three different factory towns.
On the high street, there is a mobile phone shop called ‘Wan Hua 
China Mobile Franchise mobile phone shop’.61 From time to time I helped 
at the shop. Wan Hua, the middle- aged owner, is a typical smart, shrewd 
and very hard- working local man; he opens the shop at 6.30 a.m. and 
closes at 10.30 p.m., seven days a week, 12 months a year, except for 
a ten-day break at Chinese New Year. Behind piles of mobile phone 
boxes there is a double bed where Wan Hua and his wife sleep during 
the night. In front of the shop is parked a brand new Ford car. Although 
he has little reason to drive, the car means a lot to Wan Hua. ‘It’s all 
about face (mianzi), you know. If I can’t even afford a car, people will 
think I am doing badly!’ As Wan Hua said, the concept of ‘face’ is truly 
important, important for understanding some aspects of social media 
use later in the book. Mianzi, known as ‘Chinese face’, is a sophisticated, 
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self- conscious feeling with regard to the opinions of others. It is a typical 
‘front- stage’ behaviour62 whose goal is to establish a particular favour-
able image in front of others.63
The second stop: Zhao village
Zhao village is a slum right in the heart of GoodPath, besieged by con-
crete residential buildings. The former busy pathway into the village 
is now an empty lane with scattered funeral supplies stores and black-
smith’s shops (Fig. 1.3). Old people, the only local residents who con-
tinue living in this area, sit in bamboo chairs outside their front doors, 
looking at a world in which they no longer play a part. Nowadays their 
neighbours are often strangers who speak totally different dialects. 
After a century’s wind and rain, most of the wooden buildings previ-
ously owned by local wealthy families are in poor condition; they are 
occupied by around 300 rural migrant households. Few toilets and no 
proper rubbish bins exist, with the result that everywhere has become 
a potential toilet or rubbish bin. The rural migrants who live here are 
regarded as the poorest, unable to afford a better room. Rent for rooms 
in these those old wooden houses is 50 RMB (US $8) per month, only 
one quarter of the cost of a room in concrete residential buildings.
Located in long and narrow lanes, a few illicit minibus service 
routes constitute the busiest areas. Minibuses run from GoodPath to 
around 70 counties in Guizhou, the poorest inland Chinese province 
from which almost half of the rural migrants in GoodPath originate. 
Given the fact that the central provincial coach station provides services 
to only two counties in Guizhou, GoodPath’s transport capability clearly 
Fig. 1.3 The Old Street in Zhao village, GoodPath town (traditional 
Chinese painting 82 × 34.5 cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang)
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reflects the high mobility of its population. Along with many declining 
villages in Chinese factory towns, Zhao village resembles a large, with-
ered tree. The birds that used to live on its branches have left, one by 
one; only old birds who cannot fly any more remain. Gradually the tree 
becomes a big trunk of standing wood, covered by thick moss. Yet when 
you look at it closely, you are amazed at the diversity of creatures still 
living on the tree.
The third stop: Peasant flats (nongmin fang) in the new villages
If Zhao village is a large, withered tree, then on the other side of the high 
street, in the new villages, are the clusters of trees in which most immi-
grant ‘birds’ dwell. Rural migrants account for two-thirds of the total 
number of GoodPath’s residents. All the buildings are concrete houses, 
three to five storeys in height, built in the past 15 years by the local peas-
ants, from which derives the name nongmin fang (‘peasant flat’).
The reason for a five- floor house is mainly that my parents tried to 
build a taller building than our neighbours. Well it’s about mianzi. 
Now thanks to those migrant workers, all vacant rooms are full.
Mr Fan’s family had built one of these buildings, in which eight rural 
migrant families now live. Chun’s family from Jiangxi province is one 
of them. In the corner of the room (Fig. 1.4) a pile of unpacked luggage 
seemed to indicate that the family is about to move out, or arrived only 
yesterday. Actually Chun has lived here for eight months.
A yard outside provides an extended living space. Here women 
cook in the open air on simple stoves; young men play cards around a 
short table; young mothers gossip with their female friends while breast-
feeding their babies; children play at hide-and-seek behind strings on 
which their neighbours’ underwear hangs. Many ‘indoor’ activities take 
Fig. 1.4 Peasant flats in the new villages
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place outside – not only because there is simply not enough room inside, 
but also because these residents, who have come from a rural area, like 
to maintain their habit of ‘living in public’.
The fourth stop: The digital centre
Adjacent to the bustling new villages, the digital centre is another place 
full of life and colour (Fig. 1.5). The centre is a collection of 24 shops 
dealing with mobile phones, digital products and other digital services, 
for example digital photographic studios. Displays of newly launched 
mobile phones or internet payment structures are everywhere. One can 
find a range of smartphones varying from 300 RMB (US $45) to 4,000 
RMB (US $600), as well as easy to use mobile phones for elderly citizens 
featuring larger buttons and louder sound (Fig. 1.6).
Chapter 2 discusses the budget smartphone market in the context 
of social media usage. Since early 2013 rural migrants have drama-
tically boosted the consumption of smartphones, especially budget 
smartphones. Ma Yu, a mobile phone dealer, rightly spotted the trend of 
smartphone use among rural migrants: 
Ninety- five per cent of budget smartphones were sold to local 
rural migrants. Those rural migrants know clearly what they 
want . . . they care about the memory card, the quality of the mobile 
phone camera, and whether it can play games, take videos, etc.
Fig 1.5 The local digital centre
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For rural migrants, a smartphone has become the ‘everyday essential’ 
since it is their only private access to the internet and all the digital 
entertainment to be found there. Where demand exists, a market will 
supply. Cheap digital content is also available in the digital centre. For 
5 RMB (less than US $1), you can get 50 music tracks, while 10 RMB will 
buy five full- length films. Catalogue books for music tracks, smartphone 
pictures and films are piled up on tables for consumteers to select their 
purchases. All the content is smartphone- friendly; in most cases, people 
bring their smartphone to the shop and download content direct from 
the shop owner’s computer. Mr Zhu, a shopkeeper selling digital prod-
ucts, explained why the digital content business is profitable:  ‘Most of 
them (rural migrants) don’t have a PC and they usually don’t have broad-
band at home, so they are willing to pay a bit money to buy them here.’
The fifth stop: Factory plants
From the digital centre, cross a provincial motorway to reach the indus-
trial area of GoodPath. Here are more than 60 factories, many less than 
eight years old, though still older than the newly planted trees along the 
roads. The small trees and roads of equal width, with road signs marked 
in arabic numerals, combine with the identical factories to give the 
whole area a bland uniformity.
These factories are massive. Each plant covers around 8,000 m2, 
and holds 700– 1,000 factory workers. Even in daytime there is no 
Fig 1.6 Mobile phones for elderly citizens
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natural light inside the factory plants, and the air is full of incessant loud 
machine noise and the pungent smell of paint. Steel is one of the main 
raw materials. Every day hundreds of rolls of steel plate are shipped to 
the factory, where usually one worker works with one machine to cut 
the original material into various shapes. The logic of the assembly line 
is ‘humankind as a part of the machine’, and the noise and the relentless 
assembly line certainly deprives people of any possibility of conversa-
tion. There is only limited automation here: labour remains cheaper than 
a fully- automated production line. Following the pre- set machine pace, 
a factory worker repeats his or her action roughly 2,000 times per day.
Jing, a 19- year- old factory worker on an assembly line, told me 
the trick of ‘not missing one punch’ is to ‘forget yourself’. ‘If you think 
things, your hands will slow down and you can’t follow the machine,’ 
she explained. Yet it is important to recognise that these factory workers 
do have options. After working at the factory for three months Jing got 
fed up. She then left her job and found a new one as a shop assistant in 
an accessories shop on the high street.
Labour work in a factory is divided into assembly line and heavy 
manual labour. Women are always welcomed as factory workers, since 
they are regarded dexterous, attentive and obedient. Compared to man-
ual heavy labour, assembly line work is relatively light and dominated 
by women. Given the mechanisation taking place in the factories, more 
and more heavy manual labour will be replaced by the assembly line. As 
Fig. 1.7 Scene from the assembly line in a factory plant
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a result young women can find a job easily in GoodPath, whereas young 
men find it more difficult to get a job, especially if they do not want to 
do the heavy manual labour. In the factories Jing earned 3,500 RMB 
(US $583) per month if she worked ten hours a day, 29 days a month. 
On the high street, by contrast, her month salary is 2,500RMB (around 
US $417). 
They (factory managers) like young women to work on the assem-
bly line, you know; they thought we were obedient (ting hua) and 
attentive (zi xi). Young women are the best. Men are nothing com-
pared to us. But it’s so tiring working in the factories. I prefer to 
work here even though I earn less.
Jing is typical of a new generation of rural migrants. She dropped out of 
middle school after a big row with close friends at school. At that time 
all she wanted was to see the outside world, to escape. School was bor-
ing, and she felt lonely since her parents and all her relatives had left 
the villages to work in factories. Jing did not think twice before join-
ing them. The older generation shared the common Chinese aspirations 
based on achievement through education and hard work, but Jing’s gen-
eration pride themselves on ‘playing it cool’, and the motivation driving 
migration is more about a chance to see the world.64 The new generation 
change jobs more often than the old generation, and are more selective 
about jobs.65
The end of the tour
We have looked around GoodPath, and what we have seen in the town 
centre has set the context for exploring social media usage in later chap-
ters. As a result of this tour it should be clear why it would be quite mis-
leading to imagine this book as simply situated in ‘China’. Rather, we 
should start with a very open mind as to who these people might be, and 
not make assumptions about their values or concerns.
As we shall see, this ‘new generation’ of rural migrants is very differ-
ent from its parents: they are motivated more by interest and have stron-
ger aspirations to ‘see the outside world’. This very particular population 
has emerged as working adults alongside the rise of new media and social 
media in China. So this book is not about how a given population takes up 
and appropriates this new media. It rather considers a situation in which a 
population that never previously existed assumes its new form very much 
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under the influence of the capacities they find in smartphones and social 
media. Social media in turn can only be appreciated if we understand the 
very dynamic context within which it is being formed.
A final note on methodology
This book is based on a 15- month period of ethnography in GoodPath. 
In undetaking our tour of GoodPath you have experienced something of 
doing field work with me and seen how I gained data and insights – by 
walking around, listening to what people say, observing what people do 
and being a participant in their daily lives.66 In anthropology we call this 
method of data collection in ethnography ‘participant observation’.67 So 
what is special about ‘participant observation’? As the anthropologist 
Margaret Mead rightly pointed out, there are actually several layers 
of self- representations in a person’s social life. ‘What people say, what 
people do and what they say they do are entirely different things,’ she 
observed. In many cases, simply doing questionnaires or interviews 
(that is, collecting what people say, or what people say they do), is quite 
different from observing what they actually do. Self- expectations, social 
norms and taboos may prevent people from saying what they really do 
and think in daily life, or sometimes people simply fail to express them-
selves articulately. Thus it is essential to observe what people do in their 
daily lives over a relatively long period of time. Another reason why 
long- term field work is so important is that it enables the researcher to 
become ‘taken for granted’ in the landscape and even to become friends 
with his or her informants. Nobody will behave naturally if they are 
aware of ‘being watched’, so effective observation only really starts at 
this point. In my case, several times people came back to me after know-
ing me for six months or more and admitted that stories they had told 
me when we had first met had not been true, because they had not really 
known me at the time.’
There were also some specific and local issues. At first a key prob-
lem was the suspicion of factory owners that researchers can be under-
cover journalists. I encountered such hostility on the first day when I was 
taking photographs of a factory building. The security guard dashed out 
and urged me to leave: ‘Our boss said no journalists!’ It took people no 
time to spot me as somebody ‘unusual’ – somebody who was not a rural 
migrant looking for a factory job.
A friend suggested that I should work on relationships (gao guanxi), 
rather than regulations to gain access to factories. ‘The smaller the place 
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is, the more important the social relations (guanxi) become.’ Just as she 
said, guanxi opened factory doors for me. After several twists and turns 
of social networking, I managed to get an introduction to a factory owner 
by his family friend, a previous student of a family member of mine. 
Thanks to that, my presence was finally no longer seen as an unpredict-
able threat. A temporary factory ID card that allowed me to visit the fac-
tory plant without extra permission was issued, and a room in the factory 
where I could stay during my research was allocated to me. Before even 
entering the factory, I had learnt one of the most important lessons about 
my field site: in most cases, the local society is based on personal social 
relationships. I could therefore understand the strategy of migrant work-
ers making a living in a strange place better, as so much of it depended on 
their personal social networks.
Being a friendly and trusted outsider turned out to be most reward-
ing thing. People shared their opinions freely with me without worrying 
that I would judge them, and confessed their secrets to me without wor-
rying such secrets would be revealed.68 Having said this, it was a con-
stant struggle to try to explain to people that an anthropologist, a word 
they had never heard, was not a journalist who has a channel to report 
local problems, nor a philanthropist who has resources to help them, nor 
an official who has the power to improve conditions. Even though some 
turned their back on me after their requests for money or a job from me 
were turned down, in most cases relationships between me and local 
people were built on an emotional, rather than an instrumental basis.
Curiously, my situation as an outsider seemed to draw a parallel 
when it comes to the role of ‘strangers’ on social media in migrant work-
ers’ daily lives. As we will examine further in Chapter 4, among migrant 
workers, friendships with strangers established and maintained but 
remaining only on QQ, have become an important part of their social 
lives. Unlike offline relationships, which are usually constrained to fixed 
social roles and mixed with various practical needs, online relationships 
were viewed as ‘purer’ relationships based on feelings and emotions.
In order to cover the diversity of local people, I  applied various 
methods (Fig. 1.8). For instance, I often had several different breakfasts 
on the same morning in various breakfast booths in order to chat with 
‘strangers’ who shared the same table with me. I  visited all the shops 
on the high street one by one to do interviews and questionnaires, and 
paid a regular visit to waiting halls of different banks, clinics and train 
or bus stations to observe and chat with people. I also helped at a local 
mobile phone shop, giving me access to the first- hand material of the 
local mobile phone market and the opportunity to get to know a lot of 
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customers. On top of this, to avoid unnecessary suspicion, balance in 
different social networks had to be carefully maintained. Few factory 
workers knew I had a good relationship with their bosses, and factory 
owners and senior managers did not know that I was very close to their 
workers. 
In terms of quantitative data, questionnaires69 were conducted 
online and offline. The problem in practice was unwillingness and 
inability to complete a questionnaire. For most people a formal academic 
questionnaire was challenging and even intimidating, given the limited 
education they had received.70 Thus questionnaires were usually fin-
ished under my explanation in colloquial language. In general research 
inquiries were integrated in casual chatting both online and offline, sit-
uations in which real thoughts were more likely to be revealed.
Naturally an ethnography about social media was also conducted 
through social media. First of all, thousands of postings on social 
Fig. 1.8 (a) Wang driving a forklift truck at a factory; (b) Wang eating 
one of several breakfasts that she had in one morning at local breakfast 
booths as part of a plan to get to know more people; (c) Wang conduct-
ing a survey of workers from a temporary bed made of protective netting 
on a building site. (Three small paintings from a traditional Chinese 
painting booklet ‘Field Note’, 31.5 × 384 cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang)
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media profiles are vivid, original records of people’s thoughts and liv-
ing experiences. For this reason Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion 
and analysis of the actual postings we find on personal social media 
profiles. This is not just a place of observation, however: it is also one 
of engagement. In GoodPath social life usually took place in noisy 
and public environments such as restaurants or open-air markets. 
There are very few places which allow for relatively private, ‘one- to- 
one’ talks. Social media thus became the place I  talked with people 
privately about personal feelings and problems. Furthermore, social 
media helped me to overcome the communicative problem caused by 
the high mobility of migrant workers. In 2014, after the Chinese New 
Year break, almost one- third of the factory workers I had got to know 
did not come back to GoodPath. A few women got married and stayed 
in their home villages, but most of the workers simply got a new job in 
a different factory town or city. In the factory where I stayed, half of 
the factory workers were newly recruited. In such a situation, social 
media became almost the only way in which I could retain contact with 
former factory worker friends.
In addition to the ethnography in GoodPath, in July 2014 I spent one 
month in Shanghai – the closest metropolis, a few hours from GoodPath 
by train. I went there to conduct surveys and in- depth interviews among 
the urban Chinese. The trip to Shanghai was actually inspired by people 
in GoodPath. In the late stages of my research, the powerful longing to 
become urban and modern among migrant workers, clearly reflected in 
their social media postings, prompted me to have a look at the way in 
which urban Chinese use social media. In many ways the use of social 
media among this ‘control group’ in Shanghai71 presented a contrast with 
rural migrant usage of social media, which helped to resolve other ques-
tions – such as whether certain uses of social media are better explained 
in terms of the specific population or the social media platform, or both. 
As a last note, I also applied my artistic skills to record the field work. All 
of the traditional Chinese paintings included in this book and transla-
tions of the calligraphy can be found at the ‘visual ethnography’ website 
(http://www.visualethnographyxy.co.uk).
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The social media landscape in China1
On 20 September 1987 the first ever email in China read:  ‘Across the 
Great Wall we can reach every corner in the world.’2 Compared to the 
brick- and- mortar Great Wall, the Chinese internet ‘Great Firewall’ ( fan-
ghuo qiang)3 is actually the more difficult for people to climb. To this 
day China has completely blocked the world’s four most visited web-
sites:  Google, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Yet it is by no means a 
desert in the social media landscape. As well as possessing the world’s 
biggest internet user base (649 million)4, China also has the world’s most 
active environment for social media. Of the online population of China 
91 per cent has a social media account, compared to 67 per cent of peo-
ple in the US.5 In practice, most Chinese netizens do not really notice the 
absence of global internet applications because they have accustomed 
themselves to indigenous websites; there is no particular sense of an 
absent ‘outside’. Far from being a desert, therefore, mainland China is a 
thriving rainforest which grows its own diverse and unique social media 
‘species’. The discussion of Chinese social media in this chapter begins 
with a brief introduction to Chinese internet development. It then moves 
on to consider the main features of Chinese social media platforms, fol-
lowed by a discussion of smartphones as the main digital device from 
which people gain access to social media.
A brief history of Chinese ICTs’ development6
In 1978 China embarked upon a massive economic reform. The coun-
try’s leadership realised that modern China had to seize the opportu-
nities of the ‘revolution in information technology’7 taking place in 
the rest of the world. Modernisation of technology was included in the 
national development goal of ‘Four Modernisations’ (sige xiandaihua) in 
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1978. In fact ‘sponsor’ is more like the role played by the Chinese gov-
ernment in the development of ICTs. Using its administrative power 
and allocating national resources, the state made a remarkable effort to 
develop China into a technological superpower.8 Chinese policy makers 
have been using the internet to achieve a ‘digital leapfrog’ of economic 
development.9
The explosive growth of digital development has contributed sig-
nificantly to the modernisation of China, which in turn has legitimated 
the regime of the Chinese Communist Party.10 In 2003 China became the 
world’s largest telephone market, and in 2008 the number of Chinese 
internet users became the largest in the world. China had also overtaken 
Fig. 2.1 The timeline of internet applications, both inside and outside 
China. Logos (left to right): [upper line] MSN (1995), eBay (1997), 
Google (1999), Skype (2003), LinkedIn (2003), Facebook (2004), 
YouTube (2004), Twitter (2005), What’sApp (2009), Instagram (2010), 
Google+ (2011), SnapChat (2011); [lower line] QQ (1999), Tianya BBS 
(1999), Baidu (2000), Taobao (2003), Renren (2005), YouKu (2005), 
Tudou (2005), Douban (2005), Kaixin (2008), YY (2008), Sina Weibo 
(2009), WeChat (2011), MoMo (2011), Meipai (2014)
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the US by that date as the world’s biggest supplier of information tech-
nology goods.11 Probably because of the huge concern and interest in the 
single issue of Chinese internet censorship, there has been a reluctance 
to acknowledge the crucial role played by the central government – and 
also by local bureaucrats – in achieving this extraordinarily rapid shift 
to an efficient and widespread information technology sector.12
The timeline (Fig.  2.1) shows the development of the principal 
Chinese internet applications in comparison with their global counter-
parts. As can be seen, QQ started five years earlier than Facebook. Yet 
viewing QQ in the context of a comparative global social media study 
risks reducing QQ to being purely ‘social media’. The first very import-
ant reminder, therefore, is that QQ is not a Chinese version of Facebook. 
It is also quite common to see the social media site ‘Renren’ described 
by Western media as the Chinese version of Facebook. This is mislead-
ing, however, because in terms of popularity Renren’s market share is 
not comparable. The chart (Chart 2.1) shows the monthly active users 
(MAU) of different social media platforms inside and outside China. 
Even though Chinese social media platforms share a limited interna-
tional market, QQ has 843 million MAU – more than half of Facebook’s 
global users. Having explored the policy and company background, the 
following section will consider in more detail the three most popular 
Chinese social media platforms among people in GoodPath.
1600
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Chart 2.113 Number (in millions) of active monthly users of main 
social media platforms
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QQ: The dominant social media platform in GoodPath
In 1999 the Chinese central government launched a ‘Government 
online project’ (zhengfu shangwang gongcheng) which urged all levels of 
administration to set up their portal websites.14 In response to the project, 
the local government of GoodPath purchased a computer. However, the 
problem was that neither local officials nor residents found any use for 
it, even though many villagers felt the purchase boosted morale, as one 
of them recalled: 
Officials claimed that the computer marked the moment that our 
town had entered the high- technology age. Well, to be honest, you 
just heard so, but didn’t really think about what that meant exactly. 
At least, it sounded exciting . . . it was like our folk saying:  ‘Even 
though you have never tasted pork, at least you have seen a pig 
running’ (mei chiguo zhurou, zongsuan jianguo zhu pao).
GoodPath’s ‘high- tech pig’ lay gathering dust for almost eight years 
until one day people found it was too old to run. For most people in 
this small town, the gap between the ‘national policy’ and ‘daily life’ 
remained unchanged until a penguin wearing a scarf walked into their 
life. The penguin (Fig. 2.2) is the mascot of Chinese ICT giant Tencent. 
In 1998 HuaTeng Ma, a young software developer, set up a software 
company called Tencent, and his first product was ‘QQ’,15 a free instant 
message (IM) service. Nowadays, in terms of numbers of users, 
Fig. 2.2 The mascot of QQ
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QQ is unquestionably the biggest social media platform in China. 
Besides IM, Qzone (QQ kongjian) is another important part of QQ’s dig-
ital service. Strictly speaking Qzone,16 the personal social networking 
platform on which users update statuses, write blogs and upload and 
share articles, photographs, music and videos with online contacts, is 
the social media platform usually compared with Facebook. For non- 
QQ users, QQ is truly different from other social media platforms in 
many ways. Five concepts will be used to consider the striking fea-
tures of QQ: 1) high degree of anonymity; 2) high media convergence; 
3) high customisation; 4) rich visuals; and 5) hierarchical structure.
A QQ account is actually a string of figures generated by the sys-
tem, usually called a ‘QQ number’ (QQ hao). Users can choose any nick-
name they like for their ‘QQ name’ (QQ ming). Real names are very 
rarely used for QQ names, and usually do not even look like a traditional 
‘name’. In many cases people use a sentence such as ‘I am crying with a 
smile’ or ‘soaring in the blue sky’ as their QQ names. Exchanging one’s 
QQ details always refers to exchanging the ‘QQ number’ rather than ‘QQ 
name’, as the QQ number will always remain the same. Young people 
frequently change their QQ names; during my research I had to make a 
note and ‘rename’ all my QQ contacts on my list so that I could recognise 
the users.17 In GoodPath 98 per cent of QQ users did not use their real 
names as QQ names; 64 per cent did not use real photographs as QQ 
avatars (profile pictures). The anonymity of profiles was slightly lower, 
but still very high among QQ users in Shanghai, where 95 per cent of 
QQ users do not use real names, and 50 per cent did not use a real photo-
graph for their QQ avatar.18
The main feature of the QQ ‘menu bar’ is a contacts list, with other 
add- on functions. In contrast to Facebook, which does not highlight ‘con-
tacts curation’, QQ strongly guides users to sort out their contacts into 
different categories. The default categories of QQ contacts are ‘Friends’, 
‘Family’, ‘Classmate’, ‘Work colleague’, ‘Strangers’ and ‘Black list’; users 
can always rename the categories.
As one can see on the menu bar (Fig 2.3), QQ offers multiple digital 
services. These include group chat (QQ group), video call, social media 
(Qzone), microblog (Tencent Weibo), email, online game, online music, 
and online shopping (QQ shop).19 Offering a whole package of digital 
solutions, QQ is the starting point for many people in China of their dig-
ital life: QQ email is the first email, Qzone is the first social media plat-
form, QQ music is the first online music programme and QQ games are 
the first online games. Nowadays the ‘convergence culture’,20 in which 
previously separate multiple media technologies have gradually merged 
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into one, has become the mainstream in the West. However, few have 
acknowledged that the trajectory of digital development in China actu-
ally started with a high-level media convergence.
The high customisation of QQ is well illustrated by the hundreds of 
personal webpage models, background pictures and music, and decora-
tive elements offered on Qzone (Fig. 2.4), as well as thousands of online 
clothes and accessories enabling users to dress their online avatars up as 
they desire (Fig. 2.5). Among hundreds of Qzones I have visited during 
my research, none have ever been identical.
Customisation of digital space is actually commonplace through-
out the Asia- Pacific region, and such a feature contributes to a far more 
humanised relationship between users and online spaces.21 One illu-
minating example on QQ is the ‘check- in’ (qian dao) service. Unlike on 
Facebook, where a check- in service allows users to mark the physical 
locations they are currently in online, the check- in service on QQ actu-
ally refers to checking into the online space of QQ, no matter where the 
Fig. 2.3 The main body of the QQ menu bar
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Fig. 2.4 The decorative elements on Qzone
Fig. 2.5 Dressing up avatars on Qzone
users may be in the offline world. QQ offers different check- in stamps 
for users. For example, Fig. 2.6 shows the daily horoscope and Fig. 2.7 
shows the ‘everyday wish’ stamps, offering helpful guidance:  ‘no pro-
crastination’, ‘quit smoking’, ‘go to bed earlier’, ‘do exercise’, ‘do not 
waste food’. Xue, a 25- year- old factory officer, tried to use QQ check- in 
to quit smoking, acknowledging ‘To some extent I  think it [QQ check- 
in] helped . . . it’s always more effective when you know that you’re being 
watched’. For weeks Xue checked in on QQ every day, and his QQ friends 
would see a ‘quit smoking’ stamp from Xue’s news feed, which meant 
that he did not smoke on that day.
The feature of ‘high customisation’ and ‘strong visuals’ are highly 
consequential. Chinese website design has been known for its richer 
colours and more complicated, cluttered layouts compared to Western 
websites, which value simplicity far more.22 On QQ the situation is the 
same. As one of the most popular good wishes at Chinese New Year, nian-
nian youyu (to have ample surplus by the end of every year) suggests, 
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to have ‘more than enough’ is traditionally considered the lucky sign of 
prosperity. The principle of ‘the more, the merrier’, frequently found on 
Chinese dining tables, also contributes to the ‘visual feast’ available on 
QQ.23 Unlike the blue and white uniform of Facebook, the Qzone inter-
face appears much more colourful and visually rich.
Finally the QQ level system is another unique function of QQ, 
reflecting its ‘hierarchical structure’ feature. Launched in 2004, the QQ 
level system is based on customers’ usage time – the longer the user is 
Fig. 2.7 Daily wish as ‘check- in’ stamps on QQ
Fig. 2.6 Daily horoscope as ‘check- in’ stamps on QQ
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signed- in on QQ, the higher the QQ level that can be obtained. Different 
QQ levels offer users different functions and services:  the higher the 
level, the more online privileges users enjoy, such as the ability to set up 
a QQ group and access more decorative elements. 
At that time [around 2001], everybody in my middle school was 
crazy about the QQ level, people with a higher QQ level were 
even more likely to have a say . . . I  also used all the means to 
gain a higher level . . . even today I  have no clue of what kind of 
privileges I’ve  got or whether I’ve really used any of them, but 
at that time you just felt good about being upgraded to a higher 
level . . . maybe it’s just about mianzi (face).
Huo, now a 26- year- old factory worker, sensed that the varied QQ levels, 
like all other systems of hierarchy, divide people into different classes; he 
thus felt the urge to gain a higher level on QQ to gain some face (mianzi), 
even though he hardly saw any instrumental value in a higher level. Huo 
even asked his older sister, who worked at a local internet cafe, to sign 
in on his QQ during the daytime when he had no access to the internet. 
Ten years ago Huo was just one of millions of Chinese QQ users working 
hard to climb the social ladder on QQ. The practice of signing in on QQ 
for as long as possible, purely for the purpose of upgrading to a higher 
level (guaji) became so popular among the population that the Chinese 
National Grid had to warn of the nationwide waste of electricity caused 
by QQ.24 In 2005 Tencent had to change the QQ upgrading algorithm to 
address such criticism. The new algorithm counts days of active usage, 
rather than hours, and two hours per day is counted as an active day of 
usage.25
Besides the basic QQ level system calculated by time, users can 
also purchase different kinds of privileges or QQ VIP membership. Juan, 
a 20- year- old rural migrant who worked at a local foot massage shop, 
bought herself a VIP QQ membership, which cost her around 250 RMB 
(US $40) for a year. As such, Juan’s QQ name was shown in red with a 
golden VIP label, and was always listed at the top of my QQ contacts list. 
When asked why she wanted to spend almost one- tenth of her monthly 
salary for a VIP membership on QQ, Juan shrugged her shoulders:  ‘I 
don’t know . . . I  just feel good being a VIP.’ At the foot massage shop 
where she worked, the VIP guests were usually rich factory owners – the 
da laoban (big bosses) as Juan addressed them. According to her, they 
were treated as kings. For Juan, the VIP title on QQ is the only afforda-
ble VIP status in her life, and it truly made her feel better about herself.
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At the first glance, the whole QQ level system seems simply to 
reflect the deep- rooted hierarchical social structure in Chinese social 
life; people seem intrinsically to accept the rules of the game. In practice, 
however, the hierarchy on QQ is fundamentally different from the social 
hierarchy in China. In offline life it is very difficult or almost impossi-
ble to overcome various existing inequalities and to reduce class differ-
ences, as the rural– urban divide, based on hukou household registration 
(see Chapter 1) clearly demonstrates. Deep frustration about reality was 
common among rural migrant workers, especially young people. The 
older generation of migrant workers appeared to have accepted reality 
after years of ‘floating’ life; they were primarily concerned with how to 
make the best of the existing situation. The new generation was more 
likely to challenge and refuse to accept such inequalities, constantly 
struggling with the gap between dream and reality. Such frustration, 
however, does not exist on QQ, since the rules are much simpler and 
more straightforward: as long as one spends either money or time, suc-
cess and upgrading is almost guaranteed.
QQ – once the symbol of urban lifestyle
I begged my brother to get a QQ for me. I  thought it would be 
extremely difficult for our rural people to get one . . . you have to 
get your application stamped in government offices or things like 
that . . . anyway, now you may think it’s silly . . . I felt so happy and so 
proud of having a QQ, even though I didn’t have internet at home 
and I didn’t know what to do with it at that time. You know, only a 
few people in our village have ever heard of QQ, let alone used it.
Da Guo, a 22- year- old factory worker, had his first QQ nine years ago. 
At that time, he was still a schoolboy, living in a poor village in inland 
China and knowing nothing about the internet. His older brother had 
already worked away in cities for two years. During Chinese New Year 
when his brother came back for the family reunion, Da Guo heard for 
the first time about the magical QQ that urbanites used. As Da Guo 
remarked, once upon a time QQ was regarded as the symbol of modern 
life, especially among people in rural areas.26
In the early stage of internet development in China, the eastern 
area had much higher rates of internet penetration than the less devel-
oped western and inland regions.27 China’s commercial internet came 
into existence in 1995 in urban areas such as Beijing and Shanghai,28 
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and was mainly used by urban elites.29 Even though the ‘digital divide’ 
between urban and rural has been reduced following two decades of 
major investment in internet and information service infrastructures in 
rural China, by the end of 2014 only 27.5 per cent of 649 million netizens 
in China belonged to the rural population.30 Due to the digital divide and 
other gaps in material life, as well as the hukou status assigned at birth, 
urban lifestyles have long been considered superior,31 and admired by 
the rural population.32 In such a context QQ, perceived as a digital priv-
ilege enjoyed by the urbanites, immediately gained a lofty status among 
the rural population when it first appeared in their lives. Clearly among 
rural young people such as Da Guo, the symbolic meaning of QQ out- 
weighed their actual use of it. To get a sense of how many people had 
a QQ before they had private access to the internet, a survey was con-
ducted in September 2014 among 200 people in GoodPath and 48 peo-
ple in Shanghai (Chart 2.2).
In Chart 2.2, both in Shanghai and GoodPath, the use of QQ started 
before the ownership of personal digital devices (PC or mobile phone). 
In GoodPath 63 per cent of people had QQ before the ownership of a 
mobile phone. QQ had been used for 5.8 years on average, with 11 years 
as the longest and 4 years as the shortest. It is also clear that the popu-
larity of QQ first started among China’s urban population and spread 
from urban to rural (the average years of use of QQ is 7.2 in Shanghai 
and 5.8 years in GoodPath). The digital gap between urban population 
and rural population in terms of ownership of digital devices seems to 
still exist, but when it comes to smartphones the gap has become less 
obvious.
Chart 2.2 Use of QQ and ownership of digital devices in GoodPath 
town and Shanghai
GoodPath  
(small town)
Shanghai 
(city)
Having a QQ before having a  
private mobile phone
63% 48%
Ownership of Smartphone /  
functional mobile phone
89% /  100% 98% /  100%
Using QQ before having a 
personal computer
96% 67%
Ownership of PC 42% 83%
Average years of use of QQ 5.8 7.2
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Despite all the disparities and differences in terms of QQ usage 
between rural migrants and residents of Shanghai, there is one common 
feature: after more than a decade of popularity among Chinese people, 
and despite remaining the biggest social media platform, QQ has lost 
its ‘coolness’ and its association with urban life or ‘modernity’. The con-
trary now applies with some people even using terms such as ‘old friend’ 
or ‘hometown’ (lao jia) to describe QQ in a nostalgic tone. As Xu Hong, 
a 30- year- old factory officer, said, she would not give QQ as her contact 
details any more since on her Qzone one may discover ‘an immature 
girl of ten years ago’. However, she did not want to delete any of the 
postings on her Qzone as it was always good to go back and visit her 
much younger self on QQ. For Xu Hong, her QQ has become her digital 
legacy.33 Among young rural migrants who are active QQ users, the use 
of QQ per se has become a routine of daily life. This is precisely the rea-
son why they spend a lot of energy on designing and beautifying their 
Qzones to make them more stylish and unique (gexing), as being unique 
is still considered to be modern. Meanwhile for urban young people QQ 
has become a land of ‘hustle and bustle’, which has somehow become 
associated with rural youth culture.
Compared to QQ, which is no longer associated with urban fash-
ion, WeChat, a smartphone- based messaging app launched in 2011, 
has become the major new social media platform used by urban resi-
dents. In 2015 the penetration rate of WeChat (the percentage of peo-
ple who use WeChat at least once a week) in Chinese ‘first tier’ cities 
(Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) had reached 93 per cent,34 while 
in small counties and fourth or fifth tier cities the figure was 26 per 
cent.35 The survey conducted during field work36 in Shanghai also 
illustrates the absolute dominance of WeChat:  86 per cent of people 
in Shanghai reported that their use of QQ had become less active 
since the use of WeChat. Meanwhile 95 per cent have now switched 
to WeChat as the main communication tool in personal relationships. 
Consequently when it came to the question:  ‘How would you react if 
somebody wanted to add you on QQ?’ a typical answer is that of Yi, a 
30- year- old white-collar worker in a Shanghai international com-
pany: ‘If somebody asks for my QQ, I would be like . . . Are you kidding 
me? Can you be any more rustic (tu)?! . . . Sorry, I  don’t think we are 
on the same planet.’ Yi’s opinion of QQ was actually representative of 
the majority of interviewees of Shanghai. Of these interviewees 61 per 
cent, like Yi, admitted that in their eyes QQ was out of fashion (guoshi) 
or rustic (tu), and exchanging QQ numbers in social life37 would appear 
awkward.
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GoodPath also witnessed the fast growth in popularity of 
WeChat among rural migrant workers (Chart 2.3). At the beginning of 
the research a survey38 shows that 19 per cent of people in GoodPath 
town had WeChat on their smartphones, whereas 96 per cent of them 
used QQ. Among these only 11 per cent regarded themselves as active 
WeChat users,39 whereas 85 per cent of them use QQ as their main 
personal social media. About a year later a similar survey40 shows that 
65 per cent of people had installed WeChat on their smartphones and 
the rate of WeChat active users had soared to 45 per cent, whereas the 
rate of QQ’s active users had slightly reduced to around 80 per cent.
The figures above come from relatively small samples. Yet they do 
serve to showcase the different cultural capital ascribed to the use of QQ 
and WeChat, which has been confirmed by the long- term ethnography. 
To analyse the difference between QQ and WeChat further, we need to 
have a closer look at WeChat first.
WeChat — China’s favourite new social media
Launched in 2011 by the same company that owns QQ, known in China 
as WeiXin (literally ‘micro letter’), the growth of WeChat is impres-
sive: by November 2015, the total of monthly active users of WeChat was 
650  million, already 72 per cent of WhatsApp’s global achievement.41 
In 2014, a survey by Global Web Index42 shows that WeChat is the most 
popular messaging app in the Asia- Pacific region. In terms of basic func-
tions (Fig. 2.8), WeChat provides text messaging, voice messaging and 
video calls, as well as multimedia sharing (links, photographs and vid-
eos). WeChat ‘moment’ (pengyou quan) is the personal profile, and the 
WeChat subscriptions/ public account (gonggong zhanghao) is where 
users can subscribe information from more than 10 million accounts43 
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Chart 2.3 Change in QQ and WeChat use from June 2013 to August 
2014 in GoodPath
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on the platform – ranging from media outlets and various institutions 
to personal blogs and more. Information on WeChat is storable and 
searchable. Users can save postings to their built- in WeChat files, or 
search for postings and conversation logs by key word on WeChat. In 
2015 a WeChat user on average read 5.86 articles per day, 20 per cent 
of WeChat users read articles from subscription accounts, while 80 per 
cent of users read on WeChat personal accounts.44 Given that in 2015 
Chinese people only read on average 4.56 books per year, far less than in 
neighbouring east Asian countries,45 one can conclude that WeChat has 
also become also a ‘reading app’.
To summarise, there are seven features of WeChat. Some 
of them are actually very different from QQ, which in a way also 
explains why WeChat and QQ are favoured by different groups of peo-
ple:  1)  smartphone- based; 2)  visually oriented; 3)  strong voice mes-
sage function; 4) low degree of anonymity; 5) high degree of privacy; 
6) closed community; and 7) high monetisation.
Being launched at the time of the fast growth of the smartphone 
market in China – in contrast to QQ which started as a web- based mes-
saging service and then was adapted for mobile – WeChat leapfrogged 
the PC era to the smartphone direct.46 WeChat is designed to suit the 
‘smartphone lifestyle’ and has become an aggregator of mobile services. 
Compared to the ‘visual feast’ on QQ, where users are allowed to design 
and decorate the whole page of their personal profiles, the room for cus-
tomisation on WeChat is limited. The layout of WeChat profiles is fixed, 
and one can only change the avatar and cover photograph, which is sim-
ilar to Facebook. However, WeChat gives priority to the visual in a differ-
ent way. Posting on WeChat is designed to be visual- orientated. For each 
Fig. 2.8 The interface of WeChat (left to right): The one- to- one chat; 
the group chat; the moment; and the subscriptions
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posting one has to upload at least one image first, before the text input 
area appears. As a result it is effectively impossible to post anything 
on WeChat without an image. On WeChat the word ‘album’ (xiangce) 
is used to refer to a user’s personal profile, which also highlights the 
importance of the visual. In this perspective WeChat works a bit like 
Instagram, where images are regarded as the main body of the post. 
Even though later on WeChat added the ‘pure text’ function – meaning 
that if users select ‘long press’ then select ‘add a new post’, a pure text 
posting is possible – this was known by less than five per cent of people 
in both Shanghai and GoodPath field sites during research. WeChat did 
not officially prompt the pure text function. Studies have proven that 
visual clues are much more effective in directing attention to core infor-
mation, enhancing comprehension of information and strengthening 
memorability.47 
Visually orientated and mobile- based entry on WeChat also 
encourages users to take more photographs with their smartphones to 
capture ‘on the go’ occasions. These visuals are not only shared with 
others immediately, but also stored on WeChat for users’ future recall. 
Such patterns of communication seem to boost more positive interper-
sonal communication, as well as offering the possibility of enhanced 
emotional well- being.48 It is known that a timely response to good or 
nice things in daily life serves to maximise their positive effects on our 
lives.49 In addition ‘savouring’, namely a mindful engaging in thoughts 
or behaviour that highlights positive emotions, heightens and enhances 
the positive experience of daily life.50 Having said this, the study in 
GoodPath and Shanghai shows that different social groups actually 
made very different use of, and had very different attitudes towards, 
the visuals on WeChat. This will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
Besides visual orientation, voice messaging, another major func-
tion of WeChat, also enhances the platform’s media richness.51 Statistics 
in 2014 show that 84.5 per cent of WeChat users employ WeChat for voice 
messaging,52 and in 2015 the average daily amount of WeChat voice 
messaging was 280 million minutes – equivalent to 540 years of phone 
calls.53 In GoodPath 60 per cent of WeChat users send or receive voice 
messages almost daily. In Shanghai voice message is also becoming pop-
ular among the elderly, as noted by Sang, a 66- year- old retired company 
official. ‘[Leaving a] voice message is as simple as making a phone call. 
I never use instant messages because first I don’t know Pinyin,54 second 
I can’t see such small words on a small screen.’
Voice messaging has enabled an older generation of Chinese, in 
their fifties and above, to enjoy much easier communication; text entry 
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has always been a big barrier for users over 50 who are not good at 
Pinyin.55 Having said this, WeChat users are in the main still very young, 
with those aged between 18 and 35 accounting for 86.2 per cent of the 
total.56 Besides ‘being convenient’, some other nuanced implications 
of voice messaging have also been acknowledged, as noted here by Guli, 
a 21- year- old factory worker: 
I only feel comfortable about talking with my boyfriend in what-
ever situation; with others you will be worried about whether your 
voice is right or not or sending voice message is proper or not.
To Guli, voice messages are more personal and private than sending a 
text message. She was once annoyed by a male colleague who recorded 
his own singing and sent it to her as a voice message: 
. . . It’s so disturbing; if it’s just text I can easily ignore it . . . but why 
did you send me voice? Why don’t some people understand the sim-
ple fact that they can’t sing? . . . Anyway I just think you shouldn’t 
send voice messages at all to people who are not that close to you.
Compared to text, voice messaging  – carrying the unique biophysical 
feature of a person  – is commonly regarded as an intimate mode in 
personal communication. Like Guli, many saw voice messaging as pri-
marily suitable for intimate and private contacts. Only 28 per cent of 
rural migrants in GoodPath town reported that they had ever sent voice 
messages to their managers, and this reduced to only nine per cent in 
Shanghai57 who had ever used voice messages in supervisor– subordinate 
relationships.
In answer to the question ‘Have you ever listened to your own voice 
messages after sending them off?’,58 47 per cent of female and 22 per 
cent of male respondents in GoodPath said yes, whereas in Shanghai 
the figures were 70 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. The main rea-
sons included: 1) ‘I want to check whether my voice message has been 
recorded completely’; 2)  ‘I am curious about my own voice’; 3)  ‘I want 
to check whether my tone is proper or whether I express myself prop-
erly’. In China few people have had the prior experience of leaving and 
receiving voice messages on telephone answering machines. Compared 
to Europe or America, therefore, voice messags are viewed as a much 
more radical innovation.
Jack, a successful businessman in Shanghai, uses WeChat to train 
his speaking skills. 
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The way you talk matters. I  listen to the voice messages I  have 
sent off to my business partners all the time. It’s like a voice 
‘mirror’ so that you know what you sound like and how you can 
do better . . . 
In the book Webcam,59 the authors noticed that one of its important fea-
tures of the webcam is that it effectively acts as a mirror, allowing many 
people their first ever opportunity to see themselves in conversation. It is 
interesting to note that a similar novel state of communication is taking 
place in the case of voice messaging among Chinese users: people can 
actually listen to themselves in daily communication for the first time. 
Even though people started to use voice messages for speed and conve-
nience, they ended up with a new awareness of their voice as something 
that one can creatively craft.
The three features of WeChat we have observed so far are: 
1) smartphone- based; 2) visually oriented; and 3) strong voice message, 
all relating to the pattern of interpersonal communication. The fourth 
feature of WeChat, ‘low anonymity’, serves as the starting point of our 
inquiry into the nature of interpersonal communication on WeChat. 
Compared to QQ, real names are used more frequently on WeChat. 
For WeChat public accounts, registration with real names is required;60 
even on WeChat personal accounts, real names are more often used 
than on QQ: 
The majority of my WeChat contacts are either my family or friends 
who knew my real name in the first place anyway, or some business 
partners or clients where you need to use real names to talk with 
them. A non- real name is not professional.
This remark by Zhao, a 32- year- old businessman in Shanghai, serves 
also to reflect another feature of the WeChat network:  its relatively 
closed community. There are a few ways61 to add new contacts on 
WeChat (Fig. 2.9), the most common being scanning a QR Code,62 using 
mobile contacts, QQ numbers63 or WeChat IDs. Scanning a QR code 
in most cases64 requires a face to  face situation, which means contacts 
added by QR code are usually those one has met. Either mobile phone 
number, QQ number or WeChat ID all suggest a very targeted contact 
search; it is extremely difficult for users to add random strangers by 
those methods.
WeChat users can nonetheless still add strangers by functions such 
as ‘people nearby’ ( fujin de ren), which facilitates users to search for 
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strangers, listed by gender, who have allowed themselves to be located 
and are within one’s vicinity (Fig. 2.9). Another option is ‘shake’ (yao yi 
yao), which allows user to shake their device to find any random people 
who are shaking their smartphone at the same time all around the world 
(Fig. 2.10), or ‘message in a bottle’ (piao liu ping). In this function, as its 
name suggests, you can pick up digital messages in the form of a text 
or short voice clip from random people, as well as toss digital messages 
into a ‘sea’ and allow others to pick them up (Fig.  2.11). Even though 
there is no exact demographic data of people who use WeChat to con-
nect with strangers, in field work it has become certain that young adults 
(18– 29) and older adults (30+) remain in general less likely than teens 
to use those WeChat functions to connect with strangers. They may have 
tried once or twice and then stopped using them, whereas teens both in 
Shanghai and GoodPath were more attracted to those game- like func-
tions. The exception is that male adults, from age 18– 50, seemed to be as 
keen on ‘people nearby’ and ‘shake’ as teens, in order to pursue potential 
romance and/ or sex.
Generally speaking, across China WeChat is mainly used by 
urban adults with a relatively stable social network, stable income and 
Fig 2.9 The ‘people nearby’ function of WeChat
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Fig. 2.10 The ‘shake’ function of WeChat
Fig. 2.11 The ‘message in a bottle’ function of WeChat
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relatively high education.65 For those people, WeChat represents a closed 
community that mainly consists of offline network (family, friends and 
colleagues at work), with little room for online strangers. Also, since the 
urban user’s online identity overlaps strongly with their offline identity, 
real names are widely accepted and applied. However, the situation is 
very different for rural migrants, who constantly feel frustration in their 
‘floating’ offline life. They therefore have a stronger desire for higher 
anonymity online, in order to lose or deny their unsatisfactory social 
identity offline. A survey in the study66 shows that 71 per cent of WeChat 
users in Shanghai applied real names or easily recognisable nick names 
or initial letters for their WeChat profiles. Eighty- two per cent of them 
used real portrait photographs (photos of themselves or their children) 
as WeChat avatars. Of the rural migrant users in GoodPath, however, 
only three per cent show their real names on WeChat, while the rate of 
real photos is as low as 12 per cent. Even though we label WeChat as ‘low 
anonymity’ in general, therefore, the situation can be very different in 
different social groups.
Designed mainly for urban users, the privacy setting on WeChat 
is stricter than on QQ and Facebook. For example, on QQ visiting one’s 
Qzone profile is in most cases67 visible not only to the profile owner, 
but also to all of the profile owner’s QQ contacts. This basically means 
that social media ‘stalking’ on QQ is difficult. On Facebook, by contrast, 
viewing someone’s profile trying not be noticed is not only possible, but 
also popular.68
Compared to the situation on WeChat, however, the visibility of 
one’s social network on Facebook69 is still much higher. On WeChat users 
have no access to their WeChat friends’ contacts list. On top of this, in 
many cases users have no access to the ‘likes’ and ‘comments’ left on 
their friends’ profile pages. For example, if A and B are both friends with 
C, but A and B are not friends on WeChat, then A cannot see B’s com-
ments or likes to C’s posts. Moreover, one can only share postings from 
WeChat ‘public’ accounts. That is to say, sharing a friend’s post by just 
clicking on ‘share’, which is very common on Facebook, is not possible 
on WeChat. For Hu, a 33- year- old journalist from Shanghai, such filter-
ing on WeChat is helpful. ‘I like the design, neat and simple; social rela-
tionships are complicated and it can avoid a lot of trouble if irrelevant 
contacts are separated rather than mixed up.’ It allows her much more 
freedom and flexibility to deal with different social networks: 
Sometimes banters between me and my close friends on comment 
can be very improper in other’s eyes . . . If all my friends’ comments 
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could be seen by all my WeChat contacts, I am afraid my reputation 
would be totally ruined, haha!
Whereas, nothing is perfect, sometimes Hu also wished that the com-
ments and likes can be seen by all, ‘ . . . but funnily enough, things are 
different if you post some good news, then you actually want everybody 
to see that you are “liked” by many and you got such and such praises on 
comments’.
Like Hu, Hao Wen, a university graduate in his twenties has also 
spotted the consequence of the ‘common  friend  only’ (gongtong haoyou 
kejian) setting on WeChat. However for him, rather than feeling regret 
that he cannot make highly praised posts visible to all the contacts, he 
actually makes his less popular postings appear to be very popular: 
The point is you don’t know exactly how many people liked or 
commented on my posts since you have no idea how many are not 
our common friends . . . then that’s something I  can work on. For 
example, I comment on my own posting saying ‘Thank you to all 
of you and I am really touched’. Now this comment can be seen by 
all, and people would believe that there are actually many people 
who have commented on or liked this posting; they couldn’t see 
any just because those who commented or liked were not common 
friends . . . I guess it’s also about mianzi (face); you just don’t want 
to lose face in front of your friends.
It is difficult to judge how many WeChat users actually applied the same 
trick as Hao Wen did to produce a more popular and positive self- image 
online. Interestingly what Hao Wen revealed was an anxiety about 
one’s public image in a relatively closed and strong- tie based online 
community. 
‘ “Face” represents an individual’s claimed sense of positive image 
in the context of social interaction.’70 In this instance social media is the 
context of social interaction, with concerns or even anxiety about one’s 
positive image on social media being commonly shared among people in 
the research. Without doubt Hao Wen successfully solved the problem 
by taking advantage of the setting of online display, and made the dis-
advantage of WeChat’s function in certain situations into a valued trick.
The features of ‘low anonymity’, ‘high privacy’ and ‘closed com-
munity’ on WeChat are embraced by many urban citizens, but they 
are not necessarily viewed as advantages among rural migrants in 
GoodPath. In fact the opposite is true: more than two- thirds of migrant 
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workers, especially younger people, showed a clear preference for QQ 
over WeChat. Some of them gave as a reason that on QQ the social 
connection is more open. As we will discover in Chapter 4, visitors of 
Qzone are encouraged or even urged to engage with more interactions, 
which help to contribute to a ‘hot and noisy’ (renao) ambience of Qzone. 
Furthermore, strangers on QQ have become an important part of social 
life online71 for rural migrants whose real names are cautiously avoided, 
given the discrepancy between people’s online and offline social 
identities.
‘High monetisation’ is the feature of WeChat to emerge most 
recently. The field work has witnessed a successful monetisation of 
WeChat, beginning at Chinese New Year 2014. On 28 January 2014 
WeChat launched a new function called ‘WeChat red envelope’ (hong-
bao), which allowed users to send ‘digital red envelopes’ of money to 
WeChat contacts electronically. ‘The red envelope’ (which contains 
real money) has a long tradition in China as a festival and ceremony 
gift (for example a gift for Chinese New Year or a wedding), with the 
implication of bringing good luck and best wishes in addition to the 
monetary value. The new function on WeChat allows Chinese people 
to move this tradition online, and to make it more fun: the sender can 
either send a ‘fixed amount’ digital red envelope to certain contacts 
or alternatively decide how much to hand out in total to how many 
people and then leave everything else to the system, which randomly 
chooses how the total is divided. For instance, A decided to hand out 
20 RMB to five WeChat contacts. The money could be divided into five 
digital red envelopes by the system randomly as 2.4, 3.6, 2.3, 1.5, and 
0.2 RMB. Then the first five WeChat contacts of A who clicked the link 
got envelopes. Being the first one does not guarantee the most money, 
however: he or she may unfortunately end up with the envelope con-
taining the least. The gambling- like red envelope grabbing soon went 
viral. From Chinese New Year’s Eve to 4 p.m. on the first day of the 
Chinese New Year (31 January 2014), more than 5 million users tried 
out the feature to deliver in excess of 75 million red envelopes. Every 
minute an average of 9,412 virtual red envelopes were received during 
this period.72
Given the fact that users had to link their bank account(s) to their 
WeChat accounts before they could hand out or withdraw73 money from 
red envelopes, the red envelope phenomenon significantly fuelled the 
monetisation of WeChat. This in turn paved the way for mobile pay-
ments via WeChat. Via a WeChat ‘wallet’, the WeChat payment account74 
(Fig. 2.12), users can make instant payments for online as well as in- store 
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purchases. In 2015 at least one in five active WeChat users were set up 
for WeChat payment.75 Besides business institutions, all the WeChat 
public accounts can also sell products or services on WeChat. WeChat 
payment verified service accounts (retailers) on its platform. Through 
WeChat payment, service accounts are able to provide direct in- app pay-
ment service to users. Customers are allowed either to pay for items or 
services on web pages inside the app or to pay in store by scanning the 
digital ID (WeChat QR codes) of products provided by offline retailers. 
In 2015 WeChat launched the ‘City Services’ project,76 further expand-
ing the scope of services to pay utility bills, book a doctor’s appointment, 
get bank statements, send money to friends, obtain geo- targeted cou-
pons, etc. Through such practices WeChat has become an aggregator 
of the most frequently used and popular services available on mobile 
devices. We can conclude that WeChat has gone far beyond a social 
media tool. It has the potential to become a highly hybrid mobile and 
social commerce platform, with built- in payment accounts (e- wallet), 
LBS (location- based services) and much more.
Fig. 2.12 WeChat pay interface
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The high monetisation of WeChat leads us to a wider exploration of 
e- commerce in China.77 China is leading the way in this field with high 
mobile purchase rates (69 per cent of Chinese consumers made a pur-
chase through their smartphone, as opposed to 46 per cent of consumers 
in the US) and a more active participation in social media.78 In GoodPath, 
around ten per cent of people79 actively engaged with e- commerce, for 
example setting up one’s own online shop or selling goods on one’s per-
sonal WeChat profiles. Most of them have full- time jobs and do WeChat 
business part- time; others do it more professionally, since they sell the 
same products in their physical stores. Around 60 per cent of people 
engaged at least once with mobile payment functions or other forms of 
online commercial events, with an even higher rate among young peo-
ple of 95 per cent.
Generally speaking, special/ local goods (local specialities) or 
products endorsed by friends sold by friends sell best. Dee in GoodPath 
represents a successful example of doing business on WeChat. Her best- 
selling product is free- range chicken eggs form her parents’ farm.80 
Towards the end of 2013 the outbreak of bird flu seriously affected the 
chicken farm’s business because all the regular buyers stopped purchas-
ing. Hundreds of organic chicken eggs became unmarketable products 
overnight. This became one of the most difficult moments in Dee’s life 
as she watched the family business slide into a desperate situation. 
Inspired by the commercial posts on WeChat that she encountered every 
day, Dee decided to turn to it. She posted a photograph of a basket of 
eggs and wrote: 
My dear friends, if you want to buy healthy, organic eggs, please let 
me know. My parents’ chicken farm offers 100 per cent healthy and 
organic free- range chicken eggs at the most reasonable price! And 
also please spread the word!
On the same day she got five orders from her friends and all the eggs 
were sold within two weeks. A friend of Dee’s, Yun, who ordered 50 eggs 
on WeChat, commented ‘I think it is a good deal, I helped her out, but it’s 
not that she owes me a big favour (renqing) since I also benefited a lot 
from the good price of the quality eggs’. During the next two months of 
the egg crisis, I continued to trace the interaction between Dee and Yun 
on WeChat, observing that Dee’s ‘like’ and comments on Yun’s new post-
ings had become much more frequent since the egg crisis. ‘I think I owe 
her a favour (renqing), so maybe because of that I paid more attention 
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to her updates on WeChat since then . . . and I do think we have a better 
relationship now,’ Dee explained.
At first glance, Dee’s egg sale on WeChat is just one instance of 
‘word- of- mouth marketing’, of which I encountered plenty in field work. 
This also seems to echo a study which shows that in China 66 per cent of 
Chinese consumers relied on recommendations from friends and fam-
ily, compared to 38 per cent in the US.81 However, in Dee’s case there 
is something more to consider. On the one hand, as we mentioned in 
Chapter 1, in the collective society of China social relations (guanxi), 
the derivative of kinship or ‘in- group’ personal relationships, has its 
fundamental impact on a whole range of social interactions from busi-
ness activities to public relations.82 On the other hand, it is important 
to acknowledge that business activities which manifest themselves, for 
example, in a form of traditional red envelopes – the gift money which 
was given with the expectation of return83 – is always an integral or even 
necessary part of personal relationships in China.84
In the anthropology of China, there is a rich literature on the ‘gift 
economy’. The major argument is that in the cycle of giving, receiving 
and the reciprocity of gift exchange, social relationships are established 
and maintained.85 In Dee’s case, the gift exchange does not take place in 
the form of a physical gift, but by way of a favour (renqing), which also 
follows the principle of reciprocity.86 Renqing literally means ‘human 
feelings’, and refers to the feelings inherent in personal relationships. 
In practice renqing also provides a moral sense of obligation (such 
feeling as ‘I owe you’) towards others, which motivates further gift 
exchange.87 In Dee’s case, therefore, her return ‘gift’ was actually more 
attention and more positive interaction with her friend on WeChat. 
In guanxi, ‘any act of helpfulness or generosity, no matter whether 
given or received, begins to draw one into the network of reciprocal 
exchanges’.88 In the end, as Dee remarked, the relationship between 
herself and her friend had become closer and more positive through the 
cycle of ‘gift exchange’.
Thus, unlike Western societies, where business is supposed to 
take place in a professional context without personal touch and ele-
ment, doing business and establishing personal relationships in China 
are usually the same approach, with slightly different fronts. In this 
sense doing business on social media in China seems to match with 
the very feature of guanxi. The success of the monetisation of WeChat, 
to a large extent, is a result of Chinese personal relationships, which 
intrinsically include business elements; such forms of success cannot 
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necessarily be copied by other societies.89 Furthermore, in the case 
of WeChat red envelopes, we see a challenge to our very understand-
ing of the social meaning of money. In the West money is tradition-
ally regarded as an impersonal medium; it is only supposed to apply 
in business where social connections are mainly functional. In The 
Philosophy of Money Georg Simmel contended that money can never 
become an ‘adequate mediator of personal relationships’ as it ‘dis-
tances and estranges the gift from the giver much more definitely’.90 
In China, by contrast, money has long been used to express concern 
and love in social relations. It has long been selected as a ‘perfect’ gift 
because it can be used to buy whatever the recipient desires, eliminat-
ing the unnecessary risk of choosing a wrong gift or the wastefulness 
of speculating on the recipient’s needs.91
In retrospect, some features of WeChat actually emerged in the 
process of use given the ‘technology affordances’.92 In practice these 
features are interlocked, and work together as a new form of social-
ity online. A  further discussion of how social relationships become 
reshaped or reinforced in the use of QQ and WeChat will continue in the 
rest of book. But now let’s move to Weibo, another buzz word surround-
ing Chinese social media.
What is Weibo?
For many Westerners, Weibo (microblogging) is the equivalent of 
Twitter. In China there are several Weibo platforms, such as Tencent 
Weibo and Sohu Weibo. Because of the popularity of Sina Weibo, how-
ever, with 212  million monthly active users,93 ‘Weibo’ is often used 
generically to refer to Sina Weibo. Many features of Weibo appear 
familiar to Twitter users,94 such as the 140 character limit, use of 
‘@’ to mention people and addition of ‘#’ to keyword the postings. 
Additionally Chinese users were able to embed multimedia content 
in Weibo more than 18  months before Twitter users could do so in 
the US.
Weibo is a celebrity hub. Chinese celebrities depend on Weibo as 
a way to connect with their fans and drive their popularity. However, 
the statistics in GoodPath show that the usage of Weibo among rural 
migrants is extremely low. Even though many have heard of Weibo, 
less than one per cent95 actually used Weibo to post or follow others. 
Among the one per cent Weibo users, Tencent Weibo, rather than Sina 
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Weibo, was the main site – mainly because Tencent QQ ‘bind’ its users to 
embedded Weibo services. Gui You, a factory official in his forties, has 
Tencent Weibo which synchronises updates automatically with his QQ 
status updates: 
When I  updated a status on QQ, the ‘Weibo’ would do the same 
thing automatically. I  have no idea about Weibo, but I  can’t be 
bothered to figure it out.
Gui You’s confusion about Weibo is widely shared among people in 
GoodPath. Few know what it is really about or what it is good for. Duo 
Tian, a 26- year- old factory worker, explained why she abandoned her 
Sina Weibo account after using it for a couple of weeks. ‘I tried, but 
I  really don’t like it . . . it’s too complicated, and you have no friends 
there.’ It is true that the specific grammar in Weibo, such as the @ and 
# function, are a bit confusing for beginners. However, the main rea-
son seems to lie in the fact that Weibo is more like a public publish-
ing platform rather than a personal ‘chat’ platform between friends. 
People find it more difficult to establish personal connections on the 
platform, and so prefer to remain with the platform that most of their 
contacts use.
Compared to WeChat, Weibo addresses a far bigger audience. Big 
cities are Weibo’s main market,96 since the urban population shows a 
stronger information- seeking motivation, driven by a need for richer, 
more diverse information. The limited market of Weibo in towns and 
villages further discourages people from using Weibo as a personal 
communication tool.
Having said that, the use of Weibo among China’s urban pop-
ulation has also witnessed a decline. It is not only my field work in 
Shanghai that has shown that people are using Weibo less97 because 
of the increasing use of WeChat. The WeChat public account has taken 
the place of Weibo for the purpose of news reading and information 
searching. National statistics show that the number of Weibo users in 
2013 declined by 27 million compared to the number of users at the 
end of 2012. The level of activity also declined, with around 80 per 
cent of users hardly ever logged in.98
There are several reasons that the Chinese urban population has 
become less interested in Weibo. First is the decline in the quality of 
Weibo information, the result of an overflow of advertisements. In con-
trast to WeChat and QQ, strangers have the right to leave comments on 
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any Weibo profile, which leaves a loophole for the posting of commercial 
advertisements99 by the millions of ‘online water army’ (shuijun) who 
get paid for such work. This has significantly diluted the user’s experi-
ence of Weibo. Secondly, since 2013 the Chinese government has started 
to ‘clean’ up the internet, targeting Weibo.100 Officials have intensified 
attacks on the spread of online rumours, and Weibo users can be jailed 
for up to three years for posting false information that is forwarded 500 
times or viewed 5,000 times.101 As a result, a large number of online pub-
lic intellectuals have had to give up their accounts. Some of them began 
to shift towards WeChat,102 as a WeChat public account works much less 
publicly than on Weibo. Information on WeChat spreads more slowly 
than on Weibo, but because of the ‘slow burn’ feature, which appears 
less intimidating to the regime, WeChat content seems to undergo less 
strict censorship.103
This chapter has introduced the main social media platforms. 
Given the low rate of usage of Weibo among people in this study, the 
discussion of Weibo here will be relatively brief. It is also true that there 
are other Chinese social media platforms, but given the limited space 
they will not be introduced one by one, particularly as they are not used 
by the majority of people in the study. However, a few of them will be 
introduced later in the book when discussing a specific individual’s 
use of social media. The next section will focus upon the very digital 
devices on which most of the engagement with social media in China 
now takes place.
Social media and smartphones
By 2014 the number of Chinese mobile internet users had reached 
527 million, making mobile phones the most common device for access 
to the internet.104 For people who cannot afford a PC,105 a smartphone 
has become their first private access to the internet. Budget smart-
phones dominate the smartphone market in GoodPath, the average 
price being around 500 RMB (US $80). The average monthly cost is 
around 100 RMB (US $16). A smartphone is definitely the number one 
internet device.
It has been young rural migrants who have driven the local budget 
smartphone market. The majority (80 per cent) of rural migrants aged 
between 17 and 35 already own a smartphone, and 70 per cent of those 
in current use are their owners’ first. One- third of people reported that 
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they wanted to have a smartphone by a ‘good brand’ (hao paizi) in a cou-
ple of years’ time, when they will have saved up enough money. A ‘good 
brand’ smartphone (such as iPhone and Samsung) is regarded as a sym-
bol of social status.
According to the local mobile phone dealers, shanzhai mobile 
phones used to be very popular, mainly because of their huge price 
advantages (usually the price is between one- fifth and one- tenth of 
the ‘real brand’). A shanzhai mobile phone refers to a fake, low-priced 
mobile phone: shanzhai in Chinese refers to the mountain camps or 
mountain villages under the control of regional warlords or bandits, far 
away from governmental control.106 Several unique features of shan-
zhai mobiles attract users. For instance, the ringtone of most shanzhai 
phones is extremely loud and some of them even have a funky and 
sparkling ‘incoming calls flashlight’. This is regarded by customers as 
not only ‘convenient’ (as most rural migrants work in noisy factories), 
but also fashionable. The function of ‘Dual SIM card dual standby’ 
(shuangka shuangdai), which allows two different SIM cards in one 
mobile phone, is also welcome as people usually choose separate phone 
packages for keeping in touch with local people and those back in their 
original villages.
Since the end of 2012, however, the shanzhai mobile phones have 
started to shift in terms of sales strategy. Previously they just copied 
famous brand names. Now some shanzhai mobile phone manufactur-
ers have set up their own branded phones, and newly designed budget 
smartphone brands such as ‘XiaoMi’ (Mi- One) have established their 
market position.107 Major Chinese telecom companies have also started 
to invest in the market for smartphones with a price lower than US $150 
(qianyuan ji)108 and launched a few packages for contract mobile phones 
(heyue ji) together with Chinese local mobile phone manufacturers such 
as HuaWei. With a guaranteed consumption (baodi xiaofei) of US $10 
to $15 dollars per month, one can get a smartphone for around US $50 
or even for ‘free’. These inexpensive smartphones quickly captured the 
low- end smartphone market, offering not only a similar price advantage 
but also better quality and after- sales service than their shanzhai com-
petitors (Chart 2.4).109 As a result the shanzhai era of Chinese low- end 
mobile phone market has already passed.
QQ was the first digital platform in China that successfully prac-
tised ‘media convergence’, and smartphones have considerably accel-
erated the process. Smartphones have not only been woven into the 
patterns of people’s daily lives, but also function as the ‘mega media’ 
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that allow people to navigate various social networks, enjoy forms of 
entertainment and participate in consumer culture. Cara Wallis notes:
For those who study convergence among more privileged users, 
there is a tendency to downplay its technological aspect, or the 
way one device can increasingly handle numerous media func-
tions. However, millions of people in the world must make do with 
a single delivery technology for most of their digital media use, 
and almost always it is a mobile phone.110
As quoted, even before the smartphone had become available among 
this ‘information have- less’ group,111 mobile phones had already 
played an essential role in the lives of low  income people. Now the 
smartphone has become the first music player, video player and 
camera, as well as the first private access to online reading, online 
payment and online social networking (Fig. 2.13). The popularity of 
budget smartphones has therefore largely closed the gap of the digital 
divide in China.
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Chart 2.4 Distribution of different kinds of mobile phone devices 
among 200 rural migrants in GoodPath
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Conclusion
So what can be learned from Chinese social media such as QQ and 
WeChat and the wider technologies of the smartphone? The real sig-
nificance of this chapter is only apparent if it is not read as a chapter 
about Chinese rural migrants and social media, or even a chapter about 
Chinese social media, but rather as part of a comparative ethnographic 
study on the very meaning and nature of social media.
The starting point has been the radically different historical tra-
jectories of these developments between China and the West. In the 
West, people have a tendency to assume they know what social media 
naturally ‘is’, because there has been a slow incremental development 
based on clear precedents. In the developed West the smartphone has 
gradually been appropriated as a new digital device, the natural succes-
sor to the personal camera, mobile phone and PC. Social media has also 
been quite a specific development in personal communications, forming 
Fig. 2.13 A rural migrant family watch television via a smartphone 
over dinner. (Chinese traditional painting, 68.5 × 41.5 cm; painter: 
Xinyuan Wang)
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a niche within more general IT development. By contrast the Chinese 
social media landscape has been formed as a result of a dynamic move-
ment. It has been cut apart from the global environment outside China, 
pushed by a very deliberate policy of the party-state, carried forward 
by a vast domestic market demand, and accelerated by the booming 
growth of smartphones. In due course this was the demand that col-
lided with the traditional pattern of social relations and technological 
innovation. This dynamism continues to grow apace, with new forces 
continually arising such as dating and commerce. We need to start by 
acknowledging the sheer, incredible scale of this. Now hundreds of mil-
lions of people, who only a short time ago had no experience of anything 
digital, suddenly find themselves in possession of instruments that are 
as powerful as their Western equivalents and, as we have seen, often 
used for an even greater range of purposes.
57
3
Visual material on social media
Seventy-nine per cent1 of people have taken more photographs since 
they started to use social media; 64 per cent believe that a visual post is 
more convincing on social media than a text- only post, and 85 per cent 
prefer visual posts to text- only posts.
Compared to former times when for most ordinary people it was 
only possible to circulate a few visual images, the contemporary world 
is very much a phenomenon ‘seen online’.2 Because of the use of social 
media and the popularity of smartphones, our relationship to visual 
images has reached a level of ubiquity that is historically unprece-
dented.3 Moreover, unlike mass media, visual material on social media is 
produced and circulated in a ‘two- way’ interaction, becoming an essen-
tial part of interpersonal communication. This chapter will discuss what 
people actually post on social media4 and see how the visual is culturally 
constructed – what is made to be seen and what is made to be unseen.5 In 
some cases the ‘face value’ of the visual can be misleading or confusing, 
and needs to be interpreted. Although visual images are the focus of this 
chapter, the analysis of visual material on social media occurs through-
out this volume. Some genres of visual images are mentioned here only 
briefly and will receive further analysis in other chapters.
Much of this chapter consists of a brief survey of what I  have 
identified as the 15 main genres of images posted by rural migrants. 
This is in order to identify some key patterns to this practice when 
viewed as a whole. This is clarified when the dominant genres of rural 
migrants are compared in the conclusion with a survey of middle- 
class people from Shanghai. What we find is that, although there is 
a continuity between visual postings and traditional photography, 
there is also a series of key new genres on social media added by rural 
migrants.
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These new genres on social media are actually crucial to under-
stand these factory workers. Relevant issues include the compression 
of being ‘young’ into a very short time, and the way in which social 
media compensates for this by providing a place where people can 
identify with youth themes. While analogue photography recorded 
life as it was lived, social media can be used for the opposite purpose 
of envisaging a life to which people aspire, articulating this far more 
effectively in visual terms than they could in words or text. Once 
again we see how social media has gained immense significance as 
‘another place’ in which migrants come to live: one that takes them 
further towards their intended destination than mere offline life 
can do.
Genres of visual material on social media
An inspection of the huge amount of visual postings on rural migrants’ 
social media profiles suggested 15 main genres:  ‘relationships’, ‘self-
ies’, ‘trivia’ ‘compulsorily shared’, ‘chicken soup for the soul’, ‘humour’, 
‘fantasy’, ‘children’, ‘travel’, ‘events’, ‘archive’, ‘political’, ‘food’, ‘anti- 
mainstream’ ( feizhuliu) and ‘commercial’. In some cases, the genres 
overlap with one another and can easily be subjected to further division. 
The main point is not to classify the different visual genres ‘scientifically’, 
but rather to help us appreciate and clarify the range of these postings.
1 ‘Relationships’
This is ‘social’ media and the majority of the visual material deals in 
some manner or other with relationships. However, the genre of ‘rela-
tionships’ here refers only to certain kinds of directly depicted relation-
ships, such as kinship (Fig.  3.1), romantic relationships (Fig.  3.2) or 
friendship (Fig. 3.3). The majority of images about kinship refer to the 
relationship between young parents and babies, partly due to the fact 
that in this study the main contributors of the visual postings are young 
people.
Friendship between females is usually expressed in a very straight-
forward way. It may include photographs of women hugging or walk-
ing hand- in- hand, and in many cases takes the form of group selfies 
(Fig. 3.4). While 32 per cent of females had photos of their best friends on 
their social media, only 3.5 per cent of males did the same. The demon-
stration of male bonding seems to be different – for instance, through 
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Fig. 3.1 Typical images of kinship on social media
Fig. 3.2 A typical image showing a romantic relationship on 
social media
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Fig. 3.3 A typical photograph of friendship on social media
Fig. 3.4 Typical group selfies of women
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playing video games together, as we will see in Chapter 4, and postings 
of related deity images, which we will further discuss in Chapter 6.
In terms of romantic relationships, the visual representation for 
young men seems to be slightly more drawn to sexual intimacy; rather 
than posting any image of themselves, the common practice is to collect 
photographs from the internet (Fig. 3.5). For women, on the other hand, 
a typical image seems to be more about emotional intimacy (Fig. 3.6). 
As Chart 3.1 shows,6 98 per cent of young women and 85 per cent of 
young men posted images from the ‘relationships’ genre. More than half 
of middle- aged people also have such postings, whereas elderly peo-
ple seem to be least inclined to post on this theme. At all ages, women 
showed more interest in posting ‘relationship’ images.
2 ‘Selfies’
The ‘selfie’, defined as ‘a photographic self-portrait; esp. one taken with 
a smartphone or webcam and shared via social media’,7 has become a 
universal phenomenon. Among rural migrants selfies also have become 
an instant visual communication of where they are, what they are doing, 
Fig. 3.5 A typical image of intimacy on the social media profiles of 
young men
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who they think they are, and who they think is watching. There are a 
number of sub- genres of selfies, and interpretations of different genres 
vary. A  typical or classic selfie is usually shot from a high angle, with 
a full focus on the face. It is common for young women to have a great 
number of this type of selfie, capturing different facial expressions, 
accessories or make- up (Fig. 3.7), whereas for young men a typical form 
is a ‘hair selfie’, focusing on their stylish haircuts (Fig.  3.8). The fact 
that the average height (around 167 cm) of male rural migrants from 
inland provinces is below the national average may explain the cult of 
hairstyles that make them appear between 2 and 5 cm taller. The other 
reason would be the desire to show a rebellious gesture; such hairstyles 
Fig. 3.6 A typical image of emotional intimacy on the social media 
profiles of young women
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seem to accord with the anti- mainstream ( feizhuliu)8 aesthetic of youth 
culture.
‘Mirror selfies’, i.e. those taken through a mirror, come across as 
another popular selfie  genre. The mirror selfie is convenient to take, 
but also allows a wider view which helps to unfold some other details, 
for example dresses or shoes (Fig. 3.9). It may be used to show some 
part of the body to best advantage (Fig.  3.10), or even the very digi-
tal device with which the selfie was taken. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Fig. 3.7 A typical range of selfies uploaded by young women to their 
social media profiles
Fig. 3.8 ‘Hair selfies’ by young men
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Fig. 3.9 A typical ‘mirror selfie’ illustrating one’s dress or shoes
Fig. 3.10 A typical ‘mirror selfie’ helping to show part of the body to 
best advantage
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iPhones are regarded as symbols of higher socio-economic status 
among low  income people such as rural migrants, thus revealing the 
ownership of an iPhone is regarded as a plus on a selfie. Of all the mir-
ror selfies posted by rural migrants, the majority (around 90 per cent) 
were taken by iPhones. However, such figures do not match with the 
relative low ownership of iPhones among rural migrants, as shown 
in Chapter  2. There are thus two possibilities:  that non- iPhone users 
choose not to take mirror selfies, or that the people featured on their 
selfies may not necessarily own the iPhone. For example, the young fac-
tory worker Huatian took a mirror selfie using the iPhone of one of his 
friends (Fig. 3.11) and posted it on Qzone. On this selfie he was wearing 
a fake Adidas T- shirt and Doc Martins, acquired at the local night mar-
ket. As he said, ‘I think you just want to show the best of you on a selfie’. 
Comments on this selfie, as he expected, focused on the nice material 
world shown in the photograph; one of the comments read, ‘Life is not 
too bad . . . Lucky you!’
Fig. 3.11 A ‘mirror selfie’ taken by a young factory worker to portray 
himself as somebody enjoying a good life
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However, not all the selfies seek to portray glamorous aspects of 
oneself. ‘Pyjama selfies’, which people take in their bedrooms in their 
most casual look, are examples of a different trend. As the text on 
Fig. 3.12 reads ‘Can’t fall asleep, too tired’, these ‘pyjama selfies’ were 
usually posted at the end of the day before people went to bed, or some-
times when they could not get to sleep. Even though most rural migrants 
do not have their own private space, given the limited living accommo-
dation, a ‘pyjama selfie’ seems to be the first time people intentionally 
invite the public to view some of the most private moments of their lives.
The results are regarded with some scepticism. ‘I think she is fak-
ing it; even though it looks like no make- up, I bet she photoshopped it 
to make sure her skin looked perfect . . . It is actually a carefully posed 
selfie to show how cute she is . . . look at the duck face and the collarbone,’ 
commented a young female participant, who did not know the subject 
of Fig. 3.14. On the other hand, in a separate interview, the subject of 
Fig. 3.13 herself remarked, ‘I just feel like taking a selfie, no specific pur-
pose’. With or without any specific purpose, the very action of posting a 
pyjama selfie is always a deliberate act by the person posting.
A pyjama selfie usually attracts more ‘likes’ or comments, partially 
because it looks different from people’s usual daytime appearance and 
Fig. 3.12 A ‘pyjama selfie’ of a young man
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helps the senders to get closer to their online contacts. As the male fac-
tory worker featured in Fig. 3.12 observed, for women a ‘pyjama selfie’ 
may mean removing physical make- up, but for men it can be the moment 
when they finally take off the ‘mask’ of social expectation of being a man: 
‘I let you see the real me which you can never see during the daytime. 
At work I won’t show a weak part of me as a man.’ Even though people 
may interpret pyjama selfies in different ways, to unfold a private and 
different aspect of oneself voluntarily is usually regarded as a friendly 
gesture on social media, where self- exposure can lead to mutual trust. 
In this sense a pyjama selfie is an example of how a selfie is a skilful 
self- representation that can connect to, and communicate with, others.9 
In terms of the awareness of relationships, the ‘group selfie’ takes a step 
further, directly portraying the closeness of the relationship (as men-
tioned in the section on ‘relationships’ postings above). Compared to 
other kinds of group photographs, group selfies require physical prox-
imity in order to include a group of people in a photo frame, which in 
a way also legitimises more intimate and informal body contact. Such 
body language, triggered by group selfies, enhances the sense of con-
nectedness, which is further reinforced when group selfies are posted 
on social media.
Fig. 3.13 A ‘pyjama selfie’ of a young woman
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In retrospect, self- love or narcissism is rarely the only moti-
vation behind selfies.10 In many cases, rather than recording them-
selves, people are in fact recording their social network via selfies. 
For many, a selfie is not ‘complete’ until it has been uploaded to social 
media and viewed by others. Thus it makes little sense to single out 
any individual selfie without acknowledging the context of the anti-
cipated audience on social media. A selfie is actually a new form of 
social interaction facilitated by social media; it reflects how people 
see themselves in a network. As shown on Chart 3.2, so far the genre 
of ‘selfies’ is still the exclusive preserve of young people among rural 
migrants. However, it is highly likely that the situation will change in 
the near future, given the evidently increasing popularity of smart-
phones among older people and the increasing social acceptance of 
selfies in China – especially now China’s President Xi has also started 
to post selfies.11
3 ‘Trivia’
The genre of ‘trivia’ refers to photographs of insignificant housework 
or household items (Fig. 3.14). It usually takes place when people feel 
bored, and it seems that the very action of taking a photo and posting 
it on social media is the less tedious activity that enlivens the daily 
routine.
As Chart 3.3 shows, in ‘trivia’ gender and age play important roles. 
For some middle- aged women trivia made up most of their original 
visual postings on social media. Men are less keen on posting trivia. 
Older people rarely posted trivia as they tended to view social media 
postings as significant personal statements, whereas many younger 
Fig. 3.14 Typical trivia postings
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people have no problem in posting daily trivia on social media as they 
see it as a personal diary.
4 ‘Compulsorily shared’
The reason this genre has been labelled ‘compulsorily shared’ is 
summed up by one participant’s response to the post’s sharing 
request:  ‘you feel you have to share it, otherwise you would worry 
that there will be something wrong.’ The majority of ‘compulsorily 
shared’ posts are deeply related to beliefs in the efficacy of the images 
of deities (Fig. 3.15), lucky animals (Fig. 3.16) or even strange beings 
(yishou) (Fig. 3.17), all of which derive from Chinese folk religion. In 
some cases the texts accompanying these images make the compul-
sion to share even stronger; the text on Fig. 3.17 reads ‘If you don’t 
share it, your parents will have a disaster in 7 days’.
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Fig. 3.15 A typical image of a deity shared on social media
Fig. 3.16 A typical image of lucky animals shared on social media
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A further discussion of the practice of Chinese folk religion on 
social media is discussed in Chapter  6. One sub- genre, however, con-
sists of regional images. For instance, the text embedded on Fig.  3.18 
says:  ‘If you come from JiangXi, you have to share this post!’ JiangXi 
is an inland province of China, from which many rural migrants come. 
The dirty face of the rural boy in Fig. 3.18 strongly contrasts with the 
large, cool sunglasses and cigarette. As a factory migrant worker who 
shared it commented: ‘Our peasants are poor, but we can also have an 
attitude (zhuai).’ On top of the image, the text blurb declares JiangXi to 
be the best place in China: 
The high buildings in Beijing are nothing compared to huts in 
JiangXi; the fast cars in Shanghai are nothing compared to the 
bikes in JiangXi; JiangXi has the most beautiful women in China, 
and men in JiangXi are all very handsome and rich.
Such posts have become ‘memes’.12 Rural migrants from other provinces 
also share similar postings about their hometowns. In the face of severe 
social discrimination and a strong rural– urban divide, the pervasive 
lack of self- confidence and sense of belonging among rural migrants is 
somehow expressed in an extremely proud tone in these postings. And 
many people feel a compulsion to share such postings to make a proud 
public statement. The reason for sharing such posts also lies in some 
pragmatic concerns. As we will see in Chapter  5, social connections 
between people from the same hometown is the fundamental social 
Fig. 3.17 A typical image of strange beings shared on social media
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network on which rural migrants rely to get a job, find a place to live and 
get access to other forms of support.13 Thus a collective identity based 
on the same hometown (tongxiang) not only serves as a sense of belong-
ing for individuals, it also plays a key role in the collective allocation of 
social resources in rural migrants’ economic lives. Given all the reasons 
above, images from the ‘compulsorily  shared’ genre are pervasive on the 
social media profiles of rural migrants (Chart 3.4).
5 ‘Chicken soup for the soul’
Images from the ‘Chicken soup for soul’ genre are usually the illus-
trations of articles on the same theme. When people shared this 
kind of article, they also shared the images embedded within them. 
Fig. 3.18 A typical ‘compulsorily shared’ posting among rural 
migrants with a focus on regional connections
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Originally Chicken Soup for the Soul referred to a book series from the 
US, consisting of inspirational true stories about how ordinary people 
managed to have happy and successful lives. The book was translated 
into Chinese around a decade ago and became a major bestseller. 
Nowadays people use the expression ‘chicken soup for the soul’ (xin 
ling ji tang) to describe shared articles on social media offering career 
and lifestyle advice. It is very common for those articles to contain pho-
tographs of celebrities. Ma Yun,14 for instance, a successful business-
man who started from scratch, frequently appeared as a great source 
of advice. Ma is viewed as a living legend, especially as he failed the 
university entrance examination twice and ended up at a third- class 
university. This relatively unimpressive educational background res-
onated with rural migrants, many of whom have a poor educational 
background, making people accept him more easily in this role. Titles 
of such articles run along the lines of ‘You are poor because you are 
not ambitious enough’ or ‘How to seize the most important opportuni-
ties in your life’. There is no direct quotation from Ma Yun or similar 
celebrities in those articles, but they all read as if suggestions came 
directly from the celebrities, and people who share them truly believe 
this is so.
Many rural migrants, especially young men, believe that if one 
follows the advice they will also become rich and successful men. 
Such conviction is reinforced by the fact that many factory owners in 
GoodPath also started from scratch. The majority of the factory own-
ers also come from villages; they were born with a rural hukou and did 
not have higher education, not dissimilar from the situation that factory 
migrant workers are in. In the eyes of many rural migrants, the reason 
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this group of people rose to become the nouveau riche (tu hao)15 is not 
because they are more hard- working or smarter; it is rather because they 
had the luck to be born in coastal villages rather than inland rural areas, 
and were blessed by the opportunities offered by economic development 
in China.
Women on the other hand, especially young women, turn more 
towards Reader’s Digest- style articles which, together with sweet 
and cute images, deal with wise attitudes towards relationships and 
life. Titles of such posts are along the lines of ‘30 pieces of advice for 
young women’, ‘What is real love?’ and ‘Men, if your woman no lon-
ger needs your protection, she no longer loves you’. Fig.  3.19 shows 
a male lizard grilling his tail for his girlfriend. The text reads, ‘Don’t 
worry, it said that my tail will grow again’. Here the sacrifice of one-
self to please a partner is presented as a touching sign of true love. On 
Fig.  3.20, the text reads:  ‘When you have to take a break and think 
about whether you are still in love with somebody, that means the love 
has already gone.’
Among all the memes which tend to give people advice for life, 
one specific topic, the ‘passing traveller’ (guoke), seems to stand out. 
The text (Fig.  3.21) reads:  ‘If you are not happy, you should let it 
go . . . someone appeared at some point and brought you a big surprise, 
which made you believe he or she was your god in life; however, you are 
wrong, some people are doomed to be just passing travellers in each 
other’s lives.’ All the ‘passing traveller’ memes deliver the message 
Fig. 3.19 A meme about a touching love story of a pair of lizards
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Fig. 3.20 A popular meme about the nature of true love
Fig. 3.21 Two typical ‘passing traveller’ memes
that one should not take current encounters too seriously since life 
itself is unsettled and nobody can really control it. It is not hard to 
see the attraction of ‘passing traveller’ memes given what we know of 
the transient lives of rural migrants. All in all, the ‘chicken soup for 
the soul’ genre stands out as a major feature in postings among rural 
migrants (Chart 3.5).
6 ‘Humour’
Most images in the ‘humour’ genre seem to be straightforward, with 
some obvious focal points for laughter. The text on Fig.  3.22, for 
example, reads:  ‘Young man, you have grasped the rule of the 
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world: swiping credit cards.’ In addition there are many amusing photo-
graphs related to children or animals (Fig. 3.23). The gender difference 
in humour postings is clear, with men all appearing to enjoy humour 
postings more than women (Chart 3.6). Middle- aged men seem to be the 
biggest ‘jokers’, which bears some consistency to people’s offline social 
life: making good jokes at the dinner table is seen as a blessed talent, 
especially among middle- aged men. Such capability often contributes 
to the ‘hot and noisy’ (renao) ambience of social life that we will discuss 
further in Chapter 4.
Fig. 3.22 A humorous posting shared by a male factory worker
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7 ‘Fantasy’
The ‘fantasy’ genre refers to beautiful and polished photographs of lux-
ury lifestyles or prestigious goods, none of which seem to have anything 
in common with rural migrants’ offline lives in GoodPath. Those images 
showcase the ideal lives for which both young women (Fig.  3.24) and 
young men (Fig.  3.25) are longing. Chapter  6 will further discuss the 
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Fig. 3.23 A typical humorous posting related to animals
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reasons behind the popularity of this genre. As apparent in Chart 3.7, the 
genre of ‘fantasy’ exists mainly among young people.
8 ‘Children’
Most photographs of children are taken in a ‘natural’ way, not posed, 
and rarely have any art filter or decoration. In our north China field site, 
it was found that parents express their best wishes for their children 
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Fig. 3.25 Images showcasing the ideal lives of young rural migrant men
Fig. 3.24 Images showcasing the ideal lives of young rural migrant 
women
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through professionally shot studio images.16 However, such studio 
photographs of children are very rare on rural migrants’ social media 
profiles. Photographs of children (Chart 3.8) are one of most popular 
topics among women, and the ‘children’ genre is a major feature17 on 
social media.
9 ‘Travel’
Photographs in the ‘Travel’ genre were usually taken when people were 
travelling, whether for work or on holiday. It is common to see images of 
train tickets or landscapes encountered on the way, posted to mark the 
journey. Even though rural migrants are characterised by high mobil-
ity, such ‘mobility’ mainly refers to the concept of ‘unsettled residence’.18 
In terms of work and living patterns, the flexibility and mobility they 
enjoyed in daily life were actually very limited. Most of them spent long 
hours labouring in factories or other workplaces, and could not afford to 
spend money and time travelling around for leisure.
Fig. 3.26 Typical postings of children
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Having made this point, one nonetheless has to observe that there 
is growing interest in the idea of tourism among rural migrants. Many 
migrant workers started to experience tourism after they left their vil-
lages, and those trips, arranged either by more experienced colleagues 
or the factory workers’ guild (gong hui), were usually very short, but 
they still introduced ‘tourism’ as a feature of modern lifestyles for the 
first time.19
Dawei, a 20- year- old factory worker, is a typical example. He took 
many photos on his new smartphone during his first trip, and posted 
all of them on his Qzone (Fig.  3.27). Last Chinese New Year, when 
Dawei returned to his village, he showed the photographs to some of 
his relatives and fellow villagers. ‘In my home village, no one has ever 
done tourism. People don’t even have the idea (mei zhe ge gai nian),’ he 
explained. Dawei’s relatives and fellow villagers who had stayed behind 
in the villages were inspired by Dawei’s tourist photographs, and a few 
weeks later they took a group trip to a nearby mountain. The local moun-
tain area was actually a very famous sightseeing attraction in China, yet 
the peasants from neighbouring villages had never been there before.
‘Travel’ genre postings on social media have introduced the mod-
ern idea of tourism, and their impact on people’s offline travelling 
behaviour is evident. Here we see how visual material on social media 
is not only the record of thoughts and daily lives. It is also an efficient 
way to transmit ideas that may have a significant impact on people’s 
offline activities. In Dawei’s case, the ideas of modern lifestyles that 
Fig. 3.27 Unedited travel photographs on social media
V ISUAL MATER IAL ON SOC IAL MED IA 81
he picked up during his migration were spread by him to the remain-
ing villagers via social media. The way in which cultural practices dif-
fused from rural migrants to rural populations also suggests that rural 
migrants’ contributions to their home villages cannot be valued only 
from an economic perspective. As well as financial remittance, there is 
another, simultaneous remittance – social remittance.20 Through this 
so- called social remittance, urban culture can increase its impact on 
the rural via interpersonal interaction between rural migrants and the 
remaining village residents.21
There is another feature of those travel photos:  such a large 
number of photographs are not usually selective. For instance, Dawei 
uploaded 248 photos about a  day trip to his Qzone. There is always 
more than one photo about the same person, object and similar scen-
ery (see the differently coloured circles on Fig. 3.27). What Dawei did 
is very common among rural migrants, and the major reason for it lies 
in technology. Most rural migrants do not have a personal computer 
or other digital device for storing all their photographs, in addition 
to which the smartphone’s memory space is limited, so QQ online 
albums actually serve as a hard disk. Even though none of them have 
ever heard of ‘cloud technology’, their QQ albums have actually been 
used as a ‘cloud’ long before this became a global technological trend. 
Generally speaking, young men appeared most active in posting travel 
photos (Chart 3.9). ‘Those photos show that you are a man with a lot 
of travelling and experience,’ explained Zhi Qiang, a 24- year- old fac-
tory worker. As he said, the idea that ‘travelling makes a man’ is deeply 
rooted. Travelling as a youth is viewed as the road to growing into a 
real man.22
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10 ‘Events’
Weddings, performance, public activities (Fig.  3.28) . . . all events that 
stand out from the routine of daily life are appropriate subjects for the 
‘events’ genre. Like travel photographs, visual material surrounding 
events also tends to include a large number of repetitive images.
Fig. 3.28 Typical postings of events
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11 ‘Archive’
Postings in the ‘archive’ genre contain how- to information, ranging from 
how to cook delicious soup and tips for using essential balm to emer-
gency first aid for children rescued from water (Fig. 3.29). The reason 
people share these postings is that they want to store the useful infor-
mation on their QQ profiles, just like a digital archive. For many people 
such shared articles have provided them with useful knowledge, and 
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some have already applied information learned from social media in 
their daily lives. For rural migrants without a higher level of education, 
these ‘archive’ postings actually offer an effective learning experience: 
the genre is an important form of adult education.
12 ‘Political’
The most popular topics of the ‘political’ genre include criticism of cor-
ruption, social discrimination, injustice and poverty (Fig. 3.30). All of 
these issues evoke high levels of sympathy among rural migrants, since 
they perceive themselves as direct victims. The most popular inter-
national political issue was the China– Japan relationship (Fig.  3.31), 
Fig. 3.29 Typical ‘archive’ postings
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Fig. 3.30 Typical political postings relating to criticism of corrup-
tion, social discrimination, injustice and poverty. The text beneath the 
photograph in the article reads (left): ‘Her husband was beaten by the 
factory owner when he asked for unpaid wages. That’s the living situa-
tion of our Chinese rural migrants.’ The text beneath the photograph in 
the article reads (right): ‘When people in big cities enjoy luxury life in 
China, this is what rural life looks like in backward inland China!’
Fig. 3.31 Typical political postings with strong elements of patriotism 
and nationalism. Text reads (left): ‘Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands belong to 
China – share it and let the world see it’. Text reads (right): ‘Chairman 
Xi tells the world that China is going to teach Japan a lesson. Share it!’
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invested with strong emotions of patriotism and nationalism. Among 
factory workers, suffering from all sorts of domestic problems on a daily 
basis, anti- Japan postings are still far more popular than any other polit-
ical postings related to domestic issues. Suffice it to say that nationalist 
sentiment against Japan is an instrument that the Chinese Communist 
Party uses to ally public support, to bolster the population’s faith in the 
party- state and to hold the country together during its rapid and tur-
bulent transformation.23 As shown on Chart 3.12, the political genre is 
definitely male- dominated and generally speaking rural migrants, espe-
cially the younger generation, have an extremely low rate of participa-
tion in this social media genre.
13 ‘Food’
The genre of ‘food’ refers both to images of food alone or to ‘people + 
food’, which shows the food being collectively consumed as a social 
event. ‘You are what you eat’, as people say: food is such an import-
ant part of Chinese perceived cultural experience.24 The use of food to 
express sophisticated social norms is highly developed in China.25 As 
Kao Tzu, an ancient Chinese philosopher, observed, ‘the appetite for 
food and sex is human nature’ (Shi Se Xing Ye). Also, in a traditional 
society, division of a stove is symbolic of family division.26 A marriage 
without eating together is not considered legitimate, while the birth of 
boys and adoption of heirs are both events marked and celebrated by 
eating together.27 Given the high social significance of food and ‘eating 
together’, it is not difficult to understand the popularity of food photo-
graphs on social media to highlight the social connection.
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As Chart 3.13 shows, middle- aged women and young men con-
tribute the highest number of postings in the ‘food’ genre. The images 
of food shared by males were in most cases about dining events, which 
usually include a group of people and food.
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Fig. 3.32 Typical postings of food
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14 ‘Anti- mainstream’ (Feizhuliu)
Contemporary China has witnessed the emergence of a motley group 
of youth subcultures or countercultures since the beginning of the eco-
nomic reforms.28 The concept of Feizhuliu (hereafter FZL), meaning 
anti- mainstream or non- mainstream, has become very popular among 
the Chinese post- 1990s generation,29 and FZL culture has its full expres-
sion on the social media postings of rural youth. There are two sub- 
genres of FZL, one rebellious and cool (Fig. 3.33), the other extremely 
cute (Fig.  3.34). On ‘rebellious’ images there are figures of evil gang-
sters, always depicted in popular Hong Kong films,30 or some brave and 
rebellious statements (on Fig.  3.33 the text reads:  ‘crush, fly’). Young 
men seem to be keener on sharing ‘gangster’ images, whereas other 
rebellious images and memes are equally popular among young men 
and women. Cute and sweet images seem to be more popular among 
Fig. 3.33 Typical rebellious anti- mainstream postings
Fig. 3.34 Typical cute and sweet anti- mainstream postings
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young women, although you can often see men sharing some extremely 
cute and sweet images. Chapter 5 will explore these issues of gender as 
reflected by the posting of cute images. As shown on Chart 3.14, post-
ings in the ‘anti- mainstream’ or FZL genre seem to be confined to young 
people and middle- aged men. In Chapter 5 we will take a closer look at 
the issue of gender identities behind these FZL images.
15 ‘Commercial’ 
Postings in the ‘commercial’ genre started to become popular among all 
ages following the monetisation of social media (Chart 3.15) – especially 
WeChat, as discussed in Chapter 2. Fig. 3.35 is a typical post in which 
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the user sells stuff on his or her profile. Another common commercial 
activity, Jizan (collecting ‘likes’) involves users collecting ‘likes’ from 
their online friends to win a coupon (Fig. 3.36). On this screenshot, the 
text on the top reads ‘I kneel down for more “likes”’; the image and link 
below form part of the advertisement of a local photography studio.
Fig. 3.35 A typical commercial posting from which people sell goods 
on their profiles
Fig. 3.36 A typical commercial posting from which people collect ‘likes’
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What is special about the visual postings  
of rural migrants?
‘We are becoming a visually mediated society. For many, understanding 
of the world is being accomplished, not through words, but by reading 
images.’31 So far we have discussed all 15 genres of social media visual 
postings. Some of the images require more contextual knowledge to 
be interpreted fully, and we will continue the discussion in the rest of 
the book, especially in Chapters 5 and 6. Even before further discus-
sion, however, we seem to have reached a good point to consider what 
is special about the images posted by rural migrants on their social 
media profiles. Are these a result of Chinese people’s general visual 
preferences, or do they reflect the choices of this specific social group? 
A comparison between the visual postings of rural migrants and those 
living in Shanghai (Chart 3.16)32 offers us a perspective from which to 
consider this question.
As shown on Chart 3.16, ‘relationships’, ‘selfies’ and ‘children’ are 
the three visual genres popular among both rural migrants and the 
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urban population. The urban population showed more interest in post-
ing visual material on the genres of ‘travel’, ‘political’, ‘archive’, ‘events’ 
and ‘food’, partly reflecting the difference of socio-economic status 
and lifestyle between Chinese rural migrants and the urban Chinese. 
However, the most outstanding discrepancies occur in the genres of 
‘compulsorily shared’, ‘fantasy’, ‘chicken soup for the soul’ and ‘anti- 
mainstream’ (FZL), where rural migrants have definitely shown more 
passion.
These four genres can very well serve as the starting point for us 
to explore the features of visual postings among rural migrants. Firstly, 
a strikingly common point between these four is that none of them 
records domestic offline life, and none is a type of social memory com-
parable with the former use of analogue photography.33 The majority 
of images in these four genres is memes and images collected from the 
internet, rather than original photographs that people took themselves. 
All the images of postings in the ‘compulsorily shared’ genre are related 
to folk religion or hometown- related memes: those in the ‘fantasy’ 
genre, meanwhile, present a modern, materialistic world, dramatically 
different from rural migrants’ offline life. Similarly, the ‘chicken soup 
for the soul’ visual genre provides a whole set of aspirational life mod-
els with artistic images or images of celebrities. And for rural youth the 
‘anti- mainstream’ (FZL) genre provides the specific visual language to 
express rebellious gestures or gestures that are not really acceptable in 
offline situations. The desire for a modern life is efficiently expressed by 
the popularity of these four visual genres. In Chapter 6 we will explore 
further how the beautified life on social media helps rural migrants 
to think through changes in their own existences and to live different 
daily lives.
Secondly, among rural migrants, the three least posted visual 
genres are ‘political’, ‘trivia’ and ‘commercial’. Given all the argument 
in Chapter  2 about the booming of social commerce in China, it may 
appear strange that the ‘commercial’ genre is still among the last three. 
Here, however, ‘commercial’ refers to postings of doing business, selling 
goods or posting commercial advertisements on one’s personal social 
media profiles. To put things in perspective, therefore, the absolute fig-
ure of 21 per cent is already very impressive compared to the situation on 
Facebook, where it is very rare to see postings on personal accounts for 
the direct purpose of making money. As for ‘trivia’, the result is not unex-
pected. However, probably the most surprising fact is that among all the 
15 genres, the concept of ‘political’ – much discussed as a key element 
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that can facilitate political participation – turns out in practice to be the 
least posted by rural migrants. Yet this may be the very population that 
need social media most, as they are least likely to express their political 
opinions in any other media. What has happened? Is this because of the 
internet censorship in China? Or were people simply indifferent about 
politics, or saw no point in political postings? Chapter 5 will address all 
these questions through a closer look into the engagement with politics, 
both online and offline, among different groups in GoodPath and a dis-
cussion of the social media’s impact on political participation.
Thirdly, it turns out that age is a key factor in terms of posting 
activity. Young rural migrants, both female and male, are far more 
active in posting images, especially aspirational images about mod-
ern lifestyles, on social media, whereas older people, especially 
women, were the least active. One can easily argue that is because 
young people are supposed to have more dreams about life, and that 
such youthful passion will gradually disappear over time. However, 
there is something more about the special situation of young people 
among rural migrants.
The coming of age of young rural migrants  
on social media
The phase of youth is a period of transition between one’s childhood and 
adult life. However, for young Chinese rural migrants this phase is short-
ened by around five years compared to their peers in cities. The period 
from age 15 to the early twenties has become the time when young peo-
ple from rural communities leave villages and enter the workplace for 
the first time, where they gain financial independence. By contrast, most 
urban young people remain at school at this age, and are still financially 
dependent.
Achieving financial independence at such an early age effectively 
catapults young rural migrants into adulthood. With regard to matu-
rity, what those young rural migrants miss is not just formal educa-
tion, but the longer time in schools and colleges that usually provides 
a relatively flexible and safe environment for a more gradual coming of 
age.34 At school young people usually spend a great deal of time with 
their classmates and school friends, and through this interaction their 
personalities and social skills are developed and their world views are 
shaped. The missed or significantly shortened time in education hin-
ders the personal development and social lives of young rural migrants. 
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Once they embark upon rural- to- urban migration they hardly have any 
quality time with peers, given the high mobility they experience and 
the limited places to spend time after work. It is in such a context that 
we can further explore the role played by social media in young rural 
migrants’ lives.
The importance of social media for China’s young rural migrants 
lies in the fact that it offers a place in which they can meet peers, and 
where they have the freedom from their families and fixed social norms 
to imagine something different. Like young people around the world, 
the ideals of individualism and autonomy find expression in a slightly 
rebellious gesture.35 These gestures, reflected from the ‘fantasy’ or FZL 
genres of images, have become a set of new norms agreed by young peo-
ple on social media. This gives young people the security that they are 
sufficiently rebellious and have a similar modern consumer taste, all of 
which can easily be recognised and approved by their contemporaries. 
In this sense, activity on social media has become an essential part of 
social life. It bears some similarity to the experience of school, allowing 
social media to provide a place for young rural migrants where they can 
be ‘educated’ by themselves or by their peers into adulthood.
In some previous studies of Chinese rural youth, researchers 
noticed that youth culture in rural China was not really rebellious or 
counterculture;36 it was rather an attempt to follow the mainstream 
culture of urbanity by conforming to key characteristics of moder-
nity, including being fashionable, materialistic and individualistic.37 
However, the fact is that in the eyes of older relatives and villagers 
in rural communities, the pursuit of being urban is already ‘counter-
cultural’ enough in the face of traditional, established rural culture. 
Furthermore, most previous studies of young people were carried out 
in rural areas, but the culture of young rural migrants in townships 
and cities is different. Just imagine one of the most common scenes in 
GoodPath: young factory workers in their early twenties, wearing the 
uniforms they described as ‘ugly as shit’, working on repetitive and uni-
form tasks on assembly lines for 10 hours a day, 29 days a month . . . and 
when they finally get back to their dormitories they log on to QQ pro-
files and upload some really cool images of young people wearing the 
fanciest and most bizarre costumes or exaggerated make- up and hair-
styles. The anti- mainstream (FZL) visual we saw online cannot really 
tell what happened offline; only when we put the online and offline 
aspects together can we fully appreciate the message delivered by the 
FZL or fantasy visual.
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On social media, rural youth can take a break from the uniformity 
imposed by heavy industry that has occupied most of their offline time. 
On social media these young people get inspired by all sorts of fantastic 
images, freeing their imaginations to go as far as they can. They may 
aspire to fast cars or to have a wedding like a princess, to be slightly 
funky or to create slightly edgy selfies. Above all, such imagination 
and aspiration can easily be conceived and visualised by images rather 
than text. The relatively low levels of education received by young rural 
migrants no longer prevent them from expressing themselves vividly 
and accurately. For example, Xiangjun, a 20- year- old factory worker, 
always shares ‘chicken soup for the soul’ memes with only one word: ‘wo’ 
[I] . Xiangjun explained that he felt these images had simply expressed 
everything he want to say, so he just needed to add a word ‘I’ to indicate 
‘that’s exactly what I  think’. When people feel they are not especially 
articulate in text and speaking, the visual can be particularly empower-
ing. In a social media context this means they can articulate their feel-
ings by simply sharing a meme edited by others.
The visual on social media – a new language
The observation that visual images on social media help young people 
to express themselves better actually extends to the entire population 
of rural migrants. In many cases it is not just a question of improving 
the ability to express oneself: some of what we find is unprecedented 
offline. To see this more clearly we can start from one particular trag-
edy. In 1993, 87 young female rural migrants lost their lives in a large 
fire in a toy factory in south China. A researcher managed to get access 
to 77 personal letters that the victims had received from friends and 
relatives, as well as to the letters they were about to send.38 Those 
letters revealed for the first time the hidden inner world of Chinese 
migrant workers. The main topics mentioned in those private letters 
were 1)  wages; 2)  work conditions; 3)  problems related to physical 
well- being; and 4) loneliness and isolation. Money is the biggest con-
cern, and a few workers mentioned they felt lonely in cities. Curiously, 
two decades later, the common topics of phone calls and other offline 
conversations among rural migrants remain much the same. The most 
common subjects in today’s phone calls were ‘how much one has earned 
or saved so far’, ‘whether one can find a better paid job’, ‘whether the 
children can get into the local schools’ or ‘whether one can help a rel-
ative or a fellow villager to find a job’. Generally speaking, how best 
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to get by remains the dominant concern within these phone calls, just 
as they were in letters and personal phone calls at that time. Even in 
these communications, personal feelings are subsumed by pragmatic 
concerns. Topics such as thoughts about life or personal aspirations 
seem to be ‘unspeakable’. Ke Li, a factory worker, put it in this way: ‘It is 
not something you will talk about on a phone call or in front of people 
you know – it’s just weird, you only talk about what needs to be done or 
what’s wrong, rather than those daydreams.’
By contrast Chi Hui, a 24- year- old factory girl, used ‘giving ideal-
istic speech’ ( jiang dadaoli) to describe the memes about romance that 
she constantly shared on her Qzone. 
Well, you won’t call your friends and give them those ide-
alistic speeches ( jiang da dao li), people must think you are 
insane . . . When you share those online that’s normal, because 
everybody does so.
As Chi Hui observed, social media has become the ‘normal’ and ‘proper’ 
place in which people can talk about their (day)dreams, their aspirations 
and what they think about life, rather than what they want to have for 
tomorrow’s dinner. The easily shared and ubiquitous visual material 
on social media certainly facilitates such new forms of communica-
tion. Besides this, the one- to- many nature of social media postings also 
encourages people to be more focused on their own feelings, rather than 
addressing specific daily issues to particular individuals. Furthermore, 
communication on social media is usually asynchronous, which enables 
people to manage their self- presentations more strategically, without 
time pressure. On Ke Li’s Qzone there are many shared postings about 
how to become a successful businessman. He also regularly posts pho-
tographs of luxury night clubs which he collects from the internet, both 
representing the kinds of personal aspiration that would not have been 
expressed in phone calls.
This chapter started with a description of the 15 genres of visual 
images that rural migrants commonly post on their social media, fol-
lowed by an analysis of the motivation behind them. These highly 
diverse and sometimes unexpected images are like a treasure trove to 
outsiders trying to understand the feelings and aspirations of a margin-
alised but massive population – one whose voices can hardly be heard 
in mainstream media, and which has kept its feelings and thoughts 
to itself over the past three decades. The chapter then proceeded to 
examine the difference between the visual languages shared by rural 
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migrants and those of the urban population in Shanghai. Only through 
such comparisons does a unique ‘visual grammar’ appear. Rather than 
being a digital memory which records offline life, the evidence suggests 
that images on social media can illustrate complementary aspects of 
life. Before social media we used to see photography as a historical 
effort to represent or duplicate life.39 However, the situation here can 
be the opposite. Certainly in visual genres such as ‘children’, ‘food’, 
‘events’, and ‘travel’ we see continuity between traditional photos and 
visual postings online. However, in other cases visual postings in the 
genres of ‘chicken soup for the soul’, FZL and ‘fantasy’ detach people 
from their offline situation and construct a whole new world online. 
People talked about what is happening on their social media in their 
offline life – in a manner that suggested that it was their online lives 
which for them represented a colourful and interesting world con-
structed around aspirational images. So online space has now become 
the world that people truly enjoy, dream about and want to replicate in 
their offline lives (Fig 3.37).
Fig. 3.37 The colourful online world of rural migrants. (A partial 
image of a traditional Chinese painting booklet ‘Field Note’, 31.5 × 384 
cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang)
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Social media and social relationships
The dynamism of Chinese social media is truly impressive. Even more 
impressive, however, is the speed of response of Chinese social media 
users. They pick up almost instantly on each subtle gesture and movement 
allowed by social media, and skilfully apply these to navigate their rela-
tionships with families, friends, romantic partners and even with strang-
ers online. A whole set of social norms have emerged regarding the use of 
social media, which people soon take for granted: social media thus comes 
to feel an essential part of their daily lives, as if it had always been with 
them. In this chapter we will explore different kinds of social relationships 
in the context of social media usage. The evidence in this chapter suggests 
that social media has not only become an integral part of everyday life, 
a place where people live alongside their offline life. It also provides the 
potential for people to experience relationships that are not fully devel-
oped, or do not even exist, in prior offline situations. In this chapter we 
will explore different kinds of social relationships, which are also called 
‘sociality’ in anthropology,1 in the context of social media usage.
‘Thank you for keeping me on your contact list’
This is a general understanding of rural migrants’ social media contacts. 
Since the autumn of 2014 people in GoodPath have been bombarded by 
a particular type of text message from their WeChat contacts. A typical 
one reads: 
My dear friend, it’s getting cold, please keep yourself warm as I do 
care about you. btw, this a group message. Copy this, and send it 
as group message to all your contacts so that you will see who have 
removed you from their contact lists since the system will tell. Try 
it; you will have a clear picture of your social relationships, and it’s 
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also convenient for you to clean up those who had removed you. If 
you receive this message, then thank you for keeping me on your 
contact list.’
Starting with a sweet, caring line, followed by some practical advice 
about cleaning up contacts, such text messages have become so popular 
among people in GoodPath that almost everyone has experienced them. 
Some found them annoying, feeling that the subtext of the message 
seemed to be ‘I don’t really care about you, I only care about whether you 
care about me’. Many followed the suggestion, trying to figure out who 
had removed them. Some people who did so actually found a few con-
tacts they were happy to discard. Others even discovered to their shock 
that those who had just borrowed money from them had already deleted 
the contact before they had returned the money; or that former col-
leagues who had recently moved to another town had already dropped 
them; or that their ex- partner, with whom they still wanted to remain 
friends, had actually severed the connection unilaterally.
The popularity of such group messages seems to indicate a perva-
sive insecurity and uncertainty about personal relationships, which can 
be explained partly by the life patterns of rural migrants. In the process 
of migration, this ‘floating’ population has experienced a large number 
of transient encounters and frequently had to say goodbye to others. 
During the research rural migrants, especially middle- aged ones such 
as 43- year- old Lao Zhou, talked from time to time about the interdepen-
dent rural communities they had come from:2 
When I was very young, in my village, if one household had dif-
ficulty in harvest, the whole village lent a hand. And when my 
grandfather died, male adults in the neighbourhood all came to 
carry the coffin . . . In a way you have to, everybody is watching you. 
If this time you don’t help others, next time nobody will come to 
help you.
I happened to observe him on another day around dinner time, when 
the muggy evening brought a sudden shower: despite what he had told 
me, when Lao Zhou rushed to collect his clothes hanging outside in the 
collective yard he only collected his own. His neighbours’ washing was 
left to get wet in the rain. I asked why. He replied: 
Neighbours? No, I  don’t think they are, who knows who they 
are? Almost every month people move in and move out. I can’t be 
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bothered to recognise all of them. Of course, in my previous village 
I would have collected my neighbour’s clothes, but here things are 
different. I am not mean, I just try to be realistic.
Knowing how fleeting a co- residence can be, rural migrants seemed to 
have little expectation of developing any long- term relationship with 
people who happened to work on the same assembly line, or happened 
to rent a room next door. Social connections, such as colleagues or 
neighbours, can be very close in the short term, but in the long run they 
were considered fragile and unstable, especially when one of the parties 
migrated to other places. Lao Zhou’s experience from a ‘super- stable’ 
social structure in a village society, in which ‘everybody is watching 
you’, to an unstable and loose connection in a floating life – ‘who knows 
who they are?’ – is common among migrant workers in GoodPath. Such 
living experience set the tone for people’s attitudes towards offline 
social life.
These differences help to explain the relationship pattern found on 
social media. Based on the analysis of 105 migrant workers’ QQ profiles, 
Chart 4.1 shows that non- kinship relationships are dominant on rural 
migrants’ social media. The majority of social connections on social 
media come from migration. Here people have more chances to inter-
act with various kinds of people, such as ‘colleagues’, ‘other friends’ and 
‘online strangers’. The labels of different social relationships followed 
the colloquial terms and categories used by participants in this survey. 
For example, many people would add ‘other’ to ‘friends’ to indicate those 
friends were not their classmates, nor fellow villagers, nor colleagues. 
Nor are the categories are mutually exclusive: most classmates are fel-
low villagers, and some of the colleagues to whom people became con-
nected on QQ were relatives or fellow villagers.
In comparison with the control group in Shanghai,3 several of 
these figures for rural migrants on the chart stand out. One notable fea-
ture is the relatively small ‘classmates’ group. Classmate ties are usu-
ally extremely important in Chinese society;4 the age- class grouping 
in school facilitates the formation of friendships and cliques, and the 
significance of the classmate friendship becomes greater over time.5 In 
Shanghai, more than 36 per cent of social media contacts are education- 
related (classmates, school friends), whereas the concepts of ‘classmates’ 
and ‘school friends’ are very ambiguous among rural migrants, many 
of whom dropped out of school early. Furthermore, more than 80 per 
cent of participants in Shanghai had never added strangers on social 
media, let alone made friends with them. By contrast ‘online strangers’, 
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referring to contacts with no offline social connection at all, stand out as 
an important part of social media contacts among rural migrants.
In practice, being connected is one thing:  keeping in touch is 
another. In fact mere figures of the distribution of various contacts do 
not tell even half the story. The word ‘zombie’ ( jiangshi) was frequently 
used by many young people to refer to those online contacts with whom 
one hardly had any form of interaction (online chatting, commenting or 
sharing). Some people choose to keep those ‘zombies’ as contacts due to 
the fact that a large number of connections on social media is regarded 
as an achievement. Many previous colleagues and fellow villagers have 
become ‘zombies’ on QQ.
Not that this is necessarily a problem. Lu Li, a 25- year- old waitress 
at a local restaurant, has become more and more reluctant to keep in 
touch with her best childhood friend on QQ. Yet when she left the village 
six years ago both of them had opened QQ accounts in order to keep in 
contact: 
To be honest I feel the only thing we could talk about was child-
hood memories and nothing else. I  am not interested in her life 
in the village and she couldn’t appreciate my sense of fashion or 
imagine the ups- and- downs in my life here . . . We no longer live in 
the same world, you know . . . but no harm in keeping her on my 
QQ. You look better online with more friends than less, don’t you?
Distribution of QQ contacts
Average number of friends on QQ: 325
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Relatives
6%
23%
9%
44% 43%
17%
Fellow villagers Classmates Co-workers
Online strangersOther friends
Chart 4.1 Distribution of QQ contacts among rural migrants in 
GoodPath
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The experience of ‘working outside’ (da gong) has broadened the 
horizons of migrant workers, and so an invisible division has started to 
separate people who have remained in villages from those who have 
already experienced ‘the outside world’. Even though physical distance 
is no longer a real obstacle, given the communication technology now 
available, rural migrants fail to keep many of their previous social con-
nections: a non- physical barrier has developed between the experiences 
and mindsets of these two groups that is perhaps even more difficult to 
bridge. Many of these differences from Shanghai make sense once it is 
understood that, as noted in Chapter  1, the ‘push’ factor of economic 
necessity that once determined the trajectory of rural- to- urban migra-
tion has now been supplanted by the ‘pull’ factor of aspiration towards 
modernity. This also needs to be taken into account in explaining the 
nature and experience of social media connections considered in the 
next section.
The ‘hot and noisy’ principle
The introduction to this book discussed the importance of interper-
sonal relations (guanxi) and face (mianzi) in exploring Chinese social 
relationships. Both guanxi and mianzi emphasise the importance of the 
harmony (hexie) of social groups, which works as a powerful mediation 
between the individual and the society. More specifically, another prin-
ciple is widely applied to achieve a harmonious ambience of social life. 
This principle can be literally translated as ‘hot and noisy’.
From time to time people would say ‘come and leave your footprints 
on my profile’ (lai wo kong jian caicai!) to their friends, inviting them to 
visit their QQ profiles6 (Qzone). On Qzone not only the user, but also 
the user’s other QQ contacts can check who has paid a visit. Having said 
this, one is supposed to ‘leave footprints’ (that is to leave comments on 
others’ profiles) in order to show the evidence of caring for one another. 
For example, two girls who work together on the same assembly line 
would still come to leave footprints on each other’s Qzone after work, 
even though they have seen each other 10 hours a day, 29 days a month 
at work. Usually ‘footprints’ resemble a long string of banter between 
friends on one’s QQ profile. ‘Don’t you think with more people coming 
here and more footprints left, it will appear more renao?’ a female fac-
tory worker asked.
‘Re’ in renao means hot, and nao means noisy. Putting the two 
characters together, renao, creates a frequently used Chinese word, 
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referring to a lively, bustling and exciting ambience of social connec-
tion. Traditionally renao was regarded as a positive and ideal status of 
Chinese social life, and was highly sought after.7 For instance, in the cele-
brations of Chinese New Year, ‘hot and noisy’ is essential as the festival 
mood.8 The expression ‘join the hot and noisy’ (cou renao) is commonly 
used to describe the attendance of any kind of meeting with others. As 
shown in chapters 1 and 2, social life in GoodPath is more dependent 
on any gathering of people, rather than people fitting themselves into 
a space specifically designated for that purpose. Any activity in public 
which is ‘hot and noisy’ thus automatically becomes a social event.
In GoodPath, one of the most renao events is the Chinese opera 
show. Every two months a traditional Chinese opera troupe from a 
nearby village would perform a show on a makeshift stage in the park-
ing area. Hundreds of people always gathered around the stage, even 
though not everyone was interested in opera. Noise off the stage was just 
as loud as the singing on the stage. When the show was over, more than 
half of the audience remained in their seats, chatting with each other. It 
seemed that for many people renao, rather than the opera, was the real 
reason why they had come to the show. The parallel between the opera 
audience and social media users shows that the expectation of an ideal 
ambience of social life has migrated from offline to online. Social media 
has become the main place where peers hang out to join the renao.
And in some situations, it is difficult to tell the fine boundary 
between online and offline when it comes to a ‘hot and noisy’ ambience. 
In GoodPath, internet cafes are very popular among young men. Each 
internet cafe has around 100 computers. At night, around 90 per cent 
of the machines are in use, with male users accounting for around 85 per 
cent. Almost all these male users are playing massive multi- player 
online games. Many young men come to the internet cafe in groups and 
play games with their friends together. The internet cafe was always 
extremely noisy. As Wuli, a 21- year- old factory worker, explained: 
Playing a game alone is definitely not the same. If I win playing 
alone, no one can share the excitement with me! With friends I can 
give a shout, letting everybody in the room know that I’ve won – 
it feels so good! . . . And you know, you feel the brotherhood when 
you go to the internet cafe together and kill enemies together!
Wuli visited the internet cafe almost every day after work with a group 
of his fellow villagers who worked in factories. When the group was 
playing games together, they talked so loudly that everybody in the 
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room could hear. Conversations that could be heard were not neces-
sarily about gaming: they might involve boasting about one’s new girl-
friend or a new purchase of an iPhone. ‘The human being is a part of the 
machine’, as a factory manager said. For factory workers such as Wuli, 
who received little attention during working hours, the loud noise they 
made in the internet cafe seemed to be one of the few moments they 
obtained any attention, and they relished it. Furthermore, in  Chapter 3 
we saw that compared to women, men are less likely to portray bond-
ing through posting group photos on their social media. Here we can 
see that this is not because there is less bonding, but rather that male 
bonding is expressed in an alternative way: through this more physical 
and performative companionship.
From leaving footprints on Qzones to playing online games in a 
‘hot and noisy’ internet cafe, the principle of renao was followed both 
offline and online. As a result, the boundary between online and offline 
has become very blurred. Following this general discussion of ‘sociality’ 
on social media, this chapter will focus more closely on social media 
usage in different categories of significant social relationships.
Couples and wider family relationships on social media
When I first saw Lan, she was producing linings for pet carriers in a dark 
workshop. It was a small, underground workshop, converted from a resi-
dential room and hidden deep in a narrow lane. On becoming aware 
of my presence, Lan immediately bowed her head even lower, and 
hushed the two children playing around the sewing machine to be quiet 
(Fig. 4.1).
It took a while to make friends with Lan, her son, aged almost 
five, and her daughter, aged three. Like many young rural migrants, 
24- year- old Lan had dropped out of school and left her village early in 
search of a better life. Five years previously she had married a truck 
driver from a neighbouring village. A year ago the couple had moved 
to GoodPath, working together in a factory. Then, in order to sup-
port each other and their young children better, Lan’s husband took 
a better paid job in Shanghai, a position to which he was introduced 
by a fellow villager. However, the living costs for the whole family 
in Shanghai were prohibitive. So as a compromise Lan’s husband 
worked in Shanghai, staying at the collective dormitory, and Lan 
remained behind, taking care of their children in GoodPath. She had 
to quit her assembly line job at a factory and take a lower- paid job 
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at this illicit sewing sweatshop, run by a local peasant. More flexibility 
was allowed at the workshop, and she could take her children there 
to save on daytime nursery fees. In Lan, one can see the typical kind 
of traditional, virtuous Chinese woman who is devoted to her family. 
Her Qzone possessed a few ‘locked’ albums, not open to visitors. ‘Only 
my husband and I know the password’, she explained. ‘I only uploaded 
photos of our children to the albums so that he can check them over 
there.’
Lan’s husband is a quiet man. I only met him once when he came 
back to visit his family. Being asked about his children’s photographs, he 
remained silent for a while, then replied: 
I was too busy during daytime. At night, on the bed, when I couldn’t 
fall asleep and worried about things, I would take out my smart-
phone and have a look at them . . . then I felt much better.
Then he became silent again.
A QQ album has become the essential connection between this 
young couple, bringing immense comfort to people who had no choice 
but to live separately.9 Yet being physically apart was not always 
regarded in a negative light by a family. In some cases, it came across as 
Fig. 4.1 Lan and her two children. (A partial image of a traditional 
Chinese painting ‘Locked album’, 145 × 75 cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang)
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a great relief, as Yan Hong, the 37- year- old owner of a local nail salon, 
describes: 
When he was at home he never did any housework. I  needed to 
take care of our daughter, him and the business of the shop. You 
know, I was not very lucky to marry such a lazy man! . . . . But now 
things have become more bearable. I no longer need to work as a 
maid, and I even feel that he cares for us more on WeChat and QQ. 
Before he had never taken the initiative to ask about our daughter’s 
performance at school. But now he asks me about her from time 
to time.
Yan Hong believed that her marriage had become more ‘bearable’: with 
the help of social media, her once unpleasant, housework- loaded mar-
ried life had been transformed into a more supportive and considerate 
one. Compared to rural migrant families, hers is definitely much better 
off. Yan Hong’s husband is a businessman who works in a city in north 
China, thus rarely staying at home. Every day the couple talk by WeChat 
voice messages. Once a week they have a half-hour QQ video call, during 
which their 10- year- old daughter, who lives with Yan Hong, joins the 
conversation and says hello to her father. Yan Hong seemed to be happy 
with her WeChat strategy: 
. . . It [WeChat voice message] is similar to a phone call, but bet-
ter . . . because you don’t need to arrange a time for a conversation. 
Before, when I  called him, he always sounded in the middle of 
something and impatient . . . which always pissed me off. But by 
voice message, it’s still as if we are talking, but in a more relaxed 
way . . . I  leave voice messages for him whenever I  want, and he 
comes back to me when he is free.
The use of voice messaging on WeChat varied remarkably among dif-
ferent people. For many young people, especially those in the early 
stages of romance, WeChat voice messages could be sent and received 
so rapidly that it functioned as a synchronous mode of communication. 
It did not have to be, however, as in Yan Hong’s case. She found that the 
acceptable time delay between WeChat messages has allowed her more 
control over previously problematic communication with her husband.
Furthermore, the ‘stored’ conversation on WeChat has brought 
some unexpected benefits. Yan had a few problems with her mother- in- 
law because the old lady was over-indulgent with her granddaughter; 
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she always became very protective of the girl when Yan Hong tried to 
establish discipline at home: 
I complained about my mother- in- law on WeChat, and my husband 
replied that, ‘grandparents always spoil kids, so don’t let her get 
involved too much, do what you feel you need to do’ . . . The next 
day, she [the mother- in- law] gave me a bollocking again when 
I was scolding my daughter for not finishing her homework. So I 
said, ‘ok, I can’t argue with you, then let your son argue with you!’ 
So I replayed that piece of voice message from my husband to her. 
She was totally shocked because my husband had never really sup-
ported me in front of his mother.
Yan Hong’s husband had never considered that a fragment of the con-
versation between him and his wife would be taken from its original 
context and used as an argument by his wife against his mother  – 
something he always tried to avoid. A similar situation also happened 
in other families. Jokes between family junior members on voice mes-
sages were replayed to senior family members, for example, causing 
embarrassment, or secrets were disclosed to non- family members by 
voice messages. Technologically it is possible to record a phone call, 
but before WeChat voice message, voice recording was very rare; most 
daily phone conversations had not been recorded automatically as 
happened on WeChat. In this sense WeChat voice message made peo-
ple’s daily phone conversations replicable for the first time. As a result 
these reconstructions of daily conversations, facilitated by the use of 
voice messages, have now become a part of both family life and wider 
social life.
Given the much higher penetration rate of smartphones and social 
media among older people in urban China, the one- month of research 
undertaken in Shanghai (July 2014)  unfolded some new patterns of 
social media usage in kinship. These had not yet happened in GoodPath. 
For instance, surveillance on social media by senior family members has 
become a problem among people in Shanghai: 
Oh my, you just don’t know how annoying it has become since my 
mum became a WeChat friend. I uploaded something after midnight; 
she left a comment, nagging me to go to bed earlier. I uploaded some 
photos with my friends having fun in a club; she called me the next 
day, nagging about why I couldn’t have a proper girlfriend . . . In the 
end, I had to block her from those ‘sensitive’ postings.
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Huang, a 28- year- old company official, decided to conduct self- censorship 
against his mother’s ubiquitous surveillance. Compared to most men who 
try not to include their parents on social media, women seem to cope 
better with the experience of having family members there. Jing Yu Qi, 
a 32- year- old tourist guide, discovered that WeChat could be a nice buffer 
mechanism between her and senior family members:
It’s true that sometimes they were a bit nosy about my personal 
issues, but that’s always the case, with or without WeChat. And 
on WeChat I can ignore their enquiries or reply later when I am in 
a good mood. In ‘face  to  face’ you can’t do that; as the junior you 
can’t say no to their face or ignore them . . . For me, WeChat is like 
a ‘cushion’.
Such usage actually has many points of similarity to Yan Hong’s WeChat 
strategy regarding her husband.
WeChat groups have also become popular among families in 
Shanghai, connecting several nuclear families together efficiently. For 
example, there is a WeChat group called ‘Grandpa, what will we have for 
dinner?’ on Fan’s WeChat. A media worker in Shanghai, she explained 
that the name of the WeChat group came from the family tradition that 
every fortnight the big family, including four nuclear families, would try 
to have a family dinner at her grandfather’s place: 
. . . In the beginning, the WeChat group was mainly functional, 
because it’s quite convenient to check who will come for dinner on 
it rather than calling each family one by one . . . I forget when it was 
that one of my uncles started to post some photos on the group, and 
others were inspired to post various things such as family news or 
jokes too . . . now we basically catch up with each other almost every 
day in the group. And the funny thing is over family dinner, face to 
face, we continue chatting about the topics from our WeChat group.
For Fan, the WeChat family group has become the virtual family dinner. 
Some also found the interaction with senior family members on WeChat 
group allowed them to see a different aspect of their relatives. Ding Yi Han, 
a freelance artist in her late thirties living in Shanghai, described how 
WeChat transformed her relationship with senior family members: 
I have never seen him smile like a child, you know: the traditional, 
typical father never smiles like that. But since we had a family 
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WeChat group, he has somehow learnt to use WeChat stickers, and 
all of a sudden I found he was no longer the serious father I knew 
before. He has become so funny and even childish. It’s not only my 
father; my grandfather was also taught to use WeChat this year. 
He too has become a lovely person, I mean before he was just the 
‘grandfather’, you know what I mean? . . . I  think that’s best thing 
WeChat has ever brought to me, and to the whole family.’
WeChat stickers (Fig. 4.2) are a popular feature of WeChat. Hundreds 
of sets of stickers like these are available. In traditional Chinese patri-
archal society senior male family members are supposed to be serious,10 
yet because of those cute stickers junior family members have started to 
discover the ‘human’ side of their fathers as well as their grandfathers. 
Meanwhile, for the older generation, WeChat has also opened a window 
on youth culture.
There are two definite trends of social transformation taking place 
beneath the observations of social media use in kinship discussed here. 
One is the massive rural- to- urban migration, and the inevitable rupture 
of kinship that occurs in the process; the other is the increasing popu-
larity of social media and smartphones among low  income people and 
the older population. In Lan’s story we see a typical family pattern of 
rural migrants in diaspora, a situation in which the use of social media 
helped to overcome long physical distances and maintain a family 
together; features such as the ‘locked album’ with a password shared 
among family members made ‘remote’ parenting possible. Yan Hong’s 
story, by contrast, reflects rather different usage. Here the new facility 
provided by WeChat (voice messaging) has been applied to break the 
Fig. 4.2 Samples of WeChat stickers
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pre- existing routine and hierarchy of family life. This may be taken fur-
ther in the light of the findings from Shanghai that revealed that some 
new aspects of kinship were ‘discovered’ through social media use. From 
online albums to voice messaging to stickers, social media changes the 
practice of family relationships by providing many new possibilities for 
communication.
During the period of research (2013/ 2014), the use of social media 
in GoodPath was still largely confined to the younger generation (aged 
under 35). The majority of social connection online was still among con-
temporaries, and very few people connected with any senior relatives 
on QQ. Communication between parents and their adult children, or 
between senior family members in a big family, remained essentially a 
matter of phone calls. Thus the discussion here about social media use 
in family relationships among rural migrants only speaks to situations 
between young couples, or among junior relatives in a large family. 
However, the use of social media in romantic relationships is now perva-
sive among young people.
Romantic relationships on social media
Every day after work, a group of young female factory workers leaves the 
factory plant together, hand in hand. All of them are unmarried young 
women, and gossip about relationships is always the most popular topic. 
Girls chatter avidly on the 10- minute walk from factory to dormitories; 
everybody is trying to contribute something to the daily ‘gossip time’: 
‘Hey, did you hear that he just asked for her QQ number? I was sur-
prised that he wanted to add her on QQ!’
‘Really? I didn’t know he was keen on her. Oh no – it is really 
bad news for his ex- girlfriend. A few days ago I just saw her new QQ 
status . . . sounds like she really regrets the break- up. Look, look . . . ’
The girl then took out her smartphone, showing her friends the evidence 
she had spotted on QQ. 
The very action of men and women adding each other on QQ can 
easily be interpreted as romance, since, in the words of one girl, ‘QQ is 
not used for talking business or other things; QQ is for you to fall in love 
(tan lian ai)’. It has become almost a consensus among young people that 
one of the major functions of social media is to develop and maintain 
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romantic relationships. Xiao Lin, a 20- year- old factory worker, sent me 
QQ messages explaining how QQ helped him to become a better lover:
I am much more bold and romantic on QQ . . . you just wouldn’t say 
those sweet words face to face . . . And I used lots of cute stickers 
when we were chatting on QQ, which made her find me really 
funny.
Many young migrant workers, like Xiao Lin, think they can be a bet-
ter lover on social media. Vivid stickers and emojis enrich people’s 
expression; an element of time delay allows more scope for strategic 
communication. Behind the screens of their smartphones, people feel 
more empowered and confident. Rather than a diminished form of inti-
mate interaction, romantic relationships on social media have become 
an efficient modality combining elements of voice, image and text, as 
well as emoji and stickers. There is another reason why social media is 
regarded a place for romantic love: a public display of love offline is usu-
ally frowned upon in GoodPath. Walking hand in hand was the most 
intimate interaction that one could spot on the street. When Xiao Yu, a 
21- year- old hairdresser’s apprentice, posted photos of herself kissing her 
boyfriend on QQ, she perceived QQ to be a romantic and liberating place 
where one can feel free to display intimacy as the ‘public’ was different:
In big cities people won’t make a fuss [about kissing in public]. But 
here some traditional people would dislike it . . . but the good thing 
is they are not on my QQ!
Xiao Yu’s kiss photographs elicited many comments. Rather than feeling 
embarrassed, she felt that was exactly what she was looking for: ‘. . . When 
you posted something like that, you just knew what people would com-
ment. If I am not sure, then I won’t post it,’ Xiao Yu explained. To the 
question ‘do you think about what kind of reaction you will receive when 
you post something on social media?’, the majority of participants, both 
in GoodPath and in Shanghai, said yes. Moreover in many cases the 
imagined audience and presupposed reaction justify the posting. A few 
days later, Xiao Yu finally uttered the real reason why she posted the 
kiss photos – to warn another girl to stay away from her boyfriend as 
she assumed the girl had been stalking her.11 ‘It’s so annoying, she is still 
flirting with him (Xiao Yu’s boyfriend) on his Qzone. Is she blind? I am 
pretty sure she saw the kiss photo on my Qzone.’
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In romantic relationships, surveillance on social media can lead to 
jealousy in various ways. For instance, a delayed reply to a WeChat mes-
sage can make the romantic partner feel unimportant, especially when 
he or she can see on other social media platforms that their partner is 
online. Situations such as that described by Cai, a 22- year- old waitress 
in a restaurant, are very common: ‘I sent him a message half hour ago; 
he didn’t reply, but ten minutes ago, he updated his QQ status . . . that 
made me feel upset.’ She was always online throughout the day when 
working at the restaurant; the multiple social media platforms her 
boyfriend used allowed her to connect with him constantly, but such 
an environment also made it more difficult for her boyfriend to hide 
anything from her. Many young people share similar insecurities about 
their romantic relationships, As Zhu, a factory worker aged 20, com-
plained: ‘She [his girlfriend] never mentioned our relationship on her 
QQ. My gut feeling is she is not that committed, or maybe she is hiding 
something from me?’
Because social media profiles are continuously subjected to scru-
tiny to a greater extent than most offline spaces, for many young people 
such as Zhu a romantic relationship gained its ‘legitimacy’ by a public 
announcement on social media. However, in practice, the attempt to 
make a public announcement may backfire. Lujia, a factory worker, set 
up a QQ group of 78 contacts in order to win the trust of his new girl-
friend. He explained: 
My girlfriend said she was not sure about my love, unless I showed 
it in public (gong kai); Once I set up the QQ group and show my 
love for her she will believe me.
On this QQ group, every few hours Lujia wrote something along the 
lines of ‘ . . . darling you are the most beautiful woman in my life and I love 
you so much’. Clearly not everybody thought Lujia’s declaration of love 
quite as sweet as his partner did, and most people soon quit the group. 
As one former member complained, ‘he thought QQ was his own place 
to do whatever he wanted . . . But why should I read screenfuls of such 
goosebump- arousing nonsense?’ What was evident in Lujia’s case was 
that ‘audiences’ felt extremely disturbed and offended. Unlike posting 
something on one’s own social media profile, Lujia’s QQ group mes-
saging, which constantly tried to grab people’s attention to witness 
something of little relevance for them, was way too aggressive and 
inappropriate.
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However, in most cases some subtle strategies regarding the pub-
lic display of love on QQ had been applied. It was very common to see 
a couple talk to each other in a way that others would not be able to 
understand without knowing the context of the dialogue. For example, 
a conversation between a young couple on Qzone that could be seen by 
all the online contacts was: 
‘Don’t forget you promised me that you wouldn’t tell her 
about that.’
‘Yes I promised, and I didn’t tell her about that at all, quite the 
opposite, I told her that you said those three words on my birthday, 
and she was so delightfully surprised. I told you she liked you.’
Even though substantial information from the above correspondence 
was very limited, everyone who read the dialogue got the message that 
these two people were close to each other and that their relationship 
was exclusive. That is exactly the reason why, rather than this taking 
place on the seemingly more convenient and private basis of one- to- one 
chatting, the couple chose to talk secretly ‘in public’. Such ‘coded’ inti-
mate talk on QQ between lovers skilfully displayed love in public with-
out disturbing others too much.
The self- exposure of personal relationships on social media is not 
always about positive emotions. Having arguments on social media, for 
example, is regarded as a fatal hit to a romantic relationship. Huang 
Ling, a 19- year- old factory worker, explained the problem: 
Each time, when we had some friction, he would update his QQ 
status immediately with things like ‘please introduce girls to me, 
I need a girlfriend, blah blah . . . I really hated him for that!
Two weeks after their break- up, Huang Ling was still complaining about 
her ex’s outrageous QQ usage, and every female friend of hers expressed 
the same resentment. As one of her close female friends remarked, ‘How 
could he say so regardless of the place and the situation (chang he)?! He 
just wanted her to lose face’. Ling applied some ‘media sanctions’ to cope 
with the break- up’s aftermath. First of all she locked her Qzone, which 
means nobody could view it except herself. 
I need some space you know. I don’t want people to gossip about 
my break- up. Even though they do it out of kindness, I still find it 
so annoying.
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Huang Ling’s elder cousin even called her very late at night to 
ask her what had happened when he saw her ‘unusual’ QQ status 
update. She felt embarrassed to explain the reason to her friends and 
relatives, and therefore locked the only channel (Qzone) from which 
most of her friends got news about her. After four days Huang Ling 
reopened her Qzone, having already deleted all her previous QQ 
status updates. Meanwhile Huang Ling’s updates on WeChat were 
very remarkable, even dramatic. During the four ‘non- QQ’ days she 
uploaded a large number of emotional remarks on WeChat. One day 
she even uploaded a photo of her arm, carved by herself with a steel 
ruler (Fig.  4.3). The two ‘bloody’ Chinese characters she carved on 
her skin were hate (hen) and love (ai). It seems that only carving her 
own skin would fully express her strong feelings about the frustrating 
break- up. She told me: 
Because some of my family members are on Qzone, I don’t want to 
scare my relatives and other friends. Whereas the circle of friends 
on WeChat is much smaller; most of them are just colleagues at 
Fig. 4.3 A photo of ‘carved flesh’ on Huang Ling’s WeChat
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the factory, so it won’t cause me too much trouble. And he [the 
ex-boyfriend] will see the photo either way as he is also my 
WeChat friend.
If we view Huang Ling’s story together with the accounts of Xiao Yu’s care-
less display of a kiss photo on Qzone and Lujia’s less successful public dis-
play of love on QQ group, a more comprehensible picture emerges. First of 
all, we need to recognise that social media provides many possibilities; it 
enables people to practise romantic relationships online with much greater 
freedom than in offline situations. Social media has also become an essen-
tial arena in which romantic relationships take place in daily life. However, 
a more liberating place online does not equal fewer social norms. New 
norms about what is appropriate or inappropriate on social media dealing 
with romantic relationships emerged almost immediately. For instance, 
the release of private problems between couples on social media usually 
brought immense embarrassment, serving to trigger even worse conse-
quences than in an offline situation. Sociologist Erving Goffman12 used the 
word ‘frame’ to explain how people’s behaviour is cued by elements that 
constitute the context of action. In the frame of social media, people were 
not only aware of the private/ public nature of social media, but also inten-
tionally played around with it to express the exclusiveness and intimacy of 
relationships – even though not everyone was successful at first.
Also, from the frequently applied and highly valued public displays 
of love on social media, we see how on social media the perceived pub-
lic gaze is just as strong as in the offline situation. Online, young rural 
migrants may be free from the disapproval and judgement of senior 
relatives and fellow villagers, yet their peers’ opinions or those of even 
strangers were highly valued, and can also cause concern. Regardless of 
what kind of social rules one follows, as long as there are ‘others’ the risk 
of ‘losing face’ always exists, and sometimes the uncertainty of who is 
watching online exacerbates the anxiety.
Another point that emerged from the varied use of social media 
in romantic relationships is that, in order to make sense of sociality 
on social media, a whole range of available communication tools must 
be taken into account. As suggested by the concept of ‘polymedia’,13 it 
makes no sense to study only one particular media platform in isolation – 
the meaning and use of any one of them is relative to the others. As is 
clearly shown in Huang Ling’s situation, her choice of WeChat only made 
sense in comparison with the role that QQ and mobile phones played 
in her social life. Furthermore, in a polymedia environment, once one 
has either the smartphone or a personal computer, the decision which 
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media to use is no longer much affected by either access or cost; instead 
it becomes a social and moral choices. For instance, in Lujia’s case, his 
choice of using QQ group messaging to declare his love for his girlfriend 
had been regarded as very inappropriate. The approach of polymedia, 
as well as the arguments put forward about new social norms on social 
media, are not confined to the analysis of romantic relationships on 
social media. We will now see how they apply equally to the analysis of 
all kinds of relationships on social media.
Friendship on social media
A common belief about social media friends in GoodPath, especially 
among young people, was basically ‘the more the better’. During a sur-
vey, when asked how many social media friends one had, many people 
answered proudly: ‘Countless, at least hundreds of them!’ Some would 
further add comments such as ‘to make more friends is what social media 
is for’, or ‘to work outside is to see the world and make more friends’. In 
most cases, having a great number of social media friends is regarded 
as convincing evidence of one’s personal charm and modern taste. Bing 
Bing, a 23- year- old waitress in a local restaurant, articulated the opin-
ion shared by many rural young people: that having many friends is an 
essential part of the experience of being a modern citizen. 
If you remain in a small village you will never know the impor-
tance of friendship. But being outside, the world is different; peo-
ple in cities all have many chances to meet new friends and they 
have many friends, and friends will have fun and sadness together, 
help each other . . . I mean real friends will be like that.
Having said that, in field work it was not difficult to notice that in offline 
situations, people still tried not to be introduced or referred to others 
as just ‘friend’ (peng you). In most cases, they used expressions such as 
‘my fellow villagers’ (lao xiang) or ‘my fellow workers’ (gong you). Some 
‘extra’ identity was always added to the person. ‘Introducing someone 
as a “friend” does not provide any information about the background 
between the party and yourself’,14 and Chinese society traditionally sees 
non- kinship ties as less important and less formal. Another research 
piece on a comparison of networking between Chinese and American 
populations seems to reinforce the observation in GoodPath. It shows 
that in China on average 6.6 per cent of the people named were described 
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as friends, whereas in the US the figure is 67.8 per cent.15 Nor are the 
Chinese alone in this. In many other societies the concept of ‘friendship’ 
as a form of social relationship only started to gain importance during 
the processes of industrialisation and modernisation, which allowed (or 
forced) people to meet and work with others outside of one’s kin- ties and 
regional social networks that were confined to certain locations.16 The 
experience of friendship seemed to have changed because of the use of 
social media. Evidence in this chapter shows that for migrant workers 
social media is not only the place where they explore and experience 
friendship, it is also the place where they start to value friendship in a 
different way.
The story of Feige, a 37- year- old forklift truck driver, presents a 
typical example to illustrate the argument. Feige once had three best 
friends, whom he called ‘my good brothers’ (hao xiong di). The four men 
used to work in the same section of a factory. The connection between 
people from the same hometown is always highly emphasised among 
rural migrants when it comes to social networks; it is practiced as a 
golden rule in the ‘jungle survival’ environment of factories. Fellow vil-
lagers are supposed to help each other and cover for each other, and thus 
form various groups in factories. In terms of recruiting new workers, 
section managers (duan zhang)  – those at the bottom of the manage-
ment hierarchy – have a say. In practice, section managers always try 
to recruit new workers from among their fellow villagers, so that their 
status in the factory will be reinforced. Bullying is common in factories, 
with victims always being those who have neither relatives nor fellow 
villagers at their workplace. For this reason Feige and the other three 
workers, who came from different provinces, ‘naturally’ became the 
victims. To cut a long story short, after enduring bullying for a couple 
of months, these four colleagues finally exploded and provoked a fist 
fight with the dominant group of over 20 workers. In the end, these four 
were badly injured and dismissed by the factory. ‘Even though we lost 
the fight, we won the friendship’, as Feige said.
It was in this context that Feige, for the first time, managed to 
establish some strong emotional attachment to his colleagues. The sit-
uation he experienced is common among factory migrant workers. For 
most people in a situation where nepotism dominates, it is very difficult 
to establish a stable friendship with colleagues who do not come from 
the same family clan or village, unless some dramatic event takes place 
in which friendship has a chance of being valued. Moreover, even if 
this happens, maintaining such friendship in the floating lives of rural 
migrants is usually very high  maintenance.
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Unfortunately, Feige’s precious friendship did not end well. After 
being fired from the factory, the four men embarked on different jour-
neys. In the beginning, though living in different places, they managed 
to keep contact with each other via QQ and phone calls, but as time 
went by such connections gradually diminished. Five years later one of 
the friends was killed following an explosion in the fireworks factory 
where he worked. The late friend’s widow called the remaining three 
men frequently, asking for financial help, and this became the last straw 
that ended these friendships. ‘Sometimes you really have no choice: life 
forces you to become more realistic and you lose your friends,’ Feige 
said. From then on he has never managed to have such good friends as 
those three from his previous workplace. However, he does not regard 
himself as somebody who lacks friendship.
On Feige’s QQ, there are more than 15 QQ groups, among which 
Feige actively participated in three. Members of those QQ groups are 
mostly factory workers with a similar rural background. Feige had never 
met those QQ friends in person, but they seemed to know much more 
about him than his colleagues who spent a lot of time with him every 
day did. ‘[Online] we are very open- minded, and you say whatever you 
want to say. I told my QQ friends a lot of things,’ Feige explained. One 
reason that Feige has never worried that his QQ friends might release 
his secrets is that all the QQ groups he joined were anonymous. Nobody 
in the group knows anyone else’s real name, offline address or other 
personal details. Usually people tell each other what they do, however, 
without giving any further details.
Feige is very popular among his friends on QQ. People found him 
funny and smart, and always asked for his opinions on social events 
and news, making him an opinion former in various groups. Gradually 
Feige’s emotional attachment to his QQ groups grew to the extent that 
he could not bear being apart from them for even a short time: 
When I  had to charge my mobile phone and went without it for 
a while, I felt restless and anxious, as if a very important part of 
me had been left behind . . . and when I finally went back, I couldn’t 
wait to check my QQ.
The friendship online has been valued highly by Feige, and that is not 
rare among rural migrants. Particularly in the specific situation of ‘float-
ing’ life, friends online seem to be the only ones who will never change 
places; in a way QQ itself has becomes a loyal friend, always there and 
never failing people. However, this does not explain the reason why 
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Feige failed to maintain his previous offline friendships online. In order 
to answer this question, we need to take a step back and consider the 
expectations of friendship. Here Feige’s comment on his online friends 
seemed to provide a new perspective: 
They [online friends] like me and talk with me because they really 
like me, not because I am rich so that they can borrow money from 
me, or I am powerful so that they can get a job from me. Here every-
thing is much purer, without power and money involved . . . The 
friendship is much purer (geng chun) on QQ.
Feige regarded the friendship between his QQ friends whom he had 
never met in offline situations as ‘purer’ (geng chun) than offline relation-
ships, as there are no pragmatic concerns involved online. Furthermore, 
for migrant workers such as Feige, who are often frustrated by their 
social status, social media provides new possibilities of sociality free 
from social hierarchy and discrimination.
Curiously, people who enjoy a high socio-economic status seem to 
have the same problems with their offline friends. Ms Cheng, a local fac-
tory owner, avoided her school reunion event and the chance to meet 
her former school friends. The reason for that was that the last time she 
went to a school reunion she subsequently received at least six phone 
calls from her erstwhile classmates, all asking for financial and other 
forms of help. As she sadly observed: 
I feel nowadays society is very pragmatic. I am sometime very con-
fused and frustrated. They said the relationship between previous 
classmates was the purest one because there is no benefit or inter-
est involved. But in my case it was no longer true.
Ms Cheng was not alone. Many factory owners or local officials, the local 
rich and powerful people, have the same problem: people befriend them 
for pragmatic purposes. A retired local official commented how, follow-
ing his retirement the previous year, he had suddenly found that ‘many 
friends who used to be nice to you kind of disappeared . . . no phone call, 
no text message, let  alone visiting you during festivals . . . because for 
them I am useless now’.
On WeChat Ms Cheng frequently visited a WeChat group where 
mothers share the experience of raising children. She could talk about 
her struggles in dealing with her two teenage children there. It emerged 
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that only on WeChat, with WeChat friends, did Ms Cheng feel free to 
release her stress and gain a great deal of support: 
At home everybody is busy with the factory stuff . . . but here [the 
WeChat group of mothers] I am a mother: just a mother, not a fac-
tory owner. I show my weakness and get a lot of support and com-
fort . . . I don’t know exactly who they are, but I know they are all 
mothers and we share our problems with each other.
Chinese migrant workers and factory owners probably lie at the two 
extremes of the wealth spectrum in this industrial China field site, yet 
both appear willing to befriend and communicate with strangers online. 
In the study of social media, arguments as to whether real friendship is 
possible in a virtual environment, or whether social relationships will 
lose their authenticity in the face of social media, are constant.17 This 
is mainly because of the assumption that one of the inevitable conse-
quences of increased technological mediation in social relationships 
is the loss of authenticity. However, such arguments assume a founda-
tional Western discourse, one entirely inappropriate to a situation in 
China that is experiencing the opposite trajectory. In this Chinese field 
site, friendships on social media that are mediated by digital technol-
ogy were perceived to be more authentic than offline relationships  – 
which in many cases are highly mediated (or ‘polluted’ as people say) 
by factors such as wealth and social status. Outside of such contested 
discourses, the premise of anthropology is that offline life has always 
been entirely mediated by all sorts of social norms; there is no such 
thing as an unmediated relationship, so there is no such opposition to 
authenticity.
These observations help to make more sense of the observation 
made at the beginning of this chapter through Chart 4.1. On rural 
migrants’ QQ there are 43 per cent of ‘other friends’ and 17 per cent of 
‘online strangers’, which altogether means that almost two- thirds of 
contacts have almost nothing to do with one’s kinship, regional affilia-
tion or school connections – the three kinds of relationship highly valued 
in Chinese society. And the general term for these contacts is ‘friend’: a 
kind of relationship that was less emphasised, or barely even existed in 
practice, in the hierarchy of sociality of the previous traditional society. 
The situation in GoodPath poses a sharp contrast to the huge debate in 
the West over the nature of friendship on platforms such as Facebook.18 
For the latter, the focus has been on whether friendship will lose its 
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authenticity on social media. For the former, however, ‘friendship’ itself 
as a modern concept barely existed in a traditional society, given the 
dominance of kinship and regional relations. Here it is on social media 
that people have the possibility of exploring and practising these new 
relationships fully. Viewed from the perspective of China, therefore, the 
approach of studying friendship on social media in the West seems to be 
parochial.
Friendship online has become an efficient supplement to one’s social 
life, and such sociality facilitates the process of becoming modern among 
rural migrants. Reasons why rural migrants felt it was more difficult to 
make friends offline than on social media included the reduction in their 
time at school and the transient, floating nature of their lives, as well as 
the practical use of social networks (guanxi) to survive. The final aspect 
of online sociality to be discussed in this chapter, that of privacy, follows 
from this – in as much as once again the online and offline situation are 
very different, and that once again social media is perceived as offering an 
important experience in becoming modern for rural migrants.
Yin si (privacy) on social media
In the discussion of romantic relationships on social media above, it was 
found that Lujia’s public display of love on QQ group did not go down 
very well. This was in part because his QQ friends felt that his behaviour 
violated their private space on QQ. Yet given the offline experience of 
living in GoodPath, such an emphasis on ‘privacy’ stands out as some-
thing unusual. 
Of course, you know people can see you, well it’s their business, 
I am doing my own stuff, normal things, nothing wrong, and why 
should I care that much . . . If you care, which means you are doing 
something wrong, something under the table, so I don’t care.
The daily life of Mr Ma, a 43- year- old shopkeeper, literally takes place 
on the street. His wife cooks three meals a day on a cylindrical briquette 
stove on the pedestrian walkway. The couple go to sleep on the bed 
inside their shop after they close the grocery in the evening. In the day-
time everybody passes by their shop and can see exactly what they are 
doing. Most people in GoodPath would agree with Mr Ma’s views, and it 
is quite common to believe that if people want to avoid the gaze of others 
there must be something weird going on.
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Strictly speaking, there is no Chinese word for privacy. The 
Chinese word yinsi is widely used when it comes to the topic, but it 
actually means ‘something secret which should be hidden from others’, 
formed from the combination of two characters: yin (meaning hide) and 
si (meaning secret, with the connotations of ‘illegal’).19 Linguistically 
yinsi in Chinese is not neutral but negative, according to the collec-
tive culture, which highly values the right of the collective.20 Privacy 
refers to something much broader than secrecy, and the etymology of 
the English word ‘privacy’ is suggestive. The basic Latin form means 
‘being single’ with the implied context ‘being not the solitary human 
being, but rather the individual facing the potential claims of other 
persons’.21 People keep something private for all kinds of reasons, but 
most of the time keeping private is an act of choosing boundaries and 
staying comfortably within them. In a collective society such as China, 
however, there are social pressures to consider ‘nothing private and to 
label refusal to disclose private information as always being shameful 
and secretive’.22 In GoodPath one can clearly feel such social pressure 
upon individuals, conscious that ‘anything one tries to hide from fam-
ily members must be something wrong’. The line between ‘privacy’ and 
‘secrecy’ in people’s real lives is also very thin. Within a big family there 
is no door (doors are always open) between rooms. Staying at home 
with your room door closed is regarded as something weird, and people 
walk into each other’s places without knocking. The situation among 
rural migrant families is not dissimilar from that described in late impe-
rial Chinese society, where ‘privacy was not a legal right but a flexible 
privilege, the boundary of which varied according to one’s social status 
in specific contexts’.23
It is difficult to generalise about China in terms of the issue of pri-
vacy. Current scholarship has been focused on the transformation of 
the notion of privacy in contemporary China, demonstrating emerging 
emphasis on individual rights to privacy and data privacy, as well as 
young people’s increasing demands for Western- style individual pri-
vacy.24 However, most studies only related to elites, middle- class and 
urban populations, thus appearing less relevant to a specific discus-
sion of privacy among Chinese rural migrants. Here ethnographies of 
ordinary rural migrants and their experience of life would have more 
significance. Furthermore, even though research found that more 
recently in Chinese villages individuals’ claims for private space had 
become evident in the major shift of household model from extended 
family to conjugal family (where couples can keep their independence 
and privacy from senior family members),25 such a trend was not found 
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among rural migrant families. This was largely because, unlike in vil-
lages where spacious houses are possible, rural migrant families sim-
ply could not afford enough living space to make this a reality.26 From 
this perspective, rural migrants are actually living in an even worse 
situation than those who remained in the villages. The latter may 
not necessarily have a strong awareness of privacy in terms of indi-
vidual autonomy and liberty, but at least they may enjoy some private 
living space.
In this context, we can further examine the role played by social 
media and smartphones in rural migrants’ private lives. As previously 
noted, following Huang Ling’s break- up, she chose different social 
media platforms to avoid scrutiny from senior family members. The 
public/ private nature of social media was not only recognised, but also 
applied and manipulated to address various issues in social relation-
ships. However, not everybody was as good at handling the situation as 
well as Huang Ling did. Many learned from mistakes.
Hudong, for example, a salesman in his early thirties, came from 
a rural migrant family. For various reasons he did not have a close 
relationship with his uncle, who lives in a nearby town. However, as a 
close relative he was supposed to join the family dinner at his uncle’s 
place. In order to avoid the event he told a white lie that he needed to 
work extra hours. Everything went well until Hudong’s niece, who is a 
WeChat contact of his, accidentally showed photos at the family dinner 
of him having dinner with his friends. Unsurprisingly, Hudong’s uncle 
was furious and a family crisis developed. The first thing Hudong did 
after the ‘WeChat leak’ was to block his niece on WeChat. He then sorted 
his WeChat contacts into several categories so that he could tailor each 
posting’s visibility by privacy setting on WeChat.
Huang Ling and Hudong both made some effort at protecting their 
privacy on social media. By comparison, for many other young rural 
migrants: social media in and of itself means privacy. Such a view is held 
by CiCi, a 17- year- old hairdresser’s apprentice: 
I am totally free on my QQ. People who can see my profile are my 
friends and would agree with what I do online: as for those pedan-
tic idiots, they can’t view my QQ . . . That’s my privacy, isn’t it?
The first time CiCi heard the word ‘privacy’ was in a television opera a 
few years ago. The word sounded very fashionable and modern to her. 
Now, on CiCi’s QQ profile, visitors are greeted by this welcome page 
(Fig. 4.4). The whole page is pink – even the model’s nails and texts are 
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this, CiCi’s favorite colour. Besides the model’s ‘cute’ face and ‘cool and 
rebellious’ hand gesture, the text reads: 
I am not a tender and sweet girl. I am careless and casual; I swear 
from time to time; I  hate unnatural people; I  hate those women 
who pretend to be ‘knowing the world’ in front of women and 
‘knowing nothing’ in front of men . . . you can play with everything, 
but don’t play with my feelings, whether friendship or love; you are 
just not good enough to play with my feelings.
In the collective dormitory where CiCi lives she has almost no private 
space. Four young women sleep together in two king-size beds, set in a 
basic room with no other furniture. Everyone’s personal belongings can 
be seen at a glance. Yet for CiCi even that is heaven: when she worked in 
a factory, a single room held eight female workers. As she recalled: 
At night, everyone was talking with their boyfriends on phone, 
as noisy as the food market . . . there seemed to be no secrets at all 
because you could always hear and see each other.
In order to have some privacy CiCi started to text more on QQ, rather 
than speak on the phone to her then boyfriend. Like CiCi, the majority 
Fig. 4.4 The welcome page of CiCi’s QQ profile
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of migrant workers in GoodPath have never owned a private space that 
is undisclosed to anyone else’s view. In such a context social media actu-
ally offers a place where people carve out their own private space. On 
social media they can ‘shut the door’, as Huang Ling did after her break- 
up, or refuse unexpected visitors, as Hudong did on WeChat to avoid 
conflict between relatives. Or, like CiCi, they can enjoy the freedom of 
QQ where there are neither roommates who overhear and see every-
thing, nor elder adults to make disapproving comments.
When looking into the specific issue of the privacy experience in 
China, among people who grew up in a collective society where keeping 
private space was usually stigmatised, it is safe to say that instead of being 
a threat to privacy, social media and smartphones actually facilitate an 
increase in experience of it. Having said that, the experience of privacy is 
very contextualised. Such an increase of privacy on social media is rela-
tive in comparison with a collective tradition: social media does increase 
privacy, but has not yet reached the levels of some Western countries.
The essence of privacy is not about whether there is a public gaze 
or not, but more about whether individuals feel they have control of per-
sonal issues and are comfortable in a given situation. The concepts of 
public and private are always relative. When people choose to record 
their thoughts and stories on social media they recognise that these will 
encounter the public gaze. However, given the relative absence of senior 
participants, this online public is perceived to be significantly different 
from the offline public. Gossip offline may easily lead to harmful conse-
quences, whereas online chat – with like- minded peers as well as friendly 
strangers who are not connected to anyone significant and therefore do 
not pose a threat – gives people the opportunity to let their inhibitions 
down to talk openly without too much fear.27 In addition, sharing secrets 
always makes for a strong ‘we- feeling’ among those in- groups who know 
the secret.28 Thus one can often witness people voluntarily exposing pri-
vate thoughts to people online.
Conclusion
This chapter started with a relatively abstract chart used to charac-
terise the complex pattern of social life online. For rural migrants the 
relationship to their classmates and kin from their villages has become 
somewhat attenuated. By contrast they seem to show more interest 
in developing new relationships with people online, and even with 
strangers. By the end of this chapter, the chart is hopefully no longer as 
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abstract. A central concern of social life in China is the process of zuo-
ren, which literally means ‘becoming a person’ or ‘to make oneself a per-
son’.29 The implication of zuoren is that a Chinese individual is not born 
as a full person: only through the process of self- cultivation and sociali-
sation can a person gradually become a moral individual. However, the 
key to understanding this term is to appreciate that in China this pro-
cess of becoming a ‘full’ person is highly socialised rather than just an 
individual pursuit.30 The relationships between kin, romantic partner, 
friends, classmates and colleagues all contribute to the very process of 
‘becoming a person’. Zuoren has never been an individualising concept 
in Chinese people’s lives. On the contrary zuoren, as a colloquial term, 
is frequently used in relation to social life. In GoodPath one can always 
hear somebody praising a person as someone who ‘knows how to zuoren’ 
(hui zuoren), indicating that this person is good at dealing with social 
relationships. Accordingly a major criticism applied to someone who is 
awkward in social life or has difficulties in following social norms is the 
phrase ‘doesn’t know how to zuoren’ – literally meaning someone who 
has not learned how to become a person. From this perspective, the dis-
cussions in this chapter represent an effort to understand the role that 
social media plays in the process of Chinese individuals becoming full 
human beings. On social media people collectively negotiate what per-
sonal relationships are and what they want them to be.
Through looking in detail at individual stories we can understand 
not only why the pattern shown on chart 4.1 makes sense for particular 
people, but also that it is hugely important. Personal relationships are 
often the main factor that determines people’s sense of happiness, con-
fidence and ability to get by in the modern world. In addition to telling 
us about a medium, communication on social media is one of the best 
places to see the desires and concerns of modern China, and the preoc-
cupation with particular moments in its history. In contrast to the tradi-
tional descriptions of Chinese kinship and sociality, we can see that the 
radical effect of social media is best understood not simply as cause but 
rather as an alignment with other radical changes experienced in the 
lives of these rural migrants to a factory town. These include the emer-
gence of an unprecedented concept of friendship and the creation of a 
relatively autonomous place not only for privacy but also for the public 
declaration of intimacy – as well as markedly different relationships to 
kinship and to place.
This was perhaps a particularly good time to be studying the 
relationship between social media use and sociality in modern China. 
The population of this field site are not only Chinese rural migrants 
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who have travelled from rural to urban areas; they are also ‘digital 
immigrants’31  – a unique generation who grew up in the analogue 
era, but joined the technological revolution from analogue to digital. 
So in order to understand the transformations taking place on social 
media, we have first to recognise the radical difference represented by 
historical rural China, as well as the extreme situation of being rural 
migrants. The ‘hot and noisy’ principle discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter and the ‘discovery’ of privacy on social media high-
lighted at the end appear to bookmark the two ends of the social life 
explored and experienced on social media by rural migrants. Here the 
continuity of rural social life met and mixed with the new practice of 
modern life.
The full spectrum of sociality on social media, in return, helps us 
to understand further what social media is. Prior to social media, the 
main ways in which people communicate are either through broad-
casting or one- to- one conversation. On social media, however, the two 
ends meet in situations that we have called ‘scalable sociality’.32 Here 
there are two scales, one from the most private to the most public, 
and the other from the smallest to the largest group. For example, as 
we have seen, Hudong’s change of his WeChat privacy setting was to 
scale down his WeChat posting from full public broadcasting to more 
limited broadcasting; Lujia’s public display of love, in contrast, led 
him to scale up his private and small group message to a more public 
statement conveyed to a larger size of group. Meanwhile Yan Hong’s 
strategy of using WeChat voice messaging is intended to ‘transplant’ 
information from one private group to another; her slight adjustment 
of the group size from two persons (the couple) to three persons (the 
couple and her mother- in- law) made a significant change to her rela-
tionship with her mother- in- law. Similarly, by locking the QQ album, 
Lan’s couple created a most private and exclusive space in the middle 
of public broadcasting on QQ. All these case studies show how social 
media as scalable sociality allows people to gain much better control 
of their social life.
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Social media, politics and gender
The previous chapter focused upon social relationships seen through the 
lens of social media. Throughout that chapter, however, it was clear how 
far such relationships may also involve issues of power that have to be 
negotiated and are often exposed through being posted online, for exam-
ple in the relationships of parents to children, in- laws and other family 
members. The focus in this chapter is directed more clearly towards 
this issue of power, exploring two of the most important regimes within 
which issues of power predominate. The first part will concentrate on 
the political sphere, which as will become clear may start with ques-
tions about state power but is actually mostly about power relationships 
between those present on the field site. This is followed by a consider-
ation of gender, which will emerge as one of the most dynamic fields of 
power in contemporary life: both migration to factories and migration to 
online have had an impact on this.
These two fields of ‘gender’ and ‘politics’ both stood out from the 
mass of field work, but in quite contrasting ways. In the case of gender, 
it was because of its ubiquitous presence on social media; in the case 
of politics because of its conspicuous absence. For most people whose 
knowledge of China comes mainly from news reporting in the West this 
will come as no surprise, and it may be assumed that there is quite a 
simple explanation. Political content would be subject to censorship, 
whereas most gender issues would not. As we have seen for almost every 
topic covered in this book, however, an ethnographic account provides 
very different and often unexpected insights into the nature of Chinese 
social media. Often this means starting by questioning what terms such 
as ‘politics’ mean in this very different context. Similarly we shall see 
that once again there are quite specific issues regarding this particular 
‘floating’ population. Gender relations may not only be different from 
other parts of China, but an ethnography can reveal how they may have 
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radically changed even in comparison to a previous decade. This is really 
the primary aim of this chapter.
The two topics also work together as will become evident, since 
exploration of the political field quickly descends from issues of formal 
politics to the sphere of more personal relations that could be termed 
micro- politics – a term that applies equally well to the issues of gender as 
found through the role of social media in peoples’ daily lives.1
Topics such as gender and politics also stand out because we have 
many preconceptions around them, and often want evidence to fit with 
a particular stance or concern. However, the task of ethnography is to 
try and resist the temptation to make evidence fit such preconceptions 
or interests. Instead we will first try to examine in some detail how 
both gender and politics actually circulate on social media, and then to 
explain these in terms of the wider ethnographic evidence – the actual 
concerns and relationships of this particular group of people.
Part A: Social media and politics
Politics is one of the least common genres of posting on social media 
among rural migrants, as shown in Chapter 3. On the other hand, a pro-
liferation of studies claim digital media to be a potentially powerful tool 
for spreading democracy, encouraging political participation, carrying 
forward social justice and empowering civil society.2 So what does the 
political silence on social media among ordinary Chinese tell us?
To date studies on Chinese politics in the digital age have tended 
to concentrate on Chinese online censorship3 and on political participa-
tion online among political elites and activists.4 Rarely has equal atten-
tion been given to the majority of the population – the ordinary people 
(especially non- political activists), including a massive working- class 
population. ‘What is ordinary people’s attitude to politics?’ and ‘How 
do ordinary Chinese people experience, perceive and talk about politics 
offline and online?’ are still questions requiring answers.
The discussion will start with an examination of Chinese online 
censorship. From there discussion proceeds through four case studies, 
intended to show how factory owners, local middle- class citizens, ordi-
nary rural migrants and rural migrants with a high level of education 
all occupy their respective place in the political spectrum. The discus-
sion will focus on the political attitudes and consequential social media 
behaviour of these four different local social groups. By considering 
these different situations and perspectives, we reach a better position to 
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discuss the role social media plays in ordinary Chinese people’s political 
lives, and to explore the relationship between political engagement on 
social media and the governance of the Chinese party- state.
Internet censorship in China
In the 2014 report of World Press Freedom Index,5 China (PRC) was cat-
egorised as a country with a ‘very serious’ situation of press freedom, 
the worst ranking on the scale. From nationwide and multi- level media 
monitoring systems to the Great Firewalls, from Google’s withdrawal 
from mainland China to the jailing of dissident journalists, bloggers and 
activists, it has been widely known that the Chinese party- state has long 
kept a very pervasive and tight rein on both traditional and new media.6
Generally speaking, censorship in China is implemented in a ‘three- 
layer- filtering’ system that includes at least three types of approaches 
simultaneously: Great Firewall, keyword blocking and manual censor-
ing (Fig. 5.1). 
The first filter is so- called the ‘Great Firewall’, which blocks off cer-
tain websites and social media services (such as Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube) from mainland China. The second filter is ‘keyword blocking’, 
which automatically prevents people from publishing content contain-
ing banned keywords or phrases online. Given the nature of the Chinese 
language, however (different characters can have the same pronuncia-
tion, and many characters look similar), people can easily replace those 
banned characters with alternatives, either possessing similar sound 
(homophones) or similar shape (homographs).7 The third filter is thus 
the last line of defence, in which ‘improper’ information that slipped 
through the cracks of the previous two filters will be censored manu-
ally. Given the huge amount of information online, the labour invested 
in ‘manual censoring’ is remarkable:  it includes 20,000– 50,000 inter-
net police (wang jing) and internet monitors (wang guan) nationwide, 
around 250,000– 300,000 ‘50-cent party members’8 (wu mao dang), and 
up to 1,000 in- house censors hired by each individual website for the 
sake of ‘self- censorship’.9
Having said this, as a recent piece of research from Harvard on 
Chinese censorship pointed out, criticism of authority will not necessarily 
be censored: the real goal of censorship is to reduce the possibility of collec-
tive action by clipping social ties, regardless of the nature of the collective 
movement is (whether against, in support of or completely neutral about 
the authority in question).10 That is to say, it is possible for individuals to 
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express their political opinions freely as long as such free speech will not 
lead to any potential collective action. From this view, Chinese people 
may be said to be ‘individually free but collectively in chains’.11
This Harvard research is a large- scale quantitative analysis of 
Chinese censorship. However, the data informing this research was all 
collected from public media platforms to which researchers have easy 
access, such as Weibo and other BBS online forums. As for private media 
platforms, neither QQ nor WeChat, the two dominant social media 
platforms, were covered by this research. The reason, as Chapter  2 
noted, is because the privacy settings on these two social media plat-
forms are much stricter than on public digital media platforms. It is 
impossible to gain access to content on personal social media profiles 
unless the researchers themselves become online ‘friends’ of millions 
of individuals, which is also impossible. Given that both public digital 
media platforms and personal social media profiles are subject to the 
same censorship mechanism, the Harvard research throws light on 
our understanding of the censorship of personal QQ and WeChat. In 
Fig. 5.1 Internet censorship in China
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the light of such a report the responsibility of the ethnography, with its 
access to hundreds of personal social media profiles of ordinary Chinese 
people, is to provide a more detailed and nuanced picture that simply 
cannot be achieved from merely quantitative analysis.
The living experience of politics – offline and online
The section above is clearly significant in addressing one of the 
most common questions, namely ‘What do ordinary Chinese people 
think about internet censorship and how do they deal with it?’ Yet 
the problem is that both question and answer tie the issue of politics 
almost entirely to the question of censorship. What if the majority of 
ordinary Chinese people are not particularly engaged with issues of 
censorship, nor feel that they have any particular experience of inter-
net censorship on their social media profiles? The section that fol-
lows is very different because it is derived not from questions posed 
by outsiders, but is rather an attempt to engage with the practices 
encountered through the ethnography. This leads to a much broader 
interpretation of politics, in which issues of censorship are not partic-
ularly prevalent.
‘Be in love with the government, but don’t marry it’
Family- run businesses constitute the mainstream business model 
in GoodPath. More than 90 per cent of factory owners were formerly 
local peasants, and more than one- third of them have no education 
above middle school. Factory owners often attribute their success to the 
opportunities of ‘doing development/ industrialisation’ (gao kai fa) led 
by the state party and local government, and regarded themselves as the 
group of people who ‘got rich first’ (xian fu qi lai de).12 During this time 
China started to introduce the market economy and struggled to throw 
off the shackles of Maoist egalitarianism.13 Mr Lee, the factory owner 
in GoodPath, who was born in a neighbouring village and became a 
billionaire in his early forties by opening three massive factories, once 
said gratefully: ‘It’s thanks to Deng: otherwise I would be just a peasant, 
farming all day long.’
It is commonplace that local factory owners see the policies estab-
lished by Deng, which were friendly to private enterprise, as the main 
reason why they escaped from rural life to become those who ‘got rich 
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first’. As stakeholders, factory owners usually hold a very cautious polit-
ical attitude; as Mr Lee said:  ‘You’d better just focus on business, don’t 
touch politics at all.’ However, this concept of ‘don’t touch politics’ is 
really about not having an overt political stance; it in no way detracts 
from the practical problems that make constant dealing with the gov-
ernment a necessity. Keeping a good relationship with local government 
was essential for factories. In practice, this meant keeping a good per-
sonal relationship (guanxi) with local government officials, as social 
structure in China ‘rests largely on fluid, personal- centred social net-
works, rather than on fixed social institutions’.14
There was very limited political content on factory owners’ social 
media profiles. One of very few politics- related postings on a factory 
owner’s WeChat read: ‘Be in love with the government, but don’t marry 
it.’ Mr Zhu, a factory owner visiting from a nearby town and the source 
of this post on WeChat, further explained: 
We [factory owners] should always show love for them [local offi-
cials] so that they won’t make trouble for our factories, but we 
should be cautious about making a commitment to any specific 
official, just in case things change.
By showing the love, Mr Zhu meant maintaining a guanxi with local 
officials. Guanxi can be used as instrumental tool to gain potential 
benefits, but not all the social connections will lead to a guanxi, since 
this needs maintenance and investment.15 The common practice was to 
engage with local officials through various leisure activities, for which it 
would be necessary to pay. Previously, the most common one would be 
to have elaborate dinners together. Since the middle of 2013, however, 
people in GoodPath had also become sensitive to the strong impact of 
the nationwide ‘combating corruption’ campaign,16 so dining in public 
with officials was avoided. As Mr Zhu explained:
These officials had become very cautious about public appear-
ances, since if anybody takes photographs of them having a meal 
with us in restaurants and uploads them to the internet, they will 
be in trouble. But, you know, there is always an alternative way of 
keeping good guanxi with them.
It is true that there are alternative ways of keeping a guanxi with offi-
cials. The way Mr Zhu dealt with a local official is through WeChat. 
Mr Zhu’s niece was the high school classmate of the daughter of the 
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deputy director of the local police authority. During the Chinese New 
Year in 2014, the WeChat red envelope game17 was popular among stu-
dents in his niece’s class. Knowing that, Mr Zhu transferred money to 
his niece’s bank account and asked her to send several WeChat red enve-
lopes containing 2,000 RMB in cash in total (around US $340) online to 
the deputy director’s daughter. ‘2,000 RMB is nothing to me, just a small 
gift. But it is enough to make a teenager very happy, and parents always 
want to see their children happy, you know,’ Mr Zhu explained.
Even though 2,000 RMB is almost a month’s salary for a factory 
worker, this amount of money is definitely ‘a small gift’ in the owner’s 
eyes compared to potential penalties his factory would face if it had prob-
lems with the police. In this case, guanxi ties up the exchange between 
money and power and is officially regarded as bribery.18 However, ordi-
nary Chinese people do not necessarily regard it as such, since ‘gift 
exchange’ is so essential and pervasive in the daily practice of guanxi.19 
As we will see in  Chapter 6, such a concept of doing guanxi through gift 
exchange has also been widely applied to the relationship between peo-
ple and deities. More importantly, here social media is definitely not the 
place to express political opinions. Instead, it is an efficient tool to main-
tain a good guanxi with government officials.
Besides keeping guanxi with the government, the way in which fac-
tory owners managed their factories showed some genuine understand-
ing of the national policy of avoiding the threat of collective actions to 
‘maintain stability’ (weiwen).20 The recruitment principle of local factory 
workers is to ‘avoid recruiting factory workers from the same village or 
from the same family’ because it is much easier to manage factory work-
ers who are not connected. Incidents in the past had involved a whole 
group of factory workers quitting their jobs together; the factory con-
sequently lost the labour for a whole assembly line overnight and was 
unable to deliver orders on time.
This principle was always difficult to follow, however, as relatives 
and fellow villagers provide the essential network in rural migrants’ job- 
hunting. Ensuring that factory workers are not connected is thus always 
a big headache for employers. As one explained: 
I asked my people in charge of recruiting new workers to observe 
them [rural migrants] first. If they are lively (huo po), we are not 
going to take them. People who are sociable are not suitable mate-
rial for factory work; they can easily be distracted, get bored about 
things, become discontented about things, and in the worst case 
they will arouse dissatisfaction (tiao shi) in others.
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This suggests that the local governance of factory workers by their 
employers is closely aligned to the very same principle of Chinese inter-
net censorship. Both aim to remove the potential for collective action. 
It has been commonly anticipated that as China experiences increasing 
economic growth, private entrepreneurs will begin to claim their polit-
ical rights and thus promote the process of democratisation.21 However, 
the findings among factory owners do not support this optimistic view. 
Chinese entrepreneurs turn out to be the least politically active, gener-
ally supporting the party- state22 and wanting to keep the status  quo.23 
Factory owners represent the very few local residents who actually own 
the majority of local wealth. Beneath that level exists a much wider spec-
trum of local residents, who, despite not managing to become super rich 
still see themselves as living relatively prosperous (xiaokang) lives. The 
political attitude of this local middle class, explored in the next section, 
represents the mainstream of local residents in GoodPath.
Politics as a football game
Mr Huang is a typical local middle- class resident, now in his late for-
ties. He was born and grew up in GoodPath and now owns a grocery 
shop. In his shop, under the transparent table mat of the cashier’s desk, 
Mr Huang kept his newspaper clippings. One of them is an entire news-
paper of photographs of the top leadership of Chinese Communist Party. 
To Mr Huang’s surprise, his cat always chooses to sit right on the por-
trait photo of Chairman Xi. He wryly observes that ‘40 years ago, I would 
probably have been put in jail just because somebody saw my cat sitting 
on the face of the great leader’. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, a 
colleague of his uncle was prosecuted, charged with despising the great 
leader, Chairman Mao, as he had used a newspaper featuring an image 
of Mao to make insoles. Mr Huang ended his insoles story with a robust, 
confident statement: ‘So we are both lucky you know, that we live in such 
a peaceful and reasonable age, and China is so powerful in the world.’ 
Clearly he was content with the status quo and full of national pride.
On his Qzone, Mr Huang’s favourite political topics were the rise of 
China and some historical anecdotes of political struggles – reflecting his 
oft- repeated view that ‘men should care more about big affairs of state 
(guojia dashi) and leave those insignificant household trivia to women’. 
However, none of his political interests were in the sphere of local poli-
tics. The unwritten rule shared by people was that local political issues 
should appear only in offline situations rather than on social media. On 
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social media, Mr Huang is a typical example of ‘passive political partici-
pation’. To be able to talk about politics, including making innocent jokes 
about politicians, seems to be an important and necessary social skill for 
local middle- aged men, helping them to appear smart and masculine in 
front of their peers. For this purpose, social media was mainly used to 
‘watch’ politics, in the way that football fans watch a match, rather than 
to ‘do’ politics. Similarly, when people watch a football match very few 
would question the basic rules of the game. On the contrary: the prem-
ise of fully enjoying the game is a sophisticated knowledge of all the 
rules and the ability to follow them. Like Mr Huang, many local middle- 
class men have a reasonable knowledge of the rules of ‘playing’ politics 
in China, but it is highly unlikely that they would challenge them. The 
parallel between following sport and politics is even closer, since both 
have become important components of contemporary Chinese ideas of 
masculinity. Local middle- aged men use social media to make fun of 
politics and to make innocent jokes; they gossip about politicians with 
their male friends in quite a similar fashion to the way in which they joke 
and talk about watching football.24
Both factory owners and the local middle class support the status 
quo, and their social media behaviour seems to be consistent with this 
attitude. In the next section, the situation is found to be different among 
rural migrants. The very concept of ‘rural migrant’ is itself a direct prod-
uct of political developments in post- Communist China. This population 
is also one of the most vulnerable social groups, facing all kinds of social 
problems in the face of the rural– urban divide and pervasive social dis-
crimination.25 However, on their social media profiles there were very 
few references to politics, especially local political issue of immediate 
concern.
‘I have no interests in politics, but being a Communist 
Party member is so useful’
After several sleepless nights Makang, a factory migrant worker in his 
thirties, decided to stay at the factory for another six months even though 
his disabled father and three- year- old son, who had remained behind, 
desperately needed him to come back. The main reason for his decision 
was a ‘probationary Communist Party member’ certificate which he had 
not yet received from the factory party branch. If he chose to quit his 
job at that moment, all his previous efforts would be in vain: the village 
party branch would not recognise the political screening undertaken at 
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the factory party branch unless he had already obtained a ‘probationary 
Communist Party member’ certificate.
To join the Chinese Communist Party involves an extremely rigor-
ous and long screening process lasting at least three years. Applicants 
first need to attend study sessions, make a sustained effort to join party 
activities, submit self- assessment reports regularly and subject them-
selves to monitoring by the party branch on a daily basis (each appli-
cant is assigned two Party liaison members, who monitor and assess the 
applicant’s political loyalty, work performance and social relationships). 
Two years of monitoring is followed by a closed- door evaluation, in 
which an applicant’s political background, as well as that of his or her 
parents and other important kin, is examined. If the candidate passes 
the evaluation, he or she will become a ‘probationary Communist Party 
member’, who will be under closer monitoring by the Party branch for 
another year before finally being accepted as a formal member.26
‘I have no interest in politics at all, but being a Party member is 
so useful,’ Makang explained. The Communist Party membership is 
viewed as a scarce political resource that in practice can be turned into 
economic benefits.27 The situation is more obvious in villages, since in 
China direct democratic elections only take place at village level.28 In 
villages local Communist Party members enjoy more political rights 
than ordinary villagers, meaning they enjoy not only higher social sta-
tus, but also better welfare and some ‘grey’ income. For instance, if a vil-
lage wants to sell collectively owned farmland to developers, only local 
Communist Party members have the right to vote on the decision. As 
mentioned previously, naturally those who can vote become the target 
of developers to make guanxi. To join the Party has become extremely 
difficult in villages. Current Party members always try to keep the bal-
ance of political power among various big families in a village, thus the 
allocation of the Party membership is in most cases pre- decided. For 
most villagers, like Makang, who do not come from a big family with 
political influence, one of the alternative ways to join the Party was 
through the factory outside the village.
Now it is not difficult to understand why Makang decided to make 
such a huge effort to join the Party. For him, such an active and direct polit-
ical participation was perceived as nothing to do with politics. The pursuit 
of Party membership was more like purchasing an insurance to provide 
some of the security that he had not yet experienced in ‘floating’ life.
None of the topics discussed above had ever appeared on 
Makang’s Qzone. Here there are very few reference to politics; over 
a whole year, there are only five postings about politics out of 59. The 
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five postings consist of two ‘anti- Japan’ posts, one ‘anti- corruption’, 
one about the social inequality suffered by rural migrants and one 
about the rise of China as an economic and political power.29 Posts 
were consistently on the national or even international level; even 
though some specific local events did appear, all of them referred to 
events in other parts of China. The pattern of MaKang’s political post-
ings on social media is typical among rural migrants:  local political 
matters, which have most immediate concerns to people, have hardly 
any visibility on social media.
Furthermore, on rural migrants’ social media, postings about 
the leadership of China were usually very positive. The positive image 
of Chinese leadership on public internet arena is the result of political 
propaganda,30 but the equally positive impressions on personal social 
media indicate the fact that many people appear to believe it. For 
example Yan Mei, a migrant worker, commented ‘In China the high 
officials (da guan) of the leadership are very good; only local officials 
(xiao guan) are not good’. She also gave a well- known anecdote of the 
previous premier Wen Jiabao as an  example: in 2003, Premier Wen 
pledged to help migrant workers expedite payment of unpaid wages 
during his surprise inspection tour after an ordinary rural migrant 
woman had made a complaint to him about the the wages owed to her 
husband by a local construction company.31 The extensive adminis-
trative and fiscal decentralisation that China has experienced since 
1980 benefited economic development remarkably. However, such 
decentralisation also led to the situation in which regional bureau-
crats are supposed to take full responsibility when problems occur, 
and so become the target of complaints.32
However, such complaints about regional officials are rarely vented 
on social media. The same Yan Mei who said that ‘only local officials 
are not good’ was involved in a demolition dispute. Her family spent 
three months discreetly approaching various individuals who may have 
some guanxi (social relations) in the local government to help them to 
remedy their situation, rather than airing their grievances publicly on 
social media. People are clearly aware of the negative consequences that 
online exposure of local issues could potentially provoke. A family mem-
ber of Yan Mei described the position, which also accounts for the polit-
ical apathy of most rural migrants who see themselves as insignificant 
individuals in political life: 
You want to solve the problem, rather than make it into a bigger 
one. Online is for those who want to make big news, or those who 
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had no other choice left . . . for our powerless ordinary people, to 
‘play politics’ (wan zhengzhi) is meaningless and dangerous: you 
have no chance of winning unless you are super lucky.
For most workers joining the Communist Party is not really a likely 
option. Indeed, their relationship to politics of any kind is fairly tenu-
ous. This is partly because as a ‘floating’ population that does not expect 
to remain in this particular area indefinitely, they assume they have 
little at stake in relation to local politics itself  – even though political 
decisions may in effect have a considerable impact upon them.33 They 
also assume that no one of any importance would have any real inter-
est in what they think or say. But equally, much as they might wish to 
be engaged in anything political, they would not have considered social 
media as an appropriate place for such activities – the very idea of social 
media is for them so closely related to everyday communication, and 
also to everyday fantasy, that it would not occur to them that politics 
should feature there.
Not everybody took an indifferent attitude towards politics, how-
ever, and a few did appear politically active. ‘Phoenix man’ Da Fei, dis-
cussed below, represents this minority group.
The ‘phoenix man’ and his political life
‘Around 99 per cent of the people who work on the assembly lines are 
rural migrants, and only one per cent of the people who sit in the offices 
are rural migrants.’ The seemingly exaggerated situation described by 
a senior factory manager actually seemed to be consistent with ethno-
graphic observation. The situation arises partly from the fact that local 
people do not want to take on heavy labour on assembly lines, while 
the poor educational qualifications of most rural migrants prevent them 
from gaining more advanced office jobs. But it is also partly due to the 
management model of local factories, in which factory owners tend to 
hire relatives and local people, rather than rural migrants, as officials 
and managers.34 Given such a rigid rural– urban divide at the workplace, 
Da Fei, a young man from a rural background with a university educa-
tion, almost achieved a miracle by becoming a senior manager. The term 
‘phoenix man’ ( fenghuang nan), from the traditional saying ‘a phoenix 
soars out of a chicken coop’ ( jiwo li feichu fenghuang), is used to refer to 
this type of rural male – one who came from a humble beginning, but 
made his way through school and managed to rise to an urban life.35
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‘Phoenix man’ Da Fei was also one of the few who constantly 
showed his strong dissatisfaction with politics, both online and 
offline. In the factory his main job was to increase efficiency by 
reducing cost – a task that proved almost impossible in the face of per-
vasive nepotism. Firstly, most of the senior managers were relatives 
of the factory owner, and all tended to protect their own interests 
rather than work with Da Fei to cut costs. Moreover, nepotism existed 
from top to bottom:  everybody tried to put their relatives or fellow 
villagers into ‘juicy’ positions, expecting that this would be recipro-
cated in the future. Da Fei was turned down when he tried to get real 
information concerning scrap rates from the assembly line, for exam-
ple, because the worker in charge of reporting the scrap rate was the 
son- in- law of a section manager; the section manager’s family in turn 
was dealing with the steel recycling business, which benefits from a 
suspect scrap rate for steel products in the factory. As a result, after 
a year all Da Fei’s efforts proved to be in vain: his only achievement 
had been to offend all the managers and their relatives in the factory. 
As a result he became the most unwanted person everywhere, offline 
and online. 
When Da Fei joined the factory, he was added to the WeChat 
group of all the senior managers. Initially Da Fei was welcomed as he 
brought interesting news to the group. Gradually he felt the collective 
hostility against him, as nobody responded to his messages in a group 
chat at all. The tension became white- hot when a senior manager (a 
relative of the factory owner) wrote on the WeChat group: ‘Why do we 
need an “outsider” to sort out the family business?’ Two days later Da 
Fei found that he had been removed from the chat group. This WeChat 
event was the last straw: it made Da Fei quit. Two weeks later he also 
left GoodPath.
Da Fei’s frustrating political struggle offline extended to his Qzone. 
Here political postings account for the majority. ‘The internet is the only 
weapon we have to push for democracy; online the people’s voice will be 
heard by the world!’ he once said proudly. A typical political posting on 
his Qzone read:
Those at the top of the power hierarchy always stand high above, 
enjoying their privileges and welfare, never affected by the situa-
tions of economic development. However, ordinary people have to 
live a tough life. For those who live at the bottom of society, except 
being submissive to oppression, what else can they do? What a 
pathetic country.
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Like this one, most criticism about corruption, nepotism or the politi-
cal system on his QQ expressed strong negative personal opinions. 
However, none of them were censored, which seems to reinforce the 
argument that the Chinese censorship system does in fact allow people 
to release very negative emotions and criticism online as long as there is 
no possibility of these causing collective action.
The reason for highlighting Da Fei’s story in this section is not 
just that he was one of the very few political activists in GoodPath who 
continued to fight nepotism and to criticise all sorts of social problems 
online: more importantly, Da Fei’s story throws light on a key finding – 
that in the political lives of ordinary people, the really crucial and effec-
tive censorship does not come from the far- reaching party- state, but 
from one’s personal relationships. Internet censorship did not prevent 
Da Fei from expressing himself online; it was the entire management 
team that struck the fatal blow by removing him from the WeChat 
group. This suggests that from an ethnographic perspective we gain 
little from using highly generalised terms and concepts such as democ-
racy. Instead we need to understand the particular arenas of power and 
control that operate mainly through social consensus locally in places 
such as GoodPath. In effect the mass population voted against Da Fei. 
The issue was not one of democracy, however, but of local and personal 
feelings and local hierarchies and groups. So overall the abstraction of 
political discourse is far less important than the everyday practice of 
local culture.
Furthermore, Da Fei’s claim that ‘on social media the people’s voice 
will be heard by the world’ seems to be over- optimistic. Certainly he was 
absolutely right about the possibilities allowed by social media, which 
theoretically empower everybody to make their content available to the 
world. However in the age of Web 2.0, the information flow works dif-
ferently – ‘the power is no longer in the hands of those who control the 
channels of distribution; the power is now in the hands of those who con-
trol the limited resource of attention’.36 Social media studies on public- 
facing social media platforms, such as blogs, Twitter and Chinese Weibo 
(microblog), have pointed out that in practice only a tiny percentage of 
social media users have influence in terms of information diffusion. The 
spreadability of the majority of social media profiles is very limited.37 
The deficiency of information spreadability is even more pronounced on 
relatively closed social media platforms such as QQ and WeChat.
Furthermore, we might expect that with social media people 
would share information beyond their previous groups. However, a 
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comparison of the sharing of 145 social media profiles of factory work-
ers and 55 profiles of middle- class Chinese in Shanghai produces evi-
dence to suggest that they do not. Over a period of four months only 
one out of 6,000 articles (0.03 per cent) was found to have been shared 
in both groups, though 5.1 per cent of articles are shared within the 
factory workers group and 1.6 per cent within the Shanghai group. 
In the case of rural migrants, the possibility of the same information 
being shared within the social group with similar social economic sta-
tus is 170 times higher than the possibility of it being shared across 
groups with different socio-economic statuses. So while most aca-
demic debates are concerned with the problems of sharing information 
from the West into China, for all intents and purposes one also has to 
acknowledge the limitations of information flow between two differ-
ent social groups within China.
Conclusion
In terms of the technological functions of Chinese social media there 
is simply no reason why Chinese social media cannot work as BBM did 
in the London riots (2011) or as Facebook and Twitter did in the Arab 
Spring (2011). The degree to which social media assumes a political 
function is totally determined by the people who use it, rather than by 
the affordance of the technology. The key point is that the majority of 
Chinese people use social media differently – or to be precise, they use it 
in ways that make sense within a Chinese context.
The main finding has been the wide diversity in the way that the 
various meanings of ‘politics’ are interwoven with social media across 
the four different social groups used here to represented the popula-
tion of this ordinary factory town. The case studies started from the 
co- operating and pragmatic political attitude held by most local fac-
tory owners and concluded with the critical attitude displayed by a few 
‘phoenix men’. In between are local, middle- class residents, especially 
men, who view politics as a form of entertainment, and ordinary rural 
migrates who either appear totally indifferent to political participa-
tion, regarding themselves as insignificant people who are unable to 
change anything, or see coping with politics as a survival skill. What 
they view as real politics can be totally unseen, and the ‘seen’ poli-
tics can have nothing to do with real politics. The ethnography also 
shows that formal government internet censorship does not influence 
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the online political expression of ordinary Chinese; the way Chinese 
people do guanxi does.
In a way all of this conclusion is pre- empted if we are sufficiently 
sensitive to the key Chinese term, which in this case is guanxi. Because 
although we translate guanxi as a practice of social relations, as noted 
in Chapter  1, it is equally regarded as integral to political relations 
in China. From their perspective, ordinary Chinese people join ‘poli-
tics’ through guanxi, rather than through any direct relationship to a 
political institution. Even in the case of factory owners, we have seen 
how they deal with local government issues mainly through develop-
ing and maintaining personal relationships with local officials. For 
ordinary people, not in any case likely to engage with formal poli-
tics, ‘politics’ is perceived and practised almost entirely as guanxi.38 
The key point of this regarding the book as a whole, however, is that 
instead of looking to see where people post politics on social media, 
we need to recognise that social media is now integral to guanxi. It 
almost therefore makes no sense to ask what is, or is not, political on 
social media.
It has probably not escaped notice that every example in this sec-
tion was male. As mentioned above, in some ways more overtly political 
expression may be regarded as masculine, in the same way that a keen 
interest in football might be. Yet that also tells us something important 
about the politics of gender, to which we now turn.39
Part B: The impact of social media on gender
For anthropologists, gender is never just a biological given. It refers to 
the social norms pertaining to gender identities as men and women, and 
the types of relations that exist between them –  largely social and cul-
tural constructs.40 These expectations and social relations are aligned in 
turn with people’s other relationships. So when we think of social media 
and its attendant technologies, for example, we recognise that these also 
have gendered associations familiar from stereotypes, such as the con-
cept of the nerd or the geek.
In GoodPath an integral part of social media was deeply involved 
in many aspects of gender relations. People gossiped on social media, 
where they spent a lot of time patrolling and speculating there, and they 
shared and commented upon memes or articles online. Both women 
and men, young and old, joined the ‘debate’ about what makes a good 
woman or a good man.
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The good women of China41
After dinner, a group of women in their forties sat in a circle, chatting. 
They were gossiping about a young woman, the girlfriend of one of the 
women’s sons. 
She is definitely pretty ... but the problem is she is not anfen at all. 
I saw her mingling with different guys several times; you’d better 
warn your son to look out . . . 
‘Anfen’ refers to the ideal situation of a well- behaved woman who knows 
(and adheres to) what she should and should not do in a family situa-
tion and in public. In Chinese the word ‘an’ means to be content, while 
‘fen’ refers to one’s social role and fate. Thus together anfen means to 
be content with one’s given lot, to know its boundaries and never to go 
beyond them or even think about it.42 Based on Confucianism, the tra-
ditional Chinese family was organised around a rigid hierarchy of age, 
generation and gender, where elder men held the say within a family 
and young women were the least significant.43 In such a context to be 
a good young women is not only to accept an inferior social status, but 
also to feel content about it. Any challenge to such a situation would be 
regarded as bu anfen (not anfen) – a very negative description of a young 
woman, indicating her failure to meet the requirement of submission 
and to perform an appropriate social role.
In GoodPath flirting with the opposite sex in public was consid-
ered damaging to a young woman’s reputation, whereas it was accept-
able if men did so. Also young women were not supposed to take the 
initiative (zhudong) in romantic relationships, as courting was seen as 
a man’s job. Nowadays, even though virginity is no longer regarded as 
the most important virtue of young women,44 and premarital sex no 
longer regarded as a very shameful thing for women, a frequent change 
of partners still provokes raised eyebrows. Young women in a romantic 
relationship for more than a year are supposed to get married – having a 
public relationship without getting married is considered strange. Young 
people are ‘supposed’ to get married and have their first child no later 
than the age of 25. A married couple without a child was also regarded 
as strange, inviting speculation that there was ‘something wrong’ and 
subjecting them to gossip. It is very common to see older people ask 
young couples whether they are married or whether they have any 
plans for having a child. To conclude, the mainstream ideas of gender in 
GoodPath are in many ways still conservative.
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However, the situation is not the same on social media. Partly because 
the older generation, who holds the idea that anfen is essential to be a 
good woman, have not yet become active users of social media, young 
people have enjoyed a greater say online. On social media the associ-
ation of anfen is something totally different. Fig.  5.2 shows a popular 
meme among young factory workers, both female and male. The text 
embedded on the image reads: ‘Youth: a heart which is not anfen.’
As discussed in Chapter  3, some anti- mainstream (FZL)45 memes 
demonstrated rebellious gestures and were very popular among young peo-
ple. On this meme, anfen equates with the non- adventurous – something 
to be disregarded by young people, who should do something modern 
and cool instead. More importantly, when young people embrace the 
general urban idea of being adventurous, they also accept a gender 
claim that young women should not be anfen. Other postings on social 
media also demonstrated a trend that the pursuit of gender equality has 
become ‘mainstream’ among young women online: 
I feel regret that I got married before reading these wise sugges-
tions [‘chicken soup for the soul’ articles about love and relation-
ships].46 When my family arranged things [marriage] for me, I was 
too young to understand what love is.
So declared Yueling Hu, a 21- year- old factory worker, who got married 
when she was only 19 (Fig. 5.3). Her husband is also a factory migrant 
Fig. 5.2 A typical anti- anfen meme posted by young factory workers
SOC IAL MED IA ,  POL I T I C S AND GENDER 145
worker from the same village. What made Yueling feel regret was the 
following:  compared to those ideal husbands depicted on the posts 
she shared on Qzone, her husband appeared to know nothing about 
romantic love. At the end of the field work, Yueling ‘disappeared’. Her 
husband confirmed that she had been arguing for a divorce for a while, 
and when she was turned down by him, she ran away from home, leaving 
her three-year-old son (Fig. 5.3). For many young female rural migrants 
those posts were the first time ideas of marriage and romantic relation-
ships were publicly discussed, along with a focus on gender equality and 
the pursuit of happiness. Some young female migrants even reported 
that they felt very shocked when for the first time they read from friends 
sharing on QQ about what a marriage should be, and the proper way 
that a man should treat his wife.
During the 15 months of field work, as far as the researcher knows, 
six migrant young women left their husbands or had an affair, mainly 
because they finally realised their marriages were not what they wanted. 
Even though married men secretly had some affairs, or in most cases pur-
chased sex,47 none of them divorced their wives for the same reasons as 
the women mentioned. Among the six women, five, including Yueling, 
were married to fellow villagers at a very early age, before they experi-
enced rural- to- urban migration; four48 of them also shared a large num-
ber of postings about romantic love and ideal marriages on their Qzones.49
However, to put things into perspective, the number of women 
who make a significant change in their gender relations remains small. In 
practice, the situation is more mixed and complicated. It is always diffi-
cult to determine whether social media is merely a place that is reflecting 
wider changes in society or if it is in and by itself a liberating and empow-
ering tool for young women seeking to escape from the oppressive gen-
der norms of the offline world. The argument that digital media provide 
opportunities for people to be able to perform and create identities freely 
online has also been emphasised by feminist internet scholars.50 Also, as 
Chapter 4 has already shown, public displays of intimacy are more accept-
able on social media than offline, and many young people see social media 
as the only place where they can be romantic. Thus from this perspective 
social media, as a relatively liberating place, strikes a balance with the 
offline situation where mainstream social norms remain conservative. For 
these reasons it seems clear that social media is not merely a reflection of 
other changes, but has emerged as a factor and a force within them.
On the other hand, it is difficult to ignore the strong continuity of 
gender images of femininity between offline and online. For example, 
as mentioned in Chapter 3, cute and sweet images were very popular on 
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social media, especially among young women. Among such images the 
gesture of sajiao is an important strategy.51 In Chinese to be jiao is to be 
delicate, dependent and vulnerable; to sajiao means ‘to deliberately act 
like a spoiled child in front of someone because of the awareness of the 
other person’s affection’.52 Unlike what is often the case in the West, a 
Chinese woman who deliberately presents herself as dependent and vul-
nerable, emphasising her weakness and helplessness in order to get her 
way, is not criticised, since this has no negative connotations. In a way 
sajiao is actually a highly manipulative way in which young women can 
survive and succeed in a patriarchal society; to some extent it reflects an 
indirect shift of power in the dominant gender power structure.53 The 
common gestures of sajiao involve pouting with big puppy eyes or cov-
ering half of one’s face to show shyness and vulnerability. The images 
of sajiao on social media visually connect the expressions from a small 
animal to little girls and then to young women (Fig. 5.4).
Such behaviour can seem to pay dividends in the offline world, as 
Xiao Ying, a 19- year- old factory worker, observed. ‘People always say 
that a woman who knows how to sajiao will enjoy a good life . . . I agree, 
men take that . . . those who sajiao in front of the section manager even 
gets a smaller workload.’ On Xiao Ying’s Qzone there are many photos 
of little girls and young women, as well as some selfies of herself, all in 
sajiao poses. Like Xiao Ying, many young women smartly spot the fact 
that gender differences are not only a source of women’s oppression, 
but also a source of power if applied well. For this reason the tradi-
tional gender norms of a woman, in which she appears vulnerable and 
inferior, were actually strengthened and reinforced on social media.
When young women became mothers, their social media profiles 
witnessed a clear image shift, manifested in a great many beautiful food 
images shared from the internet (Fig. 5.5). In many societies, including 
China, married women are stereotyped as the primary care- givers.54 
Cooking seems in addition to be universally associated with mother-
hood,55 and in China it is believed that one of the core criteria of being a 
‘good mother’ is to cook well.56
Furthermore, among all the food images, photographs of soup 
seem to be dominant. The emphasis on images of soup among young 
mothers online is not a coincidence. In Chinese cuisine soup is valued 
as one of the most nutritious dishes.57 The cooking of soup usually takes 
a long period of time, patience, delicate heat control and a fair knowl-
edge of ingredients. As such it makes a natural analogy to caring for 
children, also always considered time- consuming and requiring a good 
deal of patience, understanding and an ability to control the ‘heat’ in the 
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Fig. 5.3 Portrait of Yueling and her son. (A partial image of a traditional 
Chinese painting ‘Marriage Battle’, 145 × 75 cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang)
relationship. Thus the frequent sharing of soup photos, the way in which 
young mothers craft an ideal motherhood online, actually reinforces 
pre- existing dominant ideals of femininity.
Men: From opposition to feminisation
On the other hand, men appeared less keen on the fact that more and 
more women were beginning to seek a more equal pattern of gender 
relations, especially when they found their girlfriends or wives to be 
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among them. Some became nostalgic like Fuqiang, a 31- year- old factory 
worker: 
Things have changed a lot nowadays; it’s impossible to have a 
woman who is happy to cook for you and wash clothes for you 
without nagging you to buy expensive items for her. Women are 
much more demanding these days.
Fuqiang witnessed how his once anfen wife had become more and more 
difficult to control.
He always advised his fellow workers to be careful about their 
partners’ use of QQ, as in his eyes QQ was largely responsible for the bad 
Fig. 5.4 Typical images of sajiao on social media
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Fig. 5.5 Typical images of food on social media. 
The text reads: ‘How do you keep your children healthy? Young 
women, when you are 25, or just older than 22, you will be “upgraded” 
to being a mother. As a young mother, there are so many things to 
learn . . . However, there is nothing more important than taking care of 
your children and making sure that they are healthy. An experienced 
mother shares several recipes with you here . . .’ 
influence on women. Dong Jing was one of Fuqiang’s colleagues who 
was getting worried because of this advice.
In 2013 Chinese lunar New Year, 23- year- old Dong Jing went back 
to his home village in the mountain area of the province of Guizhou58 
to undergo several blind dates arranged by his family. Fortunately for 
him, one girl’s family selected him.59 Given that Dong Jing only had 
two weeks’ leave in the village before he went back to the factory, the 
engagement ceremony took place immediately after the two families 
made a deal. Three months later Dong Jing went back to his village to 
get married after having seen his bride only twice. According to Dong 
Jing, the main job he did is to ‘sow human seeds’.
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On Dong Jing’s Qzone there were some very early postings (memes) 
about love, indicating how much he was looking for romantic love. Since 
he got engaged those postings have disappeared, seeming to bring a 
close to his previous fantasy about a girl he had met two years ago in a 
factory where he once worked. Just before he wanted to take a further 
step, however, he discovered that a section manager in the same factory 
was his rival. Unlike Dong Jing, the section manager had his own office 
room with an air conditioner. Furthermore, he had a local hukou (house-
hold registration). To cap it all, the section manager was a Communist 
Party member, which entitled him to enjoy better social benefits 
( fuli) than non party members . . . Compared to all that, Dong Jing had 
nothing to offer. It was after that frustrating experience of having to 
give up this girl that Dong Jing finally accepted the idea of an arranged 
marriage, encouraged by his parents’ nagging to get married as soon as 
possible.
Like Dong Jing, more than half of the rural migrant young people 
in GoodPath ended up with marriages arranged by their families,60 even 
though some of them had various experiences of romantic love before. 
Marriage indicates a re- allocation of resource between the two families 
united by the marriage.61 It has long been recorded in anthropology that 
in traditional societies marriage is not a personal affair between two indi-
viduals; it rather involves two kin groups and thus constitutes a commu-
nity event.62 People tend to regard arranged marriages as more ‘reliable’ 
than free love in terms of compatible family background, financial capa-
bility and lifestyle. For young rural migrants it is not very easy to have 
a long- term relationship in their ‘floating’ lives, and even more difficult 
to find a partner who also meets the family’s expectations. For young 
men the family’s approval and support is essential, since the bride 
price (cai li)63 required by the bride’s side is normally way beyond an 
individual’s financial capability. In Dong Jing’s case his family had 
to borrow from a number of relatives to provide at least 80,000 RMB 
(around US $13,300) in advance. This amount of money was only the 
average according to the local standard, even though it represented 
about 8– 10 years’ worth of savings for the young couple, both of whom 
worked in a factory.64
Dong Jing’s new wife was shy, nice and four years younger than 
him; she had never been outside her village and had dropped out of 
school in order to help with housework at home. All those features made 
her an obedient (anfen) and virtuous (xian hui) woman – a good woman 
and a perfect wife in fellow villagers’ eyes. After they got married Dong 
Jing gave his wife a brand- new iPhone4, which cost him two months 
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wages. At that time nobody owned such a high- end (gao dang) smart-
phone in their village. The first- ever iPhone arrived as if it had a halo, 
and won a lot of ‘face’ (mianzi) for the bride and her family. Nowadays 
the couple mainly keep contact on QQ via smartphones, which cost 
nothing after pre- paid data packages.
However, one thing had been bothering Dong Jing, especially after 
his colleague Fuqiang’s warning of the bad influence that QQ exerts on 
women. One day his newly married wife shared an article with beauti-
ful photographs of ‘top honeymoon destinations worldwide’ on her QQ 
profile with a comment that read: 
My husband has never taken me anywhere, let alone to those hon-
eymoon places. What I have is zuo yuezi [‘sitting the month’, mean-
ing confinement in childbirth] . . .65
When he read this Dong Jing’s first reaction was ‘From where did she 
get  all this urbanite nonsense of honeymoons?’ To express his disap-
proval and dissatisfaction he intentionally ignored the posting by not 
commenting on it. Making no response is quite unusual, since he always 
commented on his new wife’s QQ postings  – not only because such 
action showed his affection for her in public, but also because it marked 
his position as ‘the husband’, and so hopefully warned off other male 
contacts on his wife’s QQ: 
I hope she will get the message . . . I mean a honeymoon is something 
for foreigners or rich urban people. If she is not anfen, and always 
dreams about something I can’t give her, she won’t be happy.
Dong Jing’s case was typical among rural migrant men whose attitude 
towards gender relations seemed to be ambivalent. On the one hand 
young men, just like young women, appear to show a great passion for 
Western- style romantic love, which unfortunately often has to com-
promise with traditional expectations in the end. However, once they 
entered married life men expected their wives to behave in accordance 
with the traditional social norms of anfen which they had both previ-
ously opposed. The reason for this contradiction is that even though 
traditional social norms constrain romantic love, they are in favour of 
a superior male position in a marriage. Dong Jing’s story also indicates 
a situation encountered by many rural migrant women once they have 
entered married life. Many are placed under huge social pressure to 
revert to a conservative gender role, even though before marriage they 
SOC IAL MED IA IN INDUSTR IAL CH INA152
may have defied convention and been women who are not anfen. In 
practice, different couples had various problems and solutions, but most 
lived in continual tension between modern and traditional ideas of gen-
der relations in a marriage.
Also, as Dong Jing’s story shows, there is a great pressure and 
urgency for rural young men to get married.66 There are several rea-
sons for this. First, China has the highest male to female sex ratio at 
birth (SRB) in the world, particularly at (140:100) in poor rural areas, 
where most rural migrants come from.67 Second, as was mentioned in 
Chapter 1, household registration (hukou) has always been one of the 
greatest obstacles to rural migrants settling down in cities. There are 
two ways for a rural resident to obtain urban hukou, one through prop-
erty investment and the other through marriage. Given the financial 
capability of rural migrants, the latter is the only viable choice. However, 
that choice in practice is only available to women. Marriage is a strategy 
by which rural women in disadvantaged positions achieve social and 
economic mobility.68
In GoodPath all the local marriages between people with rural and 
urban hukou were between rural women and urban men. In Chinese 
society, like many other societies, the tendency of the marriage market 
is for women to marry men of higher socio-economic status, especially 
when there is a shortage of women.69 All of this reinforces the evidence 
that getting married at all has become very difficult for rural migrant 
men. On the other hand, in traditional Chinese society getting married 
and becoming a parent is crucial to a sense of identity for men.70 Single 
rural migrant men all felt the crisis of their situations, and a remarkable 
number of them felt a profound sense of failure.71 Meanwhile the social 
status of rural women, especially young, unmarried rural women, has 
been enhanced by such a skewed gender imbalance.
Chinese rural migrants as a whole are a disadvantaged group at the 
bottom of Chinese social stratification. Most gender studies of Chinese 
rural migrants seem to focus only on females, assuming that females are 
the disadvantaged of the disadvantaged.72 It is true that gender inequality 
is prevalent in Chinese society, and that in rural areas the situation is more 
severe. However, what some rural migrant men posted on their QQ sug-
gested that the position is not the same as people assumed when we scru-
tinise the in- group gender discrepancy among Chinese rural migrants.
The previous section has showcased the way in which sajiao (vul-
nerable and cute) images on social media offered a means for young 
women to strengthen their traditional gender roles. However, on social 
media sajiao is not the exclusive privilege of young women. It has been 
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very common to see men apply sajiao too. For example, a middle- aged 
rural migrant man posted a photo of his wound online (Fig. 5.6), say-
ing: ‘I cut myself accidentally; I need someone to comfort me and bring 
me some fruit!’
Such anti- masculine behaviour can be explained by ethnography. 
First, rural migrant men as a whole have lost the advantage in the mar-
riage market as described above. Second, Chinese men are supposed 
to take the main, if not full, responsibility for supporting the family. 
However, such traditional expectations conflicted with the financial sit-
uations and personal capabilities of rural migrant men. As a result, in 
many cases male rural migrants are actually under much greater pres-
sure in daily life, and feel permanently frustrated by the fact it is impos-
sible to meet social expectations. To summarise, it is no exaggeration to 
say that male rural migrants actually constitute an equally, if not more, 
disadvantaged group. Compared to offline situations where men are 
supposed to respect masculine norms that do not include romanticism, 
weakness and sensitivity, social media provides the relatively free place 
where rural migrant men can experiment with what they cannot be in 
their offline lives – for example, as adopting the strategies of a young 
woman and playing sajiao to get their way in society. This is a remark-
able turnaround for a society that has always been known as an example 
of entirely different gender asymmetries.
Fig. 5.6 A typical sajiao posting by a middle- aged male rural migrant
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Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with two key topics where there is considerable 
debate regarding the possible impact of social media. Does social media 
reinforce conservatism, facilitating criticism and subsequent change, or 
is it a vicarious arena in which things are performed that appear to be 
consequential but – precisely because they are only online – have no sig-
nificant impact offline? In both cases this chapter has tried to present con-
crete evidence that allows us to assess these different possibilities. With 
regard to politics, for example, the evidence supports the point made in 
the introduction: rather than empowering or encouraging political par-
ticipation, the use of social media tends to diminish any motivation for 
turning discontented thoughts into actual political action. In many ways 
social media rather helps to monitor and channel public opinion (yulun 
daoxiang) and so further legitimate the Chinese party- state.
The focus on gender is in turn important in helping us to reassess 
social media’s role. From the images of soup posted by young mothers to 
anti- anfen memes shared by young women and those seemingly confus-
ing sajiao photographs on the profiles of middle- aged men, social media 
has served to reinforce, disrupt or simply shift gender roles in different 
situations.
As we have just seen, a significant break with the social norms of 
femininity and masculinity occurred in GoodPath when people publicly 
performed unconventional gendered selves on social media. This was 
complex to analyse, as the same person can behave differently on social 
media in different phases of life. For example, when young women 
retreated from anti- anfen public life into the private institution of moth-
erhood, their gendered images on social media changed accordingly. So 
social media in and of itself is a powerful tool, but not necessarily the 
key transformative factor. In addition, we need to reflect on some of the 
underlying factors that have had an impact on peoples’ conceptions of 
gender. These include financial capability, the shifting marriage market 
and the job market. However, it is the overall migration, with its search 
for an engagement with modernity, that explains most fully why there is 
also some acceptance of this modern conceptualisation of gender.
This becomes clearer if we compare what happened in GoodPath to 
the ethnography of our rural China field site.73 There QQ, the very same 
social media platform, has been used in a quite different way in terms of 
gender relations, although the situation with regard to politics is more 
similar. In that town men and women mainly shared material which 
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portrayed what they see as traditional family relationships according to 
Confucianism, including a large number of pictures of children, parents 
or happy spouses.74 The way in which people in our two Chinese field 
sites use social media to express their different ideals of gender relations 
is the best evidence for showing that social media is neither traditional 
nor liberating in and of itself. At the same time this chapter has also 
shown that we should not take the opposite route and see social media 
as merely a passive reflection of offline changes. Our evidence points to 
a middle ground between these two.
This conclusion follows also for politics, where people do use social 
media to make critical, sometimes angry75 points about their lives in gen-
eral, without turning these into specific attacks on local politicians. Yet 
this is also where we see a difference between the spheres of gender and 
politics, since social media has not become a significant terrain for imag-
ining an alternative life within an alternative political regime. When it 
comes to gender and people’s more personal lives, however, that is exactly 
what social media is becoming important for. Already we have seen how 
in issues of gender both men and women are starting to imagine worlds 
that were unprecedented in their prior offline lives. But since this refers 
to a field of relationships that is certainly undergoing change, it is not 
simply an alternative fantasy world – indeed what emerges quite clearly 
is that we cannot reduce this to a dualism of online ‘fantasy’ opposed to 
offline ‘reality’. One of the reasons for this is that creativity, imagination 
and transcendent other worlds have always been part of everyday life, 
reflected for instance in realms such as religion. So the conclusions of this 
chapter with regard to gender will become clearer as we progress to the 
next chapter, which focuses on precisely these questions.
With respect to this final point, in many ways the evidence and 
conclusions of this chapter are only completed by the extension repre-
sented by  Chapter 7. These discussions of gender open up certain key 
questions about the place of online images within peoples’ lives. Do 
romantic images or images that reflect greater gender equality online 
drive or merely represent developments offline? To what extent is social 
media in and of itself a force for change? These are complex issues, and 
to some extent online images are bound to be involved in all such pro-
cesses rather than any one of them.
156
6
The wider world: Beyond social 
relationships
Chapter 4 mapped out a whole range of social relationships from the 
perspective of social media use, while Chapter  5 focused upon the 
topics related to ‘power’. By the end of Chapter 5 we could also appre-
ciate that when we talk about ‘relationships’ in everyday lives, these 
include both offline and online contexts. The latter continues the work 
of our individual imaginations and our social beliefs and practices. In 
this chapter we extend the discussion to encompass even more sig-
nificant ties. Perceived relationships between a person and the uni-
verse, his or her ancestors and the place where he or she came from, as 
well as with ‘oneself’, all significantly shape how people live through 
and make sense of their daily lives. Here we explore these other sig-
nificant relationships, as expressed through or transformed by social 
media. These range from the apparently metaphysical to the intensely 
personal.
The atheist, folk religion and death
Lao Zhang died at the age of 81 without a struggle; he simply passed 
peacefully away. Local people believed that this was a ‘good death’ (hao si), 
something only achieved by those who are blessed ( you fu qi). On the 
day of Lao Zhang’s funeral a ‘master’ (da shi) led the way, chanting spells 
aloud in a flat tone which, from time to time, was overwhelmed by the 
fireworks.
A middle- aged man who worked as a driver for a local Party offi-
cial brought me down to earth by commenting that, ‘You know what? 
Because he [Lao Zhang] was a senior Party member, the Party paid 
 
 
 
THE WIDER WORLD :  BE YOND SOC IAL REL AT IONSH IPS 157
not only the regular funeral expenses, but also the fee for the master 
(dashi).’ This seemed confusing to me, so I pressed further: 
‘Really?! . . . but . . . why does a Communist Party member need a 
folk religion master to perform the funeral ritual?’
‘Why not? The Party leadership thought he deserved a proper 
funeral.’
‘No, no, no . . . I mean, isn’t the Communist Party atheist?’
‘Hey look, he worked for the Party when he was alive, but the 
problem is the Party can’t take care of him after his death, right? So 
now everything is taken over by the deities (shen ming)!’
As the man jerked his head forward, clearly punctuating his statement 
with an exclamation mark, our conversation was interrupted by shout-
ing from the front of the procession. ‘Dad, run! Run fast!’ someone 
exclaimed. ‘There will be a big fire!’ A chorus of voices shouted ‘Run!’, 
‘Run!’, ‘Run!’, ‘Run!’ – warning the spirit (hun) that the body was going 
to be carried into the incinerator.
After an hour the procession moved on to inter the ashes, led by 
the master. Before the sealing of the stone cave where the ashes were 
placed, he re-arranged the display of offerings for better ‘Feng Shui’,1 
then toasted a cup of spirit (shao jiu) to the god of the Earth (tu di gong). 
The toast was a rhetorical negotiation with the deity, which basically ran 
along these lines: descendants of Lao Zhang will visit here every year and 
make offerings; therefore, in turn, the god of the Earth shall take care of 
Lao Zhang under the ground and bless his descendants. After the toast, 
Lao Zhang’s relatives started to burn piles of ‘spirit money’ – the funeral 
banknotes (Fig. 6.1) that, according to tradition, would be ‘transferred’ 
to Lao Zhang’s account underneath the ground, to be used by deities and 
himself. As we noted in Chapter 2, money is always regarded as a proper 
expression of family feelings; it is also used in Chinese folk religion to 
maintain a good relationship with the gods. As a folk saying declares, 
‘the god of the Earth runs a bank; money opens the way to the gods’ (tu 
di ye kai yin hang, qian tong shen lu), reflecting a common belief that 
‘money’ was used widely as ‘capital by the gods themselves in transac-
tions with human beings’.2
The ‘underground’ banknote, with a face value of 1 billion, is 
issued by ‘the bank of Earth and heaven’ (tian di yin hang). It appears 
to be very international: the layout and signatures are those of the US 
dollar, while on the side two Chinese characters read ‘pounds sterling’. 
In the middle is an image of Jade Emperor (yu huang da di), the supreme 
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God in Chinese Taoism. The face value has nothing to do with inflation, 
but simply suggests that one has an unlimited supply of money – liter-
ally, money to burn.
On the way back, the driver took an extremely strange detour, 
basically turning right and left randomly at each intersection we passed. 
He explained: 
We need to confuse the sprit. It remembers the way we came 
here and will follow us, so I need to make a lot of detours to get 
rid of it. Otherwise we will both suffer from disaster (zai) in the 
following days.
The next day an image of GuanYin (Avalokitesvara) was shared on this 
driver’s Qzone (Fig. 6.2). GuanYin is a mother Buddha3 who is also wor-
shipped in Taoist temples. The posting commented: 
If you see this image please share it on your Qzone and WeChat; 
it will help you to avoid bad luck in the coming seven days. If you 
don’t share, you will have a disaster (zai) soon.
Lao Zhang’s daughter also posted the image of GuanYin on her WeChat 
and wrote, ‘A safe trip, my father’.
People in GoodPath would never use terms such as ‘religion’ 
or ‘cosmology’. To them, what happens in daily life is a reflection of 
their beliefs and fears about the universe, deities, bad luck and death. 
Fig. 6.1 ‘Spirit money’, the funeral banknotes
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The Communist Party’s official doctrine would describe what the 
driver did both offline and online as ‘feudal superstition’ ( fengjian 
mixin).4 In practice, however, such folk beliefs, including Feng Shui, 
have become so deeply rooted that in many cases the Party, or the 
Party officials actually appear to endorse it.5 From here we see that, 
despite the huge effort made by the Communist Party for more than 
half a century to reshape the ‘superstructure’ of Chinese society,6 it 
has failed to change the essential beliefs held by much of the pop-
ulation. Such beliefs have been practised in folk rituals and handed 
down from one generation to the next, reinforced by a myriad of folk 
tales, over hundreds or even thousands of years. ‘Say one thing and do 
Fig. 6.2 An image of GuanYin, a mother buddha figure, shared on 
social media
SOC IAL MED IA IN INDUSTR IAL CH INA160
another’, (shou yi tao, zuo yi tao) as people say, and it appears that they 
do. In the survey I  conducted, an overwhelming majority of people 
(86 per cent) wrote down ‘nil’ to the inquiry about religion (zongjiao 
xinyang).7 However, when it comes to immediate personal interests 
and welfare, such as trying to ensure the best ‘after- death life’ for a 
loved one, people have no problem in abandoning the ‘politically cor-
rect’ doctrine and following their own systems of belief. Social media, 
the platforms on which people feel freer to express themselves, 
has become one of the major places where people can practise folk 
religions. The situation is especially true for rural migrants, whose 
‘floating’ lives make practising such folk religion more difficult.
Chinese folk religion: Some background
In brief, Chinese folk religion involves three main categories of super-
natural beings:  gods, ghosts and ancestors.8 The latter two both rely 
heavily on offerings made by living people. Ancestors have a perma-
nent abode within an individual household or an ancestral hall, where 
they receive offerings of food, incense and flowers.9 Ghosts however are 
‘unwanted beings’  –  usually people who have died a premature, acci-
dental or other ‘unnatural’ death,10 after which they wander around as 
lonely spectres. However, the terms ‘ancestor’ and ‘ghost’ are relative. 
Someone’s ancestor can be another person’s ghost, because ancestor 
sprits, unlike a deity, will only bless their own descendants and may be 
harmful to someone not related to them.11 That explains why the driver 
at Lao Zhang’s funeral perceived the spirit possibly to be an evil ghost 
who might bring him bad luck.
Polytheism, meaning belief in more than one god, is a striking con-
cept. In practice Chinese people have no problem in worshipping deities 
from Buddhism or Taoism or saints from Confucianism all together. As 
one observed: ‘All the deities out there are friends; they just speak differ-
ent languages.’ Most people are tolerant of this diversity in religion and 
see no reason for bothering about the distinctions.12
Orientation towards the secular is another striking feature of 
Chinese folk religions. The word ling (efficacy) is frequently used 
to describe whether supernatural beings can or would be willing 
to address the desires and claims from the secular world, whether 
these concern wealth, health or other specific wishes such as hav-
ing a baby.13 Gods are ranked according to efficacy, but such a rank 
is flexible according to different situations  –  all suggesting a clear 
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correspondence between Chinese folk cosmology and the structure of 
secular bureaucracy.14 In GoodPath people would discuss which tem-
ple is the most efficacious one, and a similar rank of deities can be also 
seen on social media postings.
Deities on social media
GuanYin and GuanGong are probably the two deities ranked most highly 
by rural migrants. It’s not the first time GuanYin,15 the mother Buddha, 
has been mentioned in this volume. In Chapter  1 the young factory 
worker Dong posted the image of GuanYin as he wished for his grand-
father to recover from a stroke. In this chapter we also saw how people 
posted images of GuanYin after Lao Zhang’s funeral, for various reasons. 
Traditionally GuanYin, is regarded as a mighty goddess who blesses fer-
tility, safety and health; she is worshipped most widely across Chinese 
society.16
Unlike GuanYin, whose image was posted and shared by both 
men and women, images of the male deity GuanGong are mainly 
shared among men on social media. In history GuanGong was a great 
general and minister during the Han Dynasty (in the third century 
ad); after his death he was worshipped as the deity of the martial vir-
tues.17 Kai, a factory worker, shared the image of GuanGong on his 
Qzone (Fig. 6.3) when one of his closest colleagues was leaving. On 
that post Kai wishes that their brotherhood would be like ‘The Oath 
of the Peach Garden’ (Tao yuan jie yi). The story, recorded in a famous 
historical novel Three Kingdoms,18 describes how GuanGong and two 
other men took an oath and became sworn brothers in a ceremony in 
the Peach Garden. The legend is based on historical fact: these three 
sworn brothers established the state of Chu Han during the Three 
Kingdoms period.
The popularity of GuanGong posts on social media among male 
rural migrants reflects the widespread ideal of brotherhood they share. 
Loyalty is always regarded as the most important virtue of such a broth-
erhood. GuanGong was a royal general who had never disobeyed the 
orders of his sworn elder brother, the emperor Liu Bei. Here brother-
hood, in many cases, aligns with China’s hierarchical social system, 
serving as one of the dominant channels of social mobility and net-
working for men.19 For young male rural migrants,20 who have very 
limited social resources and have to rely on the protection and secu-
rity of such brotherhoods, this is now even more true. In many cases 
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such brotherhoods assumed forms of patronage, mentoring and 
‘discipleship’.21 Unfortunately, however, as happened in history,22 the 
brotherhood among young male migrant workers can be very fragile 
and easily quashed. Feige’s story in Chapter 4 provides a typical exam-
ple of a once- valued brotherhood that was actually very short- lived  – 
partly because it was formed under the pressure of survival in a specific 
situation, and was not strong enough to endure the test of ‘floating’ life 
in the longer term.
The image of GuanGong on Kai’s post,23 therefore, does not only 
portray a supernatural being with magical powers to be used for bless-
ing and protecting his brotherhood. As GuanGong himself had a secular 
life and became a deity after death, he can also represent this ultimate 
ideal brotherhood24  – something that rural migrants desperately long 
for, but can hardly ever achieve. The very figure of GuanGong resonated 
Fig. 6.3 An image of the deity GuanGong shared on social media
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with ordinary people, and enabled them to project their own lives on to 
it. The folk tales of GuanGong give the ground and material for people 
to imagine what brotherhood should be in a secular world. In this sense, 
traditional folk beliefs have never been separated from the daily practice 
of social relationships.
In some cases, posts related to folk religion are also a means of 
making relationships with deities more practical. A typical meme on QQ 
read: 
From 11 p.m. to 9 a.m. tomorrow morning, GunYin Bodhisattva 
will open the heaven treasury. If you shared this amulet image 
(ping an fu) for people who were born in the year of the cockerel 
(the years 1969, 1981, 1993 and 2005) they will have good fortune 
and be healthy and wealthy forever. Share it, and bring good luck 
to your friends who were born in the year of the cockerel!
There are several similar posts featuring different zodiac animals25 and 
offering good luck to people who were born in the year of the rabbit, the 
goat, the tiger, the dragon and so forth.
‘Luck’ is probably a universal concept. However, the ‘luck’ in 
Chinese folk belief represents a more specific emphasis on human 
endeavours and efforts. In contrast to ‘fate’ (ming), which refers to one’s 
life- long, immutable fortune, luck (yun) refers to a something that peo-
ple can change or ‘shift’ (zhuan) through their own efforts (such as pro-
viding offerings to deities or consulting fortune- tellers).26 The Chinese 
character 转 (zhuan) is used in both the phrases meaning ‘to change 
one’s luck’ (zhuan yun) and ‘to share something on social media’ (zhuan 
fa). Thus these two phrases with the same head vowel formed a catchy 
expression, as people said: ‘share it (on social media), so you can have a 
change of your luck (zhuan fa jiu zhuan yun).’
Guang, a factory worker in her thirties, frequently shared images 
of various deities on her QQ profiles. Her reasons seem to be instinctive 
rather than carefully considered: 
Well, I  don’t know exactly why . . . Anyway . . . it’s a good thing to 
do. At least . . . I think the deities (shen ming) will be pleased if you 
show respect to them, and in return you will be blessed (bao you), 
which is very important.
Guang was not alone, Even the majority of people who had shared 
similar posts failed to give a clear answer to why and how those postings 
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would bring them good luck; they all believed that the very act of shar-
ing the images of deities is, in its own right, a way to please them.27 
As one said, ‘It’s always safer to believe that they exist rather than not 
(ning ke xin qi you, bu ke xin qi wu). Who knows whom you will offend?’ 
To put it in another way, given the fact that there are so many deities, 
some of whom are benevolent and some not, people had learned to 
show respect to all of them so that they will not offend (de zui) any by 
mistake.
Whether the issue was one of pleasing or offending these deities, 
people assume that these gods were just like human beings, capable 
of being pleased and offended in the same way on social media. It 
is thereby evident that Chinese deities are philosophically ‘down to 
earth’ in contrast to deities in other religions who are believed to be 
entirely transcendent, above and beyond humankind.28 In Chinese 
folk religion, therefore, people are in a better position to negotiate 
with deities for their own benefits. Building relationships with vari-
ous deities is a very similar process to the practice of guanxi (social 
relations); social networking is pragmatically applied on the princi-
ple of reciprocity and it seems that deities are rather similar to sec-
ular bureaucrats who can be bribed. In addition, the practice of folk 
religion has been deeply and tightly integrated into people’s everyday 
lives: managing relationships with various deities has always been a 
part of life for ordinary Chinese rural migrants. Viewing the images of 
deities that people post on social media, it can be easy to focus on the 
sharp contrast between the ‘digital’ and the ‘deities’, while forgetting 
that the latter were part of daily life way before the digital age. As a 
result, when people began to embrace the digital in their lives, they 
naturally included the deities.
Other kinds of deities are worshipped only by respective kinship 
groups. As previously noted, in Chinese folk beliefs all people become 
deities after death; ancestors are then dependent upon regular worship 
and offerings from their descendants, since without offerings those 
ancestor spirits will become unwanted ghosts. In return, ancestors will 
reward filial descendants by protecting and blessing them. There is thus 
a mutual dependence between the living and the dead.29 Moreover, a 
common practice to ensure an efficient approach to higher ranked dei-
ties is to go through one’s ancestor deities, perceived to be the near-
est to the living; the idea of a direct leap from the human world to the 
metaphysical sphere seems not to be convincing enough.30 Thus the 
strategy underlying guanxi (social relations), widely applied in human 
relationships, is also applied in those between humans and deities. 
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It is not the only one, however, as the traditional respect for ancestors 
and spirits can also be mediated by relationship to the places associated 
with them. Such associations of lineage and burial sites was indeed a 
major theme in the early anthropology of China.31 Relationships with 
one’s ancestors provide essential intermediaries within the greater 
human– deity relationship. On social media we can also find the rep-
resentation of such relationships in the photographs of people’s places 
of origin. However, in several respects this was not as might have been 
predicted.
The homeland on social media
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this research started with an assumption that 
social media would play a key role in enabling a displaced migrant pop-
ulation to re- connect with their homelands. However, the accumulated 
evidence from the ethnography suggests that the degree of diminished 
contact with their villages of origin was not because of the lack of tech-
nological support, but mainly from choice. Furthermore, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, rural migrants seemed to show more interest in exploring 
new kinds of social relationships on social media than maintaining con-
tact with those left behind in their villages. The experience of ‘seeing 
the modern world’ has made young migrants unwilling to return to a 
backward and boring rural life: many regard themselves as no longer 
sharing the same values as those who remained behind.32 In addition for 
the majority of migrant workers, as surplus labour, there is nothing left 
for them to do within the agriculture system: as soon as they return to 
the villages they risk losing financial independence, or even the chance 
to earn a living. On top of this, their social networks, built on reciprocity 
between fellow villagers, largely collapsed when the migrants no longer 
made any contribution to the local communities. For many, returning to 
their home villages has become a myth.
For many rural migrants in GoodPath, the feeling towards ‘home-
land’ has become ambivalent. On the one hand, people want to get rid 
of the rural background and become modern; on the other hand, as the 
folk saying goes, ‘no ancestors, no identity’:33 the home village is the only 
place to which they can link, and ancestors left behind in their home-
land are the most reliable deities to whom they can turn. Moreover, as 
increasing numbers of the migrant population are born into, and grow 
up in, such ‘floating’ lives, many young migrant workers have no real- 
life connection to the villages where their parents or grandparents came 
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from and their ancestors are buried. Thus for them the homeland, in a 
way, is not lost – it never existed in the first place. In situations where the 
physical homeland has atrophied and one can no longer present offer-
ings to ancestors direct, people choose not to return to their homelands 
physically, but rather to move the homeland where their ancestors live 
on to their social media profiles.
For Hua, the factory worker in her late thirties, Chinese New Year 
is a crucial opportunity to win good luck (hao yun) for the whole fol-
lowing whole year. Ideally she should go back to her home village for a 
family reunion and worship of her ancestors, but the length of the trip, 
plus other expenses and concerns, have prevented her from doing this 
for many years. However, she has always made sure that some relatives 
who had remained behind provided offerings to the ancestral grave on 
her behalf: 
People like us [rural migrants] depend heavily on our luck (yun qi) 
while working outside (chu lai da gong); you don’t know what will 
happen, and everything can happen to you. My ancestors can pro-
tect me and my family from bad luck . . . My life has nothing great, 
well, you know, you can’t really change your fate (ming), but noth-
ing went terribly wrong . . . which is good enough.
Besides posts of deities, Hua’s Qzone features an album called ‘home-
land’ ( jia xiang) where she uploaded large numbers of photographs 
of the mountain behind her native village (Fig.  6.4). The homeland 
album on social media is commonplace among rural migrants. Around 
Fig. 6.4 A typical ‘homeland album’ on social media
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15 per cent of rural migrants’ Qzones have a specific online album 
called ‘homeland’ or ‘home village’. In her homeland album Hua wrote, 
in an almost nostalgic tone, that she has a strong emotional attachment 
to the beautiful mountain behind the village where her ancestors have 
their eternal sleep. Curiously, however, when I asked Hua whether she 
had thought about moving back to her home village, her answer was a 
definite ‘no’.
‘My home village is a place you always miss, but not really a place 
you want to return to,’ she explained. On those homeland photos all the 
bad memories and negative associations of village life and homeland 
had been expunged, leaving only the ideal, purified images to symbolise 
her homeland and ancestors. Her birthplace has thus become a symbol – 
but one that exists on people’s social media and helps to ground daily 
existence within one’s ‘floating’ life.34
‘History is always ambiguous, always messy, and people remember, 
and therefore construct the past in ways that reflect their present need for 
meaning.’35 If the popularity of posting deities on social media reveals the 
continuity of the practice of folk religion, offline and online, then the home-
land album takes a step further: through these albums, millions of rural 
migrants who have been uprooted from their homeland rebuilt their past 
on social media. In this sense social media, once a symbol of modernity,36 
has reversed the trajectory of Chinese rural migrants’ movement from ‘tra-
dition’ to ‘modernity’, effectively serving as an ‘ancestral temple’ where 
ancestors and other deities are worshipped and folk tales are related.
Nevertheless, to put things into perspective, just as political erad-
ication and crackdowns on folk religions under the rule of the Chinese 
Communist Party did not change the essential beliefs held by large parts 
of the population, nor does the mechanism of social media make people 
‘become’ more traditional or religious. Both political regulation and tech-
nological methods are outside forces which either restrain or facilitate 
people’s activities in their daily lives. The real reason that social media 
has come to serve as a ‘clan temple’ is not because of the technologi-
cal affordances of QQ or WeChat. It is because Chinese rural migrants 
strongly believe in the magical power of the deities, and the practice of 
traditional folk religion has always been part of their daily lives.
Folk tales on social media
Kai’s post of the deity image GuanGong was associated with a whole 
range of associated folk tales. Such stories are not only an essential 
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part of Chinese folk beliefs. They also comprise the main body of folk 
literature  – far more persistently and pervasively in history than the 
‘aristocratic literature’ of more ‘cultured’ groups because they were 
more readily accepted by the majority of the people.37 On social media, 
besides posts of deities and homeland, storytelling also represents a 
major genre. Almost half of rural migrants have shared at least one story 
on their social media in their last 20 social media posts.38 Here are two 
examples of popular stories widely shared by rural migrants.
Story 1 (in brief)
A very good-looking village woman followed her husband to work out-
side the village. The couple worked together in a large factory, owned 
by a very rich man. The woman’s beauty soon caught the attention of 
the factory owner, who seduced her secretly through money and fine 
promises. Soon the woman betrayed her husband and became the 
factory owner’s secret mistress. Her husband discovered the affair, 
but was then threatened by the factory owner. Even though he was 
heartbroken, he decided to let his wife go since he loved her so much 
and wished her a better life than he could afford. He quit the factory 
job and came back to the village to take care of the couple’s only son. 
The 10- year- old boy refused to accept that his mother would never 
come back, and secretly set off alone on a trip to find her. After a very 
tough, long journey the little boy finally arrived in the city where 
his parents had worked together. There, at the factory entrance, he 
had the shock of seeing his mother walking out with a strange man, 
hand in hand. Before she could recognise him, the little boy dashed 
away, but unfortunately he was run over by a speeding car. The whole 
village was outraged and everybody, including the mother’s family, 
cursed her at the boy’s funeral. However, the man said nothing. The 
mother felt so guilty that she committed suicide after the funeral. 
Hearing of his wife’s death, the man still said nothing and disap-
peared. Two days later he appeared at the factory, where he stabbed 
the factory owner to death and then committed suicide. The whole vil-
lage mourned for him and everybody worshipped him as a hero from 
then on.
The story ends up with a warning that people who live for money, 
and women who betray their husbands for money, will never come to a 
good end. Nor will the rich come to a good end if they do not treat the 
poor as human beings.
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For Wei, a 28- year- old factory worker, whether the story is true or 
not does not really matter. He believed it because of his own experience: 
I have seen a woman like that. The wife of a workmate of mine 
left him without saying anything. He actually treated her very 
well; he had never beaten her, always gave her money to buy new 
clothes . . . but she still ran away, somebody said she had run away 
with a businessman. Poor man – now he has to raise two kids all 
by himself. Alas, there seems to be no way to prevent it; you know, 
nowadays most women, I  bet, are much more realistic . . . I  agree 
with the story:  if you betray your husband for money, you don’t 
deserve a happy ending, and the man had guts. So I shared it.
As noted in Chapter 5, young rural migrant women can improve their 
socio-economic status via marriage and other relationships, whereas 
young rural migrant men may risk being jettisoned. Wei’s sense of jus-
tice has been expressed perfectly through the dramatic tension of the 
story he shared.
Story 2 (in brief)
When Qiang was a child, he spent the whole day idling around in the 
village where he lived. His parents became very worried about him, 
thinking he would end up achieving nothing. On the other hand his 
neighbour Ming studied very hard, and all the villagers believed that he 
would become somebody one day.
When Qiang and Ming were both 19  years old, Qiang, not sur-
prisingly, failed the university entrance examination. He then followed 
other villagers to work outside the village on a highway construction 
site, earning monthly wages of 3,000 RMB (US $500). Ming by con-
trast received an offer from a top Chinese university to study road and 
bridge engineering, with a tuition fee of 5,000 RMB (US $850) per year. 
When they were both 23  years old, Qiang’s parents arranged a mar-
riage for him. The bride was a very capable and virtuous village girl. 
Meanwhile, Ming had fallen in love with a girl from the city. The follow-
ing year Qiang brought his new wife to the construction site to look after 
him. Meanwhile Ming finally graduated and got a job in a construction 
company.
For Qiang, as a worker, life was not too bad. After work he had 
plenty of time to enjoy playing cards and watching television. Ming’s life 
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as an engineer was much more stressful. During the daytime he had to 
visit various construction sites, and in the evening he had to work extra 
hours. Since he was too busy, his girlfriend finally broke up with him. 
When they were both 28 years old, Qiang had already saved up 200,000 
RMB (US $35,000) and had become the father of two children. He went 
back to his village, where he built a new house and opened a pig farm. 
Meanwhile Ming finally gained his intermediate engineer qualification 
certificate, but was still single. So finally he accepted an arranged mar-
riage. For his new family Ming bought an apartment in the city on a mort-
gage; each month he had to pay the majority of his salary to the bank.
By the time Qiang and Ming were both 35  years old, Qiang had 
made a fortune from his pig farm. Ming was actually in debt, however, 
because of his monthly mortgage and the high cost of his son’s educa-
tion. When they were both 50 years old, Qiang had become the grand-
father of three grandsons. He enjoyed the sunshine in the village every 
day. Meanwhile Ming finally got his senior engineering qualification 
certificate – but he still had to work very hard every day.
When both men were in their seventies Qiang fell ill. He held his 
wife’s hand, saying:  ‘I have lived for almost 70  years. I  have sons and 
grandsons. I am so satisfied with my life.’ Ming also held his wife’s hands, 
saying: ‘I was always busy, never at home. I know you have suffered a lot 
for decades. I  feel so sorry.’ Soon Qiang recovered, thanks to the clear 
air of the countryside and fresh vegetables and meat from his own farm. 
However, Ming was not so fortunate:  years of intense work and stress, 
plus a poor quality of life under the busy pace of the city, finally took their 
toll. He soon passed away. The story concludes with the scene of Qiang in 
his eighties, standing in front of Ming’s tomb and sighing with emotion as 
he reflects: ‘we only live only once, and how different we are’.
It seems as though the life of rural migrants has been dramatically 
romanticised in this story. Some Chinese experts39 have suggested that 
urban white-collar workers may very well be its original target audi-
ence. There certainly is a rather dark sense of humour in the recognition 
that ‘after all the struggles to succeed, a senior engineer’s life may end 
up even worse than a rural migrant’s’.40 Having said that, the story also 
became popular among rural migrants with a different interpretation. 
Bobo, a 19- year- old factory worker, dropped out of school two years ago. 
She shared this story on her Qzone with the comment ‘so true’: 
Well, I know you would say knowledge can change one’s life, but 
actually education is not that useful for us . . . Education just isn’t 
my thing, and I don’t want to waste money or time on it.
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Half a century ago in China, university education almost always ensured a 
‘job for life’ and a secure urban identity.41 However, this is no longer axi-
omatic in the context of a market economy with no job guarantees: the 
massive expansion of university enrolment in China42 also means that 
graduates are no longer regarded as the ‘elite’. Moreover in China, where 
top universities are state- owned, the tuition fee for the first tier univer-
sity is the cheapest or may even be free. By contrast private universities 
charge a far higher tuition fee to students unable to get into state uni-
versities. This means that students pay more for less qualified univer-
sities. For rural students, who grow up with relatively poor educational 
resources and limited family guidance, it has become very difficult to get 
into first tier universities. As a result many perceive higher education to 
be a waste of time: years are spent pursuing an expensive but useless 
university certificate that could have been spent earning money in fac-
tories. Faced with such pragmatic concerns, many young people from 
rural backgrounds choose to drop out of school and work in factories 
from a very early age. Such decisions are generally supported, or at least 
not opposed, by their families. This story exactly reflects the attitude 
towards education among rural migrants, one surprisingly different 
from the well- known high valuation of education to many Chinese.
There are several common points between the two stories. First, 
both took place within the setting of ordinary rural migrants’ daily lives, 
settings to which people can easily relate. Second, both contain quite a 
bit of drama, which both purifies and spices up everday life into a legend, 
and through which strong and distinct thoughts and attitudes unfolded. 
Third, they both safeguard and reinforce values and morals shared by 
the specific rural migrant group.
All these features remind us of the folk tales, which also serve 
as a pedagogic device, reinforcing morals and values ‘particularly, but 
not exclusively, in non- literate societies’.43 In those stories we watch the 
heroes and traitors, the perceived justice and unfairness, the doomed 
fate and the up- and- down rollercoaster of everyday life. Stories on social 
media, the folk tales of a digital age, play an important role in record-
ing and shaping the world view of Chinese rural migrants. Compared 
to other text- based publications, stories on social media have the low-
est threshold in terms of getting stories published, and thus the most 
accessible outlet for less- educated people who may otherwise struggle to 
get their voices heard. Folk tales were traditionally spread by oral trans-
mission, making them products of an entire community rather than 
a particular writer.44 Similarly on social media stories are spread and 
reproduced by sharing – and in the ‘charmed circle’ of sharing people 
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contribute their personal experiences and different interpretation. It has 
been said that ‘each of us comes to know who he or she is by creating a 
heroic story of the self’.45 By arranging the episodes of their daily lives 
into stories, Chinese rural migrants seek to invest a fragmented and con-
fusing experience of living with a sense of coherence, and so to discover 
the truth about what is right and what is meaningful in their on- going 
‘floating’ lives. These new folk tales on social media help people think 
through changes in their current lives.46 All of this suggests that there 
is a clear trajectory of applying social media to deal with one’s past and 
current life, from deity images and homeland albums to the relating of 
contemporary ‘folk tales’ on social media. To complement this, the next 
section explores the ways in which people use social media to create a 
vision of their future lives.
Future life on social media
In GoodPath there is a popular saying that helps people to deal with the 
tough life they lead at present: ‘bitterness first and sweetness will follow’ 
(xian ku hou tian). It is a belief that one day, when enough money is saved 
and everybody has settled down, one will finally lead a happy, urban- 
style life without any worries. Before that, however, one has to endure 
bitterness (ku) in life. Such a philosophy of life was mentioned again 
and again by many migrants, ranging in age from their early twenties 
to their late fifties, although none of them managed to say when exactly 
the ‘sweetness’ (tian) would arrive  –  ‘one day’, as people always said 
(Fig. 6.5). The belief that things will be better ‘one day’ gives meaning 
for the current struggle to keep going, but what exactly does the future 
look like in peoples’ minds?
As we have seen both in folk religion and on social media, making 
something visual, or sometimes even making it immaterial,47 is a form of 
efficacy in and of itself. Transitions between the tangible, physical world 
and the intangible world of the deities help people to reflect upon the 
relationship between the two, which may be what makes these mani-
festations efficacious. So if you can no longer actually visit the temple in 
your place of origin, you can equally well make a visual trip online with-
out losing the efficacy. Moreover, such visibility on social media not only 
ensures the efficacy of deities; it also enables people to conceive a new 
understanding of themselves, and of what they want to be in the future.
Talking of visibility on social media, Liping, a 22- year- old factory 
worker, has her own understanding of the word. She once complained 
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that I  was always ‘invisible’ (in terms of my QQ status) online, which 
is true. The ‘invisible’ status means that people cannot tell whether the 
user is online or not. There are six online statuses on QQ: ‘I am online’; 
‘Q me’ (chat with me); ‘Away’; ‘Busy’; ‘Do not disturb’; and ‘Invisible’. 
However, there are other ‘hidden’ options in the advanced setting. Right 
click any QQ contact’s avatar, in the drop down box, and you will see a 
few more options, including one meaning ‘visible to him/ her in invisible 
status’ ( yin shen dui qi ke jian). This enables the selected contact always 
to ‘see’ you, even when you are ‘invisible’ to others. For Liping, such a 
tailored ‘visibility’ has some significance in a relationship –  ‘It is like I am 
always there waiting for you, you know, very close and exclusive,’ Liping 
explained.
‘To see’ is different from ‘to look’: the latter happens all the time in 
social life, but does not necessarily lead to the former. A factory man-
ager once remarked that the logic of the assembly line lies in perceiving 
humankind to be part of the machine. When asked whether he knew 
Fig. 6.5 ‘Eating some bitterness of life for me is nothing.’ So says  
Lao Qin, a middle- aged factory worker who loves smoking his pipe  
and works hard to support his family. (Traditional Chinese painting  
34 × 34 cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang)
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any of the factory workers personally, given that he spends most of his 
time in factory workshops, the answer was ‘no, it’s not necessary’. In 
vast factory workshops, monotony on a daily basis is the grand narra-
tive, eclipsing individuality. Most of the time migrant factory workers 
are ‘invisible’ as people. In the age when the availability of information 
has exploded, the scarcity of attention is always palpable to everybody; 
it has indeed been argued that attention has become the real ‘currency’ 
of business for an individual.48 Migrant workers such as Liping are in 
general all deep in ‘attention deficit’; they are always the attention giv-
ers, but rarely become attention gainers. In this sense social media is the 
only place where these workers can enhance their social visibility and 
see themselves as they want to be perceived.
JiaDa is a 23- year- old forklift driver in a factory. He sees himself as 
a ‘wolf’ – an animal that is always ‘cool, alone and very masculine’ – and 
he named his QQ group in similar vein as ‘the youth who are like wolves 
and tigers’ (ru lang si hu de qing nian). This QQ group includes JiaDa’s 
168 online friends, all of whom are also rural migrants. The group’s 
profile includes ‘group album’ (qun xiangce), and ‘group notification’ 
(qun gonggao). The group notification reads: ‘I hope everybody may be 
a person with suzhi.’ Suzhi means ‘human quality’ and is a concept that 
has been constantly discussed in many academic studies of Chinese soci-
ety, since the word is associated with the Chinese urban– rural divide.49 
People living in cities use expressions such as ‘low suzhi’ or ‘without 
suzhi’ to refer to rural people whom they regard as intrinsically inferior. 
The clear message is that within social media people can effectively cre-
ate a world of self- respect that accords with the dominant ideals of mod-
ern China. Photographs displayed in the group album were collected 
from online, the most important criteria are again ‘being cool’ and 
‘being modern’ according to JiaDa (Fig.  6.6). Images such as ‘modern 
city landscape’, ‘consumer culture’ (luxury cars and other goods), ‘sex’, 
smoking, large sunglasses, denim and some audacious gestures from the 
West such as the ‘f**k’ gesture are regarded as ‘modern’ and ‘cool’.
One day JiaDa came to me and claimed: ‘You know what, our fac-
tory owner’s wife has a similar car (the brown luxury car in the photo) 
parked just outside the factory plant  – isn’t that cool?’ He said this as 
proudly as if he owned the Porsche Panamera himself. In a way JiaDa 
is right: he does own a luxury car somewhere else. YY is another social 
media platform that he uses specifically for playing massive multi-player 
online games. This is where he keeps his luxury car: online, not offline.
On YY, there are not only fast cars, but also ‘noble titles’ which 
bring users privileges. The titles include ‘baron’, ‘earl’, ‘duke’ and ‘king’, 
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all depending on how much you pay. For example, the lowest ‘baron’ 
costs 250 RMB (US $42) per month, while to be able to use the title ‘king’ 
online the user has to pay 120,000 RMB (US $20,000) per month. As 
shown on the screenshot (Fig. 6.7), section 1 is the photograph of the 
live show broadcaster of this channel; section 2 is a list of top monthly 
contributors (people are encouraged to buy gifts for the broadcaster); 
section 5 is a list of gifts one can purchase; section 6 is a virtual avenue 
for nobles who come in their luxury cars (a baron’s car is a Smart car, 
and a king’s is a Rolls- Royce Phantom). Here on section 6 the news feed 
reads:  ‘Let’s welcome Viscount so and so to this show in his Mercedes 
Benz SLR!’
JiaDa bought himself a ‘baron’ title that cost him 250RMB per 
month  – almost one- tenth of his monthly salary and more than the 
monthly rent of his small room. ‘Well, maybe I can never afford a real 
Fig. 6.6 Images about modern life shared on rural migrants’ 
social media
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car, but here I can,’ he said half- jokingly. Now it’s easy to think how silly 
it is to spend the equivalent of a month’s rent on buying a useless vir-
tual car just to feel good. However, when this is compared to people who 
splash out millions and millions on real luxury cars or yachts, and con-
sider what that amount of money could do in building rows of dwellings 
for homeless refugees, what JiaDa did to make himself ‘feel good’50 actu-
ally seems rather less ridiculous.
Like JiaDa, many factory workers talked of the luxury cars 
belonging to factory owners with a trace of pride. People took photo-
graphs of the cars, or even photographs of themselves with the cars. 
The fact that they could not afford such a fast car did not seem to 
bother people, as far as one can tell. On the contrary: they seemed to 
celebrate the moments in their offline lives when they encounter the 
glamorous things that they have been collecting online. Ownership of 
images of such luxury cars, either by collecting photographs of cars 
or purchasing virtual cars online, or even just taking photographs of 
a car, is viewed as a way of engaging with the modern world that they 
hope one day to inhabit.
Through JiaDa’s wide online collection of luxury cars, alluring 
ladies and all the other ‘cool’ and ‘modern’ things, we also come to 
acknowledge the consumer culture among low  income rural migrants. 
In such ‘floating’ lives, an imaginary existence built around an urban, 
luxurious lifestyle can provide an alternative ‘reality’.51 One can sense 
rural migrants’ acute desire for these luxury goods, especially for the 
foreign ones. However, the use of photography to create a new reality 
Fig. 6.7 The screenshot of YY
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is not unique to the digital age. The definition of a fancy car may have 
changed, but the technique of archiving a ‘modern’ self remains the 
same. A  century ago people went to a photographer’s studio to have 
a portrait photograph taken with a foreign backdrop. An elabo-
rate ‘paper’ car, for example, might be integrated as a prop in such a 
portrait.52
In addition, slide shows were very popular among Chinese peas-
ants in the 1860s. People from the countryside, who had never had the 
opportunity to travel, learned about foreign places through such slide 
shows, discovering the world that existed beyond their villages.53 The 
images people view on smartphone screens must be different from those 
that their relatives saw through a little hole of a peepshow half a century 
ago. However, it seems that the motivations behind the two viewings are 
in fact very similar.
Today a photography studio is located at the digital centre in 
GoodPath. All the young women in the town seem to dream of taking 
a nice set of ‘art photos’ (yishu zhao). Lily, a 19- year- old factory worker 
from a Chinese inland village, was delighted when the chance arose to 
create her own art photos: 
I always wanted to, but I didn’t save up enough money for that. Last 
week they launched a sale, and with 50 Likes on WeChat54 I was 
able to have a basic set of art photos for half the price.
It took the stylist two and half hours to make up Lily’s face. Large amounts 
of foundation were applied to her skin and ‘fake eyelashes’ were glued to 
her eyelids, while meticulous hairstyling sculpted her straight hair into 
perfectly shaped curls. Finally, when all was complete, Lily was helped 
into an evening dress with padding at the breast and folds that exagger-
ated her hips. In just a few hours the stylist had transformed a factory 
girl into a generic look- alike film star, no longer recognisable to her par-
ents or closest friends (Fig. 6.8). She explained why: 
I wanted to record my youth, the most beautiful phase in my whole 
life. One day I will get married, and no longer be young.
Yet such a perspective made her decision of taking ‘art photos’ seem even 
more bizarre. Why would she consider such a ‘once- in- a- life- time’ look 
to be the ‘record of her youth’? According to the stylist all the young 
women attending the studio are satisfied by the evening dress on offer; 
none of them had ever worn one before. As the judge of fashion and 
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beauty, his job seemed more like a punching machine in a factory, pro-
ducing identical beauties from factory workers: 
My job is to make them fashionable and beautiful, no matter how 
plain they may be; after the styling and Photoshop everybody looks 
equally fashionable and beautiful. They don’t need to have a clue 
as I know how to deal with everything.
In this sense, what Lily wanted is not to record her youth, but to have a 
beautiful youth created in the studio and preserved in an image. Such 
youth should be as beautiful as the photographs she collected on QQ 
(Fig. 6.9).
Lily updated her Qzone at least once a day. It is neat and clean, 
using the colours of light blue and white. Online Lily is surrounded by a 
group of admirers, and talks as if she was a princess who is waiting for 
true love. In GoodPath she is not alone at all; she lives with her parents, 
Fig. 6.8 An ‘art photo’ of Lily
THE WIDER WORLD :  BE YOND SOC IAL REL AT IONSH IPS 179
younger brother and sister, while almost 40 other members of her large 
family live nearby. Lily’s parents work in the same factory. The five mem-
bers of her family inhabit two small rooms and share a toilet with two 
other rural migrant families. In summer the family wash themselves in 
the shared bathroom, which is without a shower: a plastic bucket and a 
plastic washbasin serve as a shower set. There is used toilet paper and 
dirty water on the floor, and the wall is stained. However, the toilet at 
home is still much better than the one at the factory plant, which people 
usually forget to flush after using it, attracting swarms of flies. In win-
ter, when temperatures fall below 0°C (32°F) roughly once a week, the 
family go to a public bath to shower because there is no heating or hot 
water at home.
At home Lily shares the bed with her 11- year- old sister in the 
upstairs room, also used as a storage room of the small grocery down-
stairs run by the landlord (Fig.  6.10). In summer, during the day, the 
indoor temperature can exceed 38°C (100°F) and there is no air condi-
tioning. One day after work Lily was ‘working with’ her smartphone, a 
Fig. 6.9 Princess images on Lily’s social media profile. 
The text with the photos reads: ‘In my life I have always dreamt about 
my true love; he will treat me very well, protect me from all the  
uncertainties, instability, sadness and loneliness. However, I have 
always known that such a person will never turn up.’
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Huawei smartphone, which she had bought for 1,850 RMB (US $308). 
She was captivated by the ‘online world’, as if she had completely for-
gotten where she was. After a while she looked up to see me. I  was 
still sitting there, sweating like a pig. ‘Life outside the mobile phone is 
unbearable, huh?’ she smiled.
Lily’s remark leads to the question ‘where do people live?’. In 
GoodPath there are very many young factory workers such as Lily, 
who actually live simultaneously offline and online. We need to under-
stand where people live, without assuming that the offline is necessar-
ily more real or more material. In research on Javanese modernisation 
in Kampung, a dreadful residential town, the anthropologist James 
L.  Peacock argued that the local theatre show, Ludruk, played an 
important role in the daily lives of working- class people there.55 One 
Ludruk story is that of a young woman from a humble background who 
managed to gain higher social status through marriage and personal 
development, thereby becoming able to enjoy modern city life. Peacock 
argued that the reason for the show’s huge popularity was that it enabled 
the working- class audience to participate in a purified and modern life. 
He observed that the show ‘provides its participants with a series of sym-
bolic actions which lead them to repudiate elements of Kampung soci-
ety and vicariously move out of that environment into extra- Kampung 
realms of sexual and social happiness’.56
Fig. 6.10 The room Lily shares with her sister
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There are some striking parallels between Chinese rural migrants’ 
use of social media and Javanese workers’ engagement with Ludruk 
shows. For many rural migrants, what they post on social media reflects 
the far more interesting and modern world in which they want to live in 
the future. In a way, therefore, they already live in a future visualised 
and conceived in advance on social media. We are actually witnessing a 
dual migration: one from villages to factories, and the other from offline 
to online.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to present the typical ways in which Chinese rural 
migrants use social media in their daily lives, encompassing a wide 
variety of relationships in addition to core social ties. The chapter 
started by examining links with traditional spiritual realms, reflected 
in folk beliefs and ancestor worship. All of these existed before social 
media, but are highly significant today: they emerge as structural fac-
tors that deeply influence the use of social media among Chinese rural 
migrants.
Each section of this chapter focused upon a specific instance of 
this transformation in social media use. In the first section the presence 
of folk religion on social media illustrated how and why the efficacy of 
social media postings has become recognised. It showed how such effi-
cacy has been widely accepted by people who view this as an integral 
aspect of the relationship between the secular world and the deities’ 
realm. The point being made is more complex than simply suggesting 
that folk religion is expressed on social media. Such a sense of religious 
efficacy has a profound effect upon what people think a social media 
posting is, and what they believe it might achieve.
The chapter then considered the discrepancy between my own 
expectations of how social media might be used reconnecting with the 
homeland and what the ethnography actually encountered. Such dis-
crepancy provided the basis for explaining a possible shift from offline 
homeland visiting to the creation of online homeland albums, in effect 
relocating the effective homeland for these rural migrants. In this way 
we saw how social media has been used as the agency for people to 
achieve this re- connection with their pasts and the places where they 
came from, but in an entirely different manner to that anticipated.
The third section revealed the way in which posts of folk tale- like 
narratives illustrate a key moment when social media became a centre 
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for a whole set of world views. Attitudes towards marriage, justice and 
education gradually emerged in the context of the current rural- to- 
urban migration. All the stories shared on the social media profiles 
implicitly, and often explicitly, constitute a moral judgement, reflecting 
the views of ordinary people about the dichotomy of right and wrong or 
good and evil within the given context of their ‘floating’ lives. Thus these 
new stories on social media provide moral guidance just as folk tales 
traditionally did, helping people to make sense of, and to think through, 
transformations of ‘the current’.
The final section turned to the role of social media in creating ‘the 
future’, both as an imagined concept and a conceived, visualised place. 
Yet to appreciate this we need to return to the example of folk religion. 
In a way Chinese folk religion can confuse us, as it is highly pragmatic 
and materialistic – quite distinct from a Western perspective of religion 
in a transcendent heavenly sphere contrasting with life in the physi-
cal realm below. However, it is only by understanding such ‘practical 
actions’, through which folk religion is used as a ‘technology’ in every-
day life, that we appreciate the role social media plays in creating an 
imaginary prospect set within everyday life.
Once again, however, social media is the means but not the cause. 
Before social media existed people already lived with an imaginary con-
nection to their ancestors and other deities as well as a vision of an anti-
cipated happy future – both ways of dealing with the trials of everyday 
life. Now, however, thanks to the visualisations of social media, one’s 
future life arrives earlier, on and through social media. Considering 
all these sections together, we can see how social media constitutes an 
integration of one’s remembered past, perceived present and anticipated 
future. As such, life on social media is not separated from ‘real’ life; it is 
rather an essential and integral part of rural migrants’ everyday lives.
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Conclusion: The dual migration
This book started with a series of claims. The first was that, in effect, this 
is a study of two simultaneous migrations, both taking place on a vast 
scale: one from rural to urban, the other from offline to online.1
At first this may appear to be simply a ‘neat’ attention-seeking 
analogy. It might seem glib to try to equate the vast upheaval repre-
sented by a population leaving its ancestral home for the alienating 
environment of a huge factory system to the increasing use of smart-
phones and social media. Now, however, having reached the end of the 
book, it should be clear that this was never intended as a mere analogy. 
It is rather entirely possible that the study of social media has revealed 
a migration as profound and as consequential as the physical movement 
with which it coincided.
The deep rupture offline
The process of the rural- to- urban migration is first of all a deep rupture. 
It began with the fragmentation of the rural collective community and 
then took shape as a turbulent ‘floating life’ leading to severe social 
exclusion. At the start of the book we saw the example of Dong, the 
young factory worker who dropped out of school when he was 16, trying 
to escape the boring and depressing life of a child left behind by his par-
ents to embrace the modern life that he had dreamt of instead. For many 
young Chinese factory workers, unlike their parents, the decision to 
break with that rural life was not determined purely by the pressure of 
poverty. Many were willing and determined to take what they saw as the 
first step towards a better life. However, what they were not prepared 
for was the frustrating gap between the dream of becoming modern and 
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the reality of being denied, excluded and even ignored as  mere cogs in 
massive factory machines.
In GoodPath we have witnessed the estrangement between locals 
and migrants – a situation already evident in the local primary school, 
where children from local and migrant families were strictly segre-
gated in different classes. We have also seen how anxiety about guanxi 
(social relations) has become pervasive, to the extent that it has become 
common practice among rural migrants to check whether one has been 
deleted from others’ WeChat contacts lists. What was happening in 
GoodPath was also taking place in hundreds of other similar ‘transi-
tional towns’ across industrial China, places in which hundreds of mil-
lions of migrant workers were striving for a better life. However, rather 
than being a ‘good path’, the route they followed was a narrow, winding 
and uneven one.
The term migration can refer to a simple process by which people 
start from a fixed location A and end up in a new settled location of B. But 
the migration of Chinese people from villages to factories has always 
led to them been termed a ‘floating’ population since the regulations of 
household registration (hukou) did not really allow them to settle down 
as local residents in urban areas.2 One of the direct consequences of such 
a floating life is passivity.3 Many migrants seem apparently content with 
the status quo and less motivated for change, since efforts to improve 
either living and working conditions or to establish local networking are 
frustrated and begin to feel pointless. Therefore, as noted in Chapter 3, 
the concept of a ‘passing traveller’ (guoke) resonated among migrant 
workers, becoming a popular term on the memes they posted and shared 
on Qzone. The mindset of being a ‘passing traveller’ coats the ‘floating’ 
life with a protective layer consisting of an attitude of pretended indif-
ference. People appear less interested, or even entirely uninterested, in 
their current job, their place of residence and those they meet in their 
daily lives. This was considered further in Chapter  5, which revealed 
how this ‘passing traveller’ mindset also partly explains the extremely 
low political participation rate among rural migrants, both online and 
offline. All in all, the absence of feelings of belonging and the rupture 
experienced within the urban/ industrial space was fully expressed by 
Guo Biao, a factory worker, in Chapter  1:  ‘It [GoodPath] is just where 
I work . . . of course it’s not a home. Home is where you go back once a 
year to celebrate Chinese New Year.’
Even though many migrant workers, like Guo Biao, tended to see their 
home villages as their real ‘home’, this book has revealed how the new real-
ity is not that straightforward. In Chapter 6, Hua, the factory woman in her 
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late thirties whose youth had been spent as a rural migrant, commented 
that ‘homeland is the place you always miss, but will never return to’. Most 
migrant workers who had spent large parts of their lives ‘floating’ from one 
factory town to another experienced at some point a poignant moment of 
recognition: that their ‘floating’ journeys had led them to cross a point- of- 
no- return. As discussed in Chapter 6, one may visit one’s home village once 
a year, but returning to live there is almost impossible. Three decades ago 
Chinese peasants finally gained the freedom to leave their homes.4 Three 
decades later they have realised that, along the way, they have somehow 
lost the ‘freedom’ to go back.
Confronting rural migrants’ sense of alienation from both agri-
cultural and industrial communities, a natural question then takes 
shape: where do (or can) these people really live? No more illuminating 
answer can be given to this question than the emic5 view of Lily, an ordi-
nary young factory worker. I met up with her one summer evening in 
the small, run- down bedroom that she shared with her younger sister. 
It was hot and humid, and Lily’s sigh acknowledged this with a helpless 
smile: ‘Life outside the smartphone is unbearable!’ What she was claim-
ing was that the place she most enjoyed living in, and where she felt 
most alive, was on her Qzone, inside the online world. The online has 
become the real home for most migrant workers who feel they do not 
belong in either villages or factory towns.
Fig. 7.1 A migrant worker uses his mobile phone during lunch break 
on the construction site of a factory. (Traditional Chinese painting  
45 × 68.5 cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang)
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The profound reconstruction online
Lily’s remark leads us to the other side of the story  –  the profound 
reconstruction in forms of individualisation and modernisation now 
taking place alongside this profound break. In fact, thanks to the vast 
empty space left by the rupture caused by migration, the personal 
pursuit of individual value and modernity has gained legitimacy and 
become more radical. Once affordable budget smartphones provided 
the material wherewithal, the perceived gap between aspiration and 
reality pushed young migrants to embrace to their utmost the new pos-
sibilities of social media. In such an environment young people from 
rural backgrounds find their post- school education and coming of age 
on social media. Here they discover and explore not only friendship, 
but also a new understanding and practice of various social relation-
ships, including encounters with strangers online. They gain aware-
ness of privacy, and often their first living experience of it, on social 
media, and all their diverse personal aspirations about a modern life 
and a modern identity find their fullest expression on social media 
rather than in offline life.
For anthropologists it is important to set this discussion alongside 
the kinds of material presented in the first half of Chapter 6. Chinese folk 
religion, popular among rural migrants, is very different from religions 
such as Christianity and other systems of belief. It follows a set of prag-
matic principles, related not to a transcendent world, but rather what 
might be called ‘magical practices’, intended to gain luck and prevent 
misfortune. Understanding the magical quality of those religious beliefs 
helps us to appreciate that social media may itself be invested with ‘mag-
ical’ properties. Even as erecting a physical temple constructs a partic-
ular kind of sacred place, so does creating a particular online space in 
which we can now circulate images of deities and other ideal images.
Such an awareness led on to the subsequent developments 
explored in Chapter  6. These revealed the ways in which people use 
social media to align themselves with what they perceive as the new 
styles of ‘cool’ and ‘modern’ – for example by purchasing a virtual fast 
car or noble title. As far as social media users are concerned, migrating 
to online has brought them closer to the cool, stylish world of modern 
China with its images of wealth and successful pop stars to whom they 
want to get closer. Knowing how folk religion works among migrant 
workers, we should at least not dismiss the real power of such ‘magic’ 
on social media. In Chapter 4 the widely held philosophy of ‘bitterness 
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first and sweetness will follow’ (xian ku hou tian) further reflected the 
fact that the ‘floating’ life itself is future- oriented – namely the imagina-
tion of a guaranteed, sweet future that helps people to survive today’s 
bitterness and stress. In other words, millions of Chinese rural migrants 
are always living in an anticipated future, rather than in the problem-
atic present. In this sense the magic they experience on social media 
is no more ‘virtual’ than the role of magic in their pre- digital lives. It 
works, and is perceived as an intrinsic part of actual life. Real life is not 
where rural migrants live offline, which is constantly insecure and in 
flux. Instead they rely upon their ability to engage in the imaginative 
construction online of what they might one day become. That is where 
millions of people now live.
At this point the focus moves to Chapter 4, which provides the core 
evidence of what it is now like to live inside social media. The chapter 
describes a key expression for this experience:  ‘hot and noisy’ (renao), 
which is exactly what people want this space to be like. It is not just a 
person who has to spend boring and exhausting hours in a factory who 
wants to spend their leisure time in this online world. Such space also 
attracts those who are shy or lonely; a person who constantly feels the 
pressure of living up to the social standards of being a good man or a 
good woman; a person who no longer feels connected to the village from 
which he or she once came; a person who does not bother with offline 
friendships in this factory town, since tomorrow he or she may be living 
elsewhere. All of these people turn to the online for their sociality or 
self- expression. Here they seek the familiar ‘hot and noisy’ experience 
that so many now miss in offline settings.
The claims made concerning the reality of dual migration are thus 
based on evidence presented over several chapters of this book. We can 
thus say that the images discussed both in Chapter 3 and at the end of 
Chapter 6 are not just fantasy. They are in effect solid visual technolo-
gies that give people a better sense of where they live and where they 
belong.
Most studies of social media in China have focused on the use of 
social media among urban populations, who have easy access to a whole 
range of digital technologies and are supposedly social media savvy. 
This book argues that it may actually be Chinese rural migrants  – a 
relatively digital have- less population, still in the process of becoming 
‘modern’  – who provide a more appropriate subject for such research. 
This is because China’s rural migrants may in certain respects represent 
a more radical population, notably in how they fully embrace the pos-
sibilities that online can offer. In the global project of which this study 
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is one part,6 it has been found that the online world of people in vari-
ous countries (for instance the English,7 Italian,8 Indian9 or traditional 
Chinese10) corresponds more closely to their offline world. Yet in the 
case of Chinese rural migrants we have encountered an unprecedented 
rupture, severing the constraints of traditional social expectations 
(‘what they should be’) and shifting the focus on to potential and aspi-
ration (‘what they could be’), given expression through the advent of 
social media. In this sense Chinese rural migrants epitomise a genuine 
‘social media population’ that provides an unusually clear guide to the 
new possibilities represented by social media.
We need to put this discovery in perspective. The frustrations of 
their offline lives are certainly important, but poverty is not the only rea-
son why Chinese factory workers embrace social media to this extent. 
After all, many people who do not live in conditions of poverty are also 
migrating part of their lives to online. Most people in most places are 
experiencing some variant of this offline to online migration, though 
generally less extreme in form and more integrated into their offline 
lives. Moreover, social media was not the first  – and is not the only  – 
‘place’ where ‘magic’ takes place. Films such as Muriel’s Wedding which 
predate the digital era portray the imagining and pursuit of a glam-
orous wedding as more important than the wedding itself – a fantasy 
that dominates the daily life of a middle- class Australian girl. An even 
greater claim could be made about the precedent represented by reli-
gion. For much of human history, and for most societies, religion has 
been a major, if not the single most important, component of many peo-
ples’ lives. Both our comparative book and the other volumes that make 
up this series consistently refuse to regard online life as something vir-
tual, inextricably opposed to another world of ‘real’ life.
What this book has in common with other comparative studies, 
therefore, is an insistence upon the integration of online life as a sub-
stantive part of peoples’ real lives. However, it is still possible to argue 
that the situation of these Chinese factory workers is exceptional, as 
the consequences of such an immersion in online life are both more 
radical and profound. The ruptures experienced by migrants more gen-
erally in their lives have opened them up more fully to the possibilities 
of this new online life. This explains the basic narrative of this vol-
ume. In China a vast population has embarked upon an offline journey 
from their villages to factories. Yet it is the parallel migration online 
that has so far allowed them to journey beyond the factory, to engage 
with an experience of the modern life that inspired this journey in the 
first place.
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cycle being related to an animal sign.
26 Harrell, S. 1987. ‘The concept of fate in Chinese folk ideology.’ Modern China, 13 (1): Part I: 
90– 109, esp. 100.
27 This echoes with another anthropological observation about the practice of folk religion in 
Taiwan:  ‘what matters to the practical believers is not whether the offerings they put out 
are actually eaten in some spiritual way by hungry ghosts, but whether by putting out such 
offerings they can cure their children’s lingering fever. More people are willing to profess 
belief in the efficacy of such offerings than will state that they believe ghosts exist’. See 
Harrell, S. 1977. ‘Modes of belief in Chinese folk religion.’ Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion. 16 (1): 55– 65.
28 See Holzman, D. 1998. ‘The place of filial piety in ancient China.’ Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 118 (2): 185– 99.
29 Hock, Y. 1997. ‘Chinese family religion and world religion.’ Singapore Bahá’í Studies Review 
2: 91– 119.
30 See Holzman, D. 1998. ‘The place of filial piety in ancient China.’ Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 118 (2): 185– 99.
31 See Watson, R. 1988. ‘Remembering the dead: Graves and politics in southeastern China.’ 
Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China 205: 140– 3. Cohen, M. 1990. ‘Lineage orga-
nization in north China.’ The Journal of Asian Studies 49 (3): 509– 34.
32 The same mindset was also recorded in Zheng, T. 2009. Red Lights: The lives of sex workers in 
postsocialist China. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
33 Ang, I. 1993. ‘To be or not to be Chinese: Diaspora, culture and postmodern ethnicity.’ Asian 
Journal of Social Science 21 (1): 1– 17
34 See Safran, W.  1991. ‘Diasporas in modern societies:  Myths of homeland and return.’ 
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1 (1): 83– 99.
35 Ang, I. 1993. ‘To be or not to be Chinese: Diaspora, culture and postmodern ethnicity.’ Asian 
Journal of Social Science 21 (1): 1– 17.
36 See Chapter 2.
37 Hung, Chang- tai. 1985. Going to the People: Chinese intellectuals and folk literature, 1918– 
1937. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
38 Data collected from 377 social media profiles of rural migrants in GoodPath.
39 The researcher consulted two journalists and a university lecturer on literature upon 
the authorship of the two stories during her one- month period of research in Shanghai, 
July 2013.
40 Such self- deprecation among the urban population has become an internet phenomenon in 
China. People intentionally depict themselves as diaosi (‘losers’) in order to vent frustration 
about society and mock various severe social problems in contemporary China, including 
high fees for education, the high price of housing, environmental pollution etc. It’s worth 
noting that most people who described themselves as ‘losers’ online actually possess a 
decent education and are university students or white- collar workers. It is very rare to see 
rural migrants describe themselves as ‘losers’ online, since they have already suffered a lot 
from being socially stigmatised in this vein. For a detailed analysis of diaosi internet culture 
see Yang, P.  et  al. 2015. ‘Diaosi as infrapolitics:  Scatological tropes, identity- making and 
cultural intimacy.’ Media, Culture and Society. 37 (2): 197– 214.
41 In terms of education people called it Du chu lai (literally meaning ‘study it “out”’). This 
refers to the situation in which rural people become urban residents through receiving 
higher education in the city, followed by getting white- collar work or a non- manual job in 
the city.
42 The acceptance rate of colleges is now higher than 70 per cent.
43 Bascom, W.  R. 1954. ‘Four functions of folklore.’ The Journal of American Folklore  
67 (266): 333– 49.
44 See Hung, C. 1985. Going to the People: Chinese intellectuals and folk literature, 1918– 1937. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
45 McAdams, D.P.  1993. The Stories We Live by:  Personal myths and the making of the self. 
New York, London: The Guilford Press. 12.
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46 Compare Peacock, J.L. 1968. Rites of Modernization: Symbolic and social aspects of 
Indonesian proletarian drama. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
47 For instance burning funeral banknotes.
48 See Davenport, T.  and Beck, J.  2001. The Attention Economy:  Understanding the new cur-
rency of business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
49 See a detailed discussion of Suzhi at Murphy, R.  2004. ‘Turning peasants into modern 
Chinese citizens: “Population quality” discourse, demographic transition and primary edu-
cation.’ The China Quarterly 177: 1– 20.
50 In the inspiring study of individualisation of rural youth in contemporary China, anthropol-
ogist Y. Yan observed the phenomenon in which the previous idea of ‘being a good person’, 
with the social expectation of self- sacrifice in a collective society, has gradually given way 
to an individual pursuit of ‘feeling good’ with an emphasis on self- development. See Yan, 
Y. 2009 The Individualization of Chinese Society. Vol. 77. Oxford: Berg.
51 See Ngai, P. 2003. ‘Subsumption or consumption? The phantom of consumer revolution in 
“globalizing” China.’ Cultural Anthropology 18 (4): 469– 92.
52 Dikotter, F. 2007. Things Modern. Material culture and everyday life in China. New York: Hurst.
53 Ibid.
54 See the explanation of ‘collection likes’ on WeChat in Chapter 2.
55 Peacock, J.L. 1968.
56 Ibid.
Chapter 7
1 Demarcation of online or offline follows a simple rule:  online refers to using the inter-
net or other digital mobile platforms, while offline refers to activities without internet 
involvement.
2 See Goodkind, D. and West, L.A. 2002. ‘China’s floating population: Definition, data and 
recent findings.’ Urban Studies 39 (12): 2237– 50.
3 This is an ironic passivity, though, as it was a very definite decision for action that led rural 
migrants into the situation.
4 Three decades ago rural- to- urban migration was illegal under the strict household registra-
tion regulation (hukou).
5 ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ refer to twin research approaches in anthropology: put simply, ‘emic’ refers 
to subjective and insider accounts, while ‘etic’ refers to objective and outsider accounts.
6 http:// // www.ucl.ac.uk/ why- we- post
7 See Miller, D. 2016. Social Media in England. London: UCL Press.
8 See Nicolescu, R. 2016. Social Media in Southeast Italy. London: UCL Press.
9 See Venkatraman, S. 2016. Social Media in South India. London: UCL Press.
10 See McDonald, T. 2016. Social Media in Rural China. London: UCL Press.
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Described as the biggest migration in human history, 
an estimated 250 million Chinese people have left their 
villages in recent decades to live and work in urban areas. 
Xinyuan Wang spent 15 months living among a community 
of these migrants in a small factory town in southeast 
China to track their use of social media. It was here she 
witnessed a second migration taking place: a movement 
from offline to online. As Wang argues, this is not simply 
a convenient analogy but represents the convergence of 
two phenomena as profound and consequential as each 
other, where the online world now provides a home for the 
migrant workers who feel otherwise ‘homeless’.
Wang’s fascinating study explores the full range of 
preconceptions commonly held about Chinese people – 
their relationship with education, with family, with politics, 
with ‘home’ – and argues why, for this vast population, 
it is time to reassess what we think we know about 
contemporary China and the evolving role of social media.
X inyuan Wang  is a PhD candidate at the Department 
of Anthropology at UCL. She obtained her MSc from 
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Chinese traditional painting and calligraphy. She translated 
(Horst and Miller Eds.) Digital Anthropology into Chinese 
and contributed a piece on Digital Anthropology in China.
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